Jose Lidio Cabral-Cabral v. ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without**
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
IH/Research
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSE LIDIO CABRAL-CABRAL,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 05-75182
Agency No. A090-176-653
MEMORANDUM *
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 17, 2009**
Before: ALARCÓN, TROTT, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
Jose Lidio Cabral-Cabral, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order summarily affirming an
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for a § 212(h) waiver
FILED
DEC 07 2009
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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IH/Research 05-75182 2
of inadmissability. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review
de novo claims of due process violations in immigration proceedings, Sanchez-
Cruz v. INS, 255 F.3d 775, 779 (9th Cir. 2001), and we deny in part and dismiss in
part the petition for review.
Cabral-Cabral’s contention concerning the retroactive application of 8
C.F.R. § 212.7(d) is foreclosed by Mejia v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 991, 997-99 (9th
Cir. 2007). Cabral-Cabral’s contention that his conviction under California Penal
Code §288(a) is not a crime of violence is also foreclosed. Mejia, 499 F.3d at 999.
We lack jurisdiction to review the IJ’s discretionary denial of Cabral-
Cabral’s application for a waiver of inadmissibility under § 212(h) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Mejia, 499 F.3d
at 999. Cabral-Cabral’s contention that the IJ violated his due process rights by
disregarding his evidence of hardship to his wife and misapplying the law to the
facts of his case is not supported by the record and does not amount to a colorable
due process claim. See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir.
2005).
Cabral-Cabral’s due process rights were not violated by the admission of his
probation officer’s report because the report was probative and its admission was
not fundamentally unfair. See Espinoza v. INS, 45 F.3d 308, 310-11 (9th Cir.

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IH/Research 05-75182 3
1995) (noting that “[t]he sole test for admission of evidence [in a deportation
proceeding] is whether the evidence is probative and its admission is
fundamentally fair”); Trias-Hernandez v. INS, 528 F.2d 366, 369 (9th Cir. 1975)
(“Hearsay is admissible in administrative proceedings, which need not strictly
follow conventional evidence rules.”).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

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