Lawrence E. Lupien v. Harold W. Clarke

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
___________
No. 03-3948
___________
Joyce McVay, as Administrator *
of the Estate of Glenn McVay, *
Deceased, *
*
Plaintiff - Appellant, *
*
v. *
*
Sisters of Mercy Health System, *
St. Louis; St. Joseph's Mercy Health * Appeal from the United States
Center, * District Court for the Western
* District of Arkansas.
Defendants, *
*
Frank Sears, in his individual and *
official capacity as a police officer *
for the City of Hot Springs, Arkansas; *
City of Hot Springs, Arkansas, *
*
Defendants - Appellees, *
*
Bethany McGraham, M.D.; Dana *
Ramsey, R.N., *
*
Defendants. *
___________
Submitted: September 17, 2004
Filed: March 4, 2005
___________

-- 1 of 8 --

1The Honorable Jimm Larry Hendren, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Arkansas.
-2-
Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BEAM, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
___________
BEAM, Circuit Judge.
Joyce McVay, in her capacity as administrator of the estate of her deceased son
Glen McVay, appeals the district court's 1 grant of summary judgment to Hot Springs,
Arkansas, police officer Frank Sears and the City of Hot Springs on the 42 U.S.C. §
1983 claim she asserted against them. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
We state the following relevant facts in the light most favorable to McVay.
See, e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, 125 S. Ct. 596, 597 n.2 ("Because this case arises in
the posture of a motion for summary judgment, we are required to view all facts and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party . . . ."). Frank Sears
is an officer with the Hot Springs, Arkansas, police department. On August 25, 2001,
Sears worked as a security guard for St. Joseph's Mercy Health Center in Hot Springs.
He wore a Hot Springs police uniform, a gun, a badge, and handcuffs. That morning,
Glen McVay was brought to the hospital's emergency room by ambulance with
symptoms consistent with alcohol withdrawal, including disorientation and lack of
mental control. At around 11:00 a.m., Nurse Dana Ramsey requested that Sears find
McVay who had wandered from his hospital room. When Sears found him, McVay
had pulled out his intravenous tube and appeared to be talking to imaginary people.
Sears thought McVay was perhaps under the influence of an unknown substance, told
him he was under arrest, and began to escort him back to his room.

-- 2 of 8 --

-3-
When the two reached McVay's room, McVay refused to enter, and instead
darted toward the exit doors leading to the ambulance bay. Sears gave chase. The
exit consists of two sets of double-doors made of glass and steel. The first set
automatically opened when McVay approached. Sears knew, however, that the
second set of doors was locked and that they were not going to open for McVay.
Sears reached McVay between the two sets of doors, grabbed him, and the two fell
to the floor. McVay hit his head, cutting his left eyebrow. Sears placed McVay
under arrest for failure to comply with a lawful order and for public intoxication.
McVay was returned to his room where Sears monitored him as McVay continued to
hallucinate. McVay died eight days later, on September 2, 2001, of hypoxic
encephalopathy caused by an acute subdural hematoma from blunt-force head trauma.
McVay's mother, Joyce, in her capacity as administrator of the estate of her
son, brought suit against Sears and the City of Hot Springs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
and also sued the Sisters of Mercy Health System, St. Louis; St. Joseph's Mercy
Health Center; Dr. Bethany McGraham; and Dana Ramsey on Arkansas state medical
negligence claims. Joyce settled her medical negligence claims, but proceeded with
the section 1983 action against Sears and the City. Both defendants moved for
summary judgment, which was granted by the district court. The district court found
that Joyce had failed to present a prima facie case of a constitutional violation that
resulted from a municipal custom or policy on the part of the City. It further found
that Sears was entitled to qualified immunity because his conduct did "'not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.'" McVay v. Sisters of Mercy Health Sys. St. Louis, No. 02-6160
(W.D. Ark. Oct. 31, 2003) (order granting summary judgment) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). McVay appeals the district court's order.

-- 3 of 8 --

-4-
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, "applying the same
standards as did the district court and affirming only when no genuine issue of
material fact remains and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Cravens v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 214 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 2000) (citation
omitted).
B. Qualified Immunity
The district court granted summary judgment to Sears on McVay's section 1983
claim based on qualified immunity. Section 1983 provides for a civil action against
any person "who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability where
"their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982). As such, it is "'an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other
burdens of litigation.'" Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (quoting Mitchell
v. Forsysth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). It is a doctrine that strikes a balance between
the "vindication of constitutional guarantees," as afforded by section 1983, and
effective public service, by reducing "the risk that fear of personal monetary liability
and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit [public] officials in the discharge of their
duties." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).

-- 4 of 8 --

2Indeed, given the district court's brief order in this case, we are unable to
determine exactly the basis for the grant of qualified immunity. Our review is de
novo and thus not affected by the court's brevity, but district courts are reminded that
Saucier provides the sequential framework that should be applied in analyzing claims
of qualified immunity.
-5-
In Saucier, the Supreme Court made clear the framework a court must follow
in a qualified immunity inquiry.2 The threshold question asks: "Taken in the light
most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's
conduct violated a constitutional right?" Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If those facts,
once established, would not amount to a constitutional violation, the inquiry ends.
"On the other hand, if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the
parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly
established." Id. That inquiry "must be undertaken in light of the specific context of
the case," id., so that "the rule of qualified immunity" does not become "a rule of
virtually unqualified liability simply by [plaintiffs] alleging violation of extremely
abstract rights." Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639. "The relevant, dispositive inquiry in
determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted."
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. "[T]he reasonableness of the official's conduct under the
circumstances is a question of law." Tlamka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628, 632 (8th Cir.
2001).
Here, we need not inquire beyond the first step of the Saucier analysis. We
hold, taking the facts alleged in the light most favorable to McVay, that there was no
constitutional violation.
McVay argues Sears violated her son's Fourth Amendment right to be free from
an unreasonable seizure by employing excessive force in stopping him from exiting
the hospital. A seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes occurs when a government
actor "'by means of physical force or show of authority, . . . in some way restrain[s]

-- 5 of 8 --

-6-
the liberty of a citizen.'" Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (quoting Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)) (first alteration in original). It is clear on the
facts of this case that Sears seized McVay by restraining his liberty by physical force.
Claims of excessive use of force by law enforcement in the course of seizing
a person are to be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard.
Id. at 394. An officer's "underlying intent or motivation" in carrying out the seizure
is irrelevant. Id. at 397. In determining whether the amount of force used is
reasonable, courts must balance "the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental
interests at stake." Id. at 396 (quotation omitted). This analysis requires "careful
attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity
of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of
the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to
evade arrest by flight." Id. "The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the
20/20 vision of hindsight." Id. Finally, judges must allow for the fact that police
officers often make split-second decisions about the amount of force necessary in
tense, uncertain, and rapidly changing circumstances. Id. at 396-97.
McVay argues that Sears intentionally forced McVay to the floor in a "tackle."
We give the injured party the benefit of the doubt, asking, "[t]aken in the light most
favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's
conduct violated a constitutional right?" Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
Given the circumstances in this case, including the fact that McVay was
disoriented and exhibiting signs of lacking mental control, that he was barreling
toward glass doors that Sears knew would not open, and the rapid pace of events as
Sears raced to reach McVay before McVay reached the locked doors, even if Sears
forced McVay to the floor in a "tackle," doing so was not an excessive use of force.

-- 6 of 8 --

-7-
It is clear that McVay posed a threat at least to himself. Given McVay's impaired
state, had McVay reached the second set of doors, he would have crashed into the
glass, potentially injuring himself severely. A reasonable officer on the scene would
have recognized the danger posed to McVay and taken whatever action he could to
help him avoid it. As tragic as McVay's death is, it is only a 20/20 hindsight analysis
which Graham counsels against that leads to the conclusion that the use of force led
to the fall, the fall led to the head trauma, and the head trauma led to McVay's death,
and therefore the force used by Sears was excessive. "Not every push or shove, even
if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates the
Fourth Amendment." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citation omitted). The result in this
case, McVay's tragic death, cannot transform the actions Sears took under the
circumstances into an actionable claim under section 1983.
Because we find that the facts alleged, viewed in the light most favorable to
McVay, do not establish a constitutional violation, we need not proceed with the
remainder of the qualified immunity analysis. The district court's grant of summary
judgment to Sears was proper.
C. The Prima Facie Case
McVay also sued the City of Hot Springs under section 1983, claiming that
Sears was acting pursuant to a municipal custom or policy that resulted in the
constitutional violation. "[T]he touchstone of the § 1983 action against a government
body is an allegation that official policy is responsible for a deprivation of rights
protected by the Constitution . . . . " Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
690 (1978). Since we have found that Sears' actions were not unconstitutional,
McVay cannot make a prima facie case against the City under section 1983. Thus,
the district court's grant of summary judgment to the City was proper.

-- 7 of 8 --

-8-
III. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
______________________________

-- 8 of 8 --