Daniel Langreder v. Freeman Expositions, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 8, 2017 *
Decided March 9, 2017
Before
WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
No. 16‐1749
DANIEL LANGREDER,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
FREEMAN EXPOSITIONS, INC.,
Defendant‐Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 13 C 371
John Z. Lee,
Judge.
O R D E R
Daniel Langreder, a 62‐year‐old carpenter, contends in this suit that Freeman
Expositions, a design and construction company that constructs and dismantles trade
show exhibits, discriminated and retaliated against him by reducing the number of
hours he offered to work under his union contract, in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. The district court granted
summary judgment for Freeman on all claims, concluding that Langreder failed to
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. See FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 16‐1749 Page 2
produce evidence showing that younger employees were treated differently from older
employees or that Freeman’s explanation for his reduction in hours was pretextual.
Langreder’s retaliation claim also failed, the district court determined, because his
protected activity postdated the reduction of his hours. We affirm.
Langreder, a member of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters, was
contractually required to work at least 250 hours each quarter (or 1000 hours a year) to
maintain health benefits through the union. He consistently reached this threshold by
working jobs in Chicago for Freeman. When his hours with Freeman began declining
significantly in 2009, he decided to retire in 2011 to preserve his union’s retirement
benefits.
In February 2011, shortly before retiring, Langreder had a contentious
conversation with his union foreman. Langreder accused the foreman of limiting his
hours, and at one point he told the foreman to “take your skirt off and be a man.” The
foreman responded by cursing Langreder. When Langreder refused to leave the
Chicago job site, the foreman said that he would knock Langreder’s teeth out. After this
altercation, Freeman placed Langreder on a do‐not‐call list, meaning that he would not
be called for union jobs in Chicago. Langreder discussed the incident with a human
resources representative from Freeman and ultimately agreed to drop matters if he
were to receive at least 250 hours per quarter and not have to work at Chicago‐based
sites. Langreder worked for Freeman twice more, in 2011 and 2012, in Houston.
Langreder then sued Freeman, alleging that Freeman discriminated and
retaliated against him by reducing his hours beginning in 2009. Freeman moved for
summary judgment, which Langreder opposed, but Freeman neglected to include a
required notice to Langreder detailing the procedure for opposing a motion for
summary judgment. See N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.2. The district court struck Freeman’s motion
for summary judgment, but later allowed Freeman to refile it with the appropriate
notice.
The district court this time granted Freeman’s motion for summary judgment.
Langreder, the court concluded, had not presented any “direct” evidence of
discrimination and, under the “indirect method,” a reasonable fact‐finder applying the
burden‐shifting framework described in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973), could not conclude that he had established a prima facie case of
discrimination. (This court since has clarified that a more straightforward inquiry is
appropriate: “whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude
that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused the

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No. 16‐1749 Page 3
discharge or other adverse employment action.” See Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc.,
834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016).) Focusing on one of the elements of the prima facie
case, the court determined that Langreder had not presented evidence that similarly
situated younger employees were treated more favorably than him (i.e., by being given
more work hours). And even if Langreder could establish a prima facie case, the court
continued, he did not present evidence of pretext sufficient to undercut Freeman’s
stated reasons for reducing his hours—the economic downturn and, after 2011, the
limited number of hours available outside of Chicago. His retaliation claim also failed,
the court concluded, because he did not engage in protected activity until after he
suffered an adverse employment action.
On appeal, Langreder generally challenges the district court’s conclusion that
Freeman was entitled to summary judgment on his discrimination claim. He argues that
he has established a prima facie case of discrimination under the “indirect method” and
that all of Freeman’s reasons for reducing his hours are pretextual.
The district court correctly determined that Langreder cannot establish a prima
facie case of age discrimination under McDonnell Douglas because the record does not
contain evidence from which a jury could infer that Freeman treated younger, similarly
situated employees more favorably. See Simpson v. Franciscan All., Inc., 827 F.3d 656, 661
(7th Cir. 2016); Hancock v. Potter, 531 F.3d 474, 479 (7th Cir. 2008). In any event, as the
court also explained, Langreder did not supply admissible evidence that Freeman’s
proffered reasons for the reduction of his hours were pretextual. Langreder submitted
an unauthenticated spreadsheet of names purporting to show a list of Freeman
employees and the hours that each employee worked. But the district court rightly
excluded this evidence as lacking foundation because it was not accompanied by an
affidavit identifying who prepared the spreadsheet, when it was prepared, or what
group of employees it purported to show. See Smiley v. Columbia Coll. Chi., 714 F.3d 998,
1005 (7th Cir. 2013).
Finally Langreder contends that the district court abused its discretion by
allowing Freeman to refile its motion for summary judgment after it had failed to
comply with the local rule requiring defendants to provide pro se litigants with notice
of how to oppose summary judgment. But the court rightly concluded that Langreder
did not suffer prejudice by Freeman’s initial failure to provide the requisite notice
because Freeman did not alter the substance of its refiled motion and Langreder did not
significantly alter his response.
AFFIRMED.

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