United States of America v. Leslie J. Woods

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 15‐2498
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA ,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
LESLIE J. WOODS ,
Defendant‐Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois.
No. 15‐CR‐30074 — Michael Reagan, Chief Judge.
____________________
A RGUED J ANUARY 7, 2016 — D ECIDED J ULY 1, 2016
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK , MANION, and SYKES , Circuit Judges.
MANION, Circuit Judge. The government filed a juvenile in‐
formation against Leslie Woods III,1 on May 18, 2015, charg‐
1 The defendant was previously identified solely as LJW pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 5038, which provides that a juvenile’s name and picture shall
not be made public unless the individual is prosecuted as an adult. Be‐
cause we affirm the district court’s transfer of Woods to adult prosecution,

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2 No. 15‐2498
ing him with multiple offenses related to two armed rob‐
beries. At the time the government charged Woods he was 20,
but at the time of the crime he was 15 and thus, under the
Juvenile Delinquency and Protection Act (“Juvenile Act”),
Woods was considered a juvenile. The United States moved
under the Juvenile Act to transfer Woods’s case for adult pros‐
ecution. After a hearing, the district court granted that motion
and transferred the case against Woods for adult prosecution.
Woods filed this interlocutory appeal. We affirm.
I.
According to the information filed by the government,
when he was 15 years old, Woods and several other gang
members robbed two convenience stores. The first robbery oc‐
curred on June 17, 2010, when Woods drove three masked
and armed gang members to the Best Stop convenience store
in Cahokia, Illinois. Woods waited in the car while the other
three entered and robbed the store of over $11,000. During
this robbery one customer was shot and another customer
was grazed by a bullet. Three weeks later, on July 8, 2010,
Woods, the same three gang members, and another accom‐
plice robbed the Mini‐Mart gas station in Cahokia, Illinois.
Woods shot the clerk several times. The clerk survived, but
was in critical condition and permanently injured.
Nearly five years later, on May 18, 2015, the United States
filed a juvenile information against Woods, charging him
with two counts of conspiracy to interfere with commerce by
robbery, two counts of interference with commerce by rob‐
bery, and two counts of using and carrying a firearm during
we refer to him by name and the proceedings, previously sealed, shall be
unsealed.

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No. 15‐2498 3
a crime of violence. The government charged Woods under
the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Act (“Juvenile Act”), 18
U.S.C. § 5031 et. seq. The Juvenile Act provides that the gov‐
ernment cannot try a juvenile for federal crimes until he is
transferred to adult status pursuant to the Juvenile Act. Ac‐
cordingly, at the same time that the government filed the in‐
formation against Woods, it moved to transfer the case for
adult prosecution.
Although Woods was 20 years old at the time the infor‐
mation was filed, he was 15 at the time he allegedly commit‐
ted the charged offenses. Under the Juvenile Act, a juvenile is
defined as “a person who has not attained his eighteenth
birthday, or for the purpose of proceedings and disposition
under this chapter for an alleged act of juvenile delinquency
a person who has not attained his twenty‐first birthday.” 18
U.S.C. § 5031. In turn, under the Juvenile Act, “juvenile delin‐
quency” is defined as a violation of federal law “committed
by a person prior to his eighteenth birthday which would
have been a crime if committed by an adult.” Id.
To charge Woods under the Juvenile Act, the Attorney
General was required to certify that the case should be trans‐
ferred for adult prosecution because it meets certain factors,
which are not at issue here. United States v. Jarrett, 133 F.3d
519, 535 (7th Cir. 1998). The Attorney General must also cer‐
tify that “there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or
the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal jurisdiction.” 18
U.S.C. § 5031; see id. Additionally, the government must sub‐
mit the juvenile’s court records as a jurisdictional prerequisite
to a transfer proceeding. Id. at 535–36. Finally, if those three
conditions are met, as they undisputedly are in this case, “the
district court must decide whether the juvenile’s transfer to

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4 No. 15‐2498
adult status is ‘in the interest of justice.’” Id. at 536 (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 5031).
Section 5032 of the Juvenile Act sets forth specific factors
the district court must consider in assessing whether the
transfer is in the interest of justice. This section requires the
court to make factual findings on:
(1) the age and social background of the juvenile;
(2) the nature of the offense;
(3) any prior delinquency record;
(4) the present intellectual development and psycho‐
logical maturity;
(5) past treatment efforts and the juvenile’s response to
such efforts;
(6) the availability of programs to treat the juvenile’s
behavioral problems.
18 U.S.C. § 5032.
In this case, the district court held a hearing to receive ev‐
idence concerning these factors. At this hearing, the govern‐
ment presented as evidence a DVD containing video surveil‐
lance of the robberies, as well as an affidavit from an FBI agent
elaborating on the details of the charged robberies. The video
surveillance of the first robbery did not depict Woods because
he was alleged to be the getaway driver, but it showed the
other individuals involved in the offense and showed one of
the gang members shooting a customer. The agent’s affidavit
also noted that a woman who had pulled up in the parking
lot as the gang was fleeing was shot, but luckily only grazed.
The second video showed the robbery of the Mini‐Mart and,
according to the government, depicted Woods entering the
store with a long rifle and shooting the cashier in the chest,
arm and hand.

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No. 15‐2498 5
The government also presented evidence from an officer
familiar with Woods and his gang involvement, as well as tes‐
timony from Woods’s juvenile probation officer. Specifically,
St. Louis County Police Detective Joseph Percich described, in
detail, the Dead End Gang involvement in the area and
Woods’s extensive involvement with the gang. Additionally,
Woods’s state juvenile‐probation officer testified in detail
about Woods’s extensive involvement in the juvenile justice
system and her role in providing court‐ordered supervision
for two drug‐related charges. She explained that Woods’s first
juvenile case was for a drug‐related charge and that, while it
was closed, only a few months later a second juvenile petition
was filed against him for drug‐related offenses. She also ex‐
plained that Woods was involved with the Dead End Gang
and would not end that affiliation. She further elaborated on
the various services offered to Woods and that “[h]e never
took accountability at any point.” She added that she recom‐
mended Woods for a residential program to remove him from
the negative influences in his life, but he was rejected because
of his “gang affiliation and his willingness to fight and cause
harm.” The juvenile‐probation officer further testified that
she had concluded “there were no additional resources that I
could afford him,” and at that point she recommended that
he be placed in the custody of the Division of Youth Services,
where minors are detained in a locked, secure, residential fa‐
cility because they are a risk to society and are not benefitting
from juvenile services. She ended her direct testimony by say‐
ing, “in the 15 years that I’ve done this work it is unfortunate
but Leslie was the first child that I truly feared and was con‐
cerned about what harm he could do to the community.”
Following the hearing, the district court found that
Woods’s social background was marked by criminal activity

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6 No. 15‐2498
and gang involvement and that at his current age (one week
shy of 21), the juvenile‐rehabilitation programs would not be
of much benefit. The court found the second factor likewise
supported transfer, given that Woods was alleged to have
been involved in two violent armed robberies and had shot
and seriously injured an individual in the second robbery.
The third factor also supported transfer, the district court con‐
cluded, because Woods had an extensive juvenile record
starting at the age of 12 and involving more than 30 separate
incidents that resulted in referrals to juvenile court. The
fourth factor (intellectual development and psychological
maturity) the district court weighed neutrally. But the court
found the fifth factor also weighed in favor of transfer because
Woods had responded poorly to past treatment programs. Fi‐
nally, the court found the sixth factor weighed in favor of
transfer because he was unlikely to benefit from juvenile pro‐
grams given his age. The court then concluded that the total‐
ity of the factors supported transfer, and entered an order
transferring Woods for adult prosecution. Woods appeals.2
II.
On appeal, Woods argues the district court erred in trans‐
ferring him for adult prosecution under the Juvenile Act. At
oral argument, we asked the parties whether Woods was still
considered a juvenile under the Juvenile Act given that he is
now over 21 and his trial had not yet begun. We directed the
parties to address that question in supplemental briefing. In
their supplemental briefs, the government and Woods both
2 “[A]n order issued under § 5032 is immediately appealable as a col‐
lateral order…” United States v. J.J.K., 76 F.3d 870, 871–72 (7th Cir. 1996).

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No. 15‐2498 7
maintain that such defendants are still considered juveniles
under the Juvenile Act. 3
Every circuit which has considered this issue has held that
the Juvenile Act “permits the district court to continue to ex‐
ercise its juvenile jurisdiction where a defendant is [charged]
while under twenty‐one but attains the age of twenty‐one
during the criminal proceedings.” United States v. Ramirez, 297
F.3d 185, 191–92 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Smith, 851 F.2d
706, 710 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Martin, 788 F.2d 696,
697–98 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Doe, 631 F.2d 110, 112–
13 (9th Cir. 1980). These courts reasoned that jurisdiction un‐
der the Juvenile Act is determined at the time the case is initi‐
ated, and thus, the fact the defendant later turns twenty‐one
is irrelevant. Ramirez,297 F3d at 191; Smith, 851 F.2d at 709;
Martin, 788 F.2d at 697; Doe, 631 F.2d at 112–13. Further,
Ramirez and Doe explained that retaining jurisdiction under
the Juvenile Act is contemplated by the statute even after a
defendant turns twenty‐one because otherwise, in cases
where the defendant was nearing that milestone, “‘the gov‐
ernment would be forced either to postpone the initiation of
a proceeding … or to rush the proceeding to its conclusion …
Neither course is desirable.’” Ramirez, 297 F.3d at 192 (quoting
Doe, 631 F.2d at 113). We see no reason to part ways with these
circuits and, accordingly, we conclude that the Juvenile Act
continues to apply even though Woods is now over twenty‐
one. We therefore consider whether the district court erred in
3 We also asked the parties whether it would be appropriate to use
Woods’s name and they agreed that, if we hold transfer was appropriate,
his identity need no longer be sealed.

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8 No. 15‐2498
ordering Woods transferred for adult prosecution under the
Juvenile Act.
We review the district court’s decision to transfer a juve‐
nile for adult prosecution for an abuse of discretion. See Jarrett,
133 F.3d at 536. In this case, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in transferring Woods to adult court. As discussed
below, the district court thoroughly and conscientiously con‐
sidered the factors Congress laid out for consideration.
The court found that the first factor, Woods’s age and so‐
cial background, weighed strongly in favor of transfer. While
noting that Woods had a close relationship with his parents,
the court added that he was placed under the protection of
the court for more than a year because of threats his mother
had made. The court also looked at Woods’s educational
background and explained that he had been suspended from
school and placed in an alternative learning program, which
he left after incidents with both staff and a fellow student.
However, he did earn his GED at a second alternative school,
but was later incarcerated at the Division of Youth Services.
In evaluating this factor, the court further reviewed Woods’s
juvenile record, which included a history of charges related to
drug possession, as well as his involvement in the Dead End
Gang, which began when he was 13 years old. Additionally,
the court noted that Woods had a long history of criminal ac‐
tivity which also included three adult felony convictions for
offenses which occurred after the robberies alleged in the in‐
formation. Taken together, the court viewed these facts as
supporting transfer, and the court did not abuse its discretion
in reaching this conclusion.
The district court next considered the nature of the alleged
offenses, which at the transfer stage requires the district court

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No. 15‐2498 9
to presume the truth of the allegations. The court found this
factor also weighed heavily in favor of transfer because the
crimes charged were two armed robberies which involved
multiple weapons and resulted in serious injuries. The court
also stressed that, during the second robbery, Woods shot the
store clerk multiple times, resulting in the clerk suffering crit‐
ical injuries and the permanent loss of the use of his right arm
and hand. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
evaluating this factor.
The third factor, the prior juvenile‐delinquency findings,
the district court also found weighed in favor of transfer be‐
cause Woods’s juvenile history demonstrated extensive in‐
volvement with the juvenile system, an escalation of criminal
activity, and the lack of success in rehabilitation. In evaluating
this factor, the district court summarized six juvenile cases in‐
volving Woods, beginning with referrals for burglary and as‐
sault when he was only 13 years old. Again, there was no
abuse of discretion in the court’s evaluation of this factor.
The fourth factor, which looked at the defendant’s present
intellectual development and psychological maturity, the dis‐
trict court found to be neutral. The court noted that Woods
had completed his GED and that there was no indication of
intellectual or psychological deficits. As a result, the court
found his legal issues were “more behavioral than psycholog‐
ical or intellectual.” We see no abuse of discretion in the court
evaluating this factor as neutral.
Next, the district court considered past treatment efforts
and Woods’s response. The district court noted that “the ju‐
venile system has made numerous efforts to assist the De‐
fendant, with little or no success.” The district court noted
that Woods responded poorly to the various programs. The

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10 No. 15‐2498
court also stressed that Woods’s escalating behavior demon‐
strated that the numerous prior attempts to rehabilitate him
did not have any positive influence, and accordingly found
this factor weighed in favor of transfer. We also see no abuse
of discretion in this conclusion.
Finally, the district court considered the availability of
programs to treat Woods’s behavioral problems. Here the
court concluded that the nature of his crimes precluded any
form of juvenile rehabilitation in Illinois, because under the
Illinois Juvenile Act an armed robbery committed with a fire‐
arm was not subject to juvenile proceedings. The Juvenile Act
only provided for treatment for individuals under 21 and be‐
cause Woods was nearly 21 at the time of the hearing, he also
wouldn’t benefit from services. The district court found this
factor weighed in favor of transfer and again we find no abuse
of discretion in this finding.
Notwithstanding the district court’s thorough and consci‐
entious evaluation of the six factors, Woods argues that the
district court abused its discretion by ordering him trans‐
ferred to adult prosecution. First, Woods posits that the dis‐
trict court wrongly shifted the burden to him to prove he had
a positive response to previous rehabilitative treatment and
would not have responded to current treatment. However,
contrary to his position, the district court did not place the
burden on Woods. Rather, the court considered the evidence
of Woods’s continued criminal behavior and the absence of
available state juvenile programs to conclude that Woods had
not benefitted from, and would not in the future benefit from,
juvenile programs. There was no abuse of discretion in that
analysis.

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No. 15‐2498 11
Woods also complains that at the time of the offense he
was 15 years old, and had the government promptly filed
charges against him, he could have benefitted from available
juvenile programs. That is unlikely given that, even though
he had been offered many juvenile programs, his behavior es‐
calated to the point where at age 15 he shot and severely in‐
jured an individual. But in any event, the pertinent question
is whether Woods would now benefit from programs and, in
assessing this factor, it is Woods’s current age that is signifi‐
cant. United States v. Ramirez, 297 F.3d 185, 193‐94 (2d Cir.
2002). The district court found that because he was almost 21,
he would not benefit from any juvenile programs, and there
was no abuse of discretion in the court taking his age into ac‐
count to reach this conclusion.
Finally, Woods complains that the district court gave little
weight to the fact that his juvenile‐probation officer had rec‐
ommended he be placed in a program outside his mother’s
home, but that no such placement occurred. Woods stresses
that the juvenile‐probation officer had determined that his
mother had played a role in his reluctance to fully engage in
the available juvenile programs. He argues that the district
court should have considered the state’s failure to provide
him with the recommended treatment outside of his mother’s
influence in evaluating his response to treatment. The district
court, though, discussed Woods’s relationship with his
mother and her failure to support the rehabilitative efforts.
The district court did not need to further elaborate on these
facts. Further, any benefit to Woods flowing from considera‐
tion of his mother’s negative influence would be offset by the
reason he was never placed in such a treatment program—
Woods was so violent that no residential program would ac‐
cept him. There was no abuse of discretion here either.

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12 No. 15‐2498
In sum, the district court thoroughly analyzed each re‐
quired factor and found that “balancing the possibility of re‐
habilitation for the offender against the threat to the public
posed by juvenile crime … the transfer of the Defendant to
adult criminal prosecution is in the interest of justice.” This
conclusion was amply supported by the record and, accord‐
ingly, there was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
decision to transfer Woods for adult prosecution.
III.
The government sought to prosecute Leslie Woods III as
an adult for multiple criminal counts related to two armed
robberies he allegedly committed while he was 15. After a
hearing on the government’s motion to transfer him to adult
prosecution, the district court concluded that transfer was ap‐
propriate. In reaching this decision the district court thor‐
oughly analyzed the required factors and its decision was not
an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we AFFIRM and
REMAND for further proceedings.

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