United States of America v. Dakota R. Moss

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 23, 2016
Decided May 26, 2016
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge
RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
No. 15‐3102
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
DAKOTA R. MOSS,
Defendant‐Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 3:14‐CR‐30208‐DRH‐1
David R. Herndon,
Judge.
O R D E R
Dakota Moss and a friend stole a pickup truck, used it to ram the 10‐foot tall gate
outside a farm‐supply store, smashed a window to gain access and, over the course of
three separate burglaries of the same store that night, stole 39 firearms, candy, and soda.
They were arrested the following day and confessed to conspiring to sell the stolen
firearms either to protestors in Ferguson, Missouri, or to “other criminal elements” in
Centralia, Illinois. Moss pleaded guilty to stealing firearms from a federal firearms
licensee, 18 U.S.C. § 922(u), conspiring to interfere with commerce by violence against a
person or property, 18 U.S.C. § 371, carrying a firearm during a crime of violence,
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), and possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The
district court sentenced him to 248 months’ imprisonment, the bottom of the calculated
guidelines range.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 15‐3102 Page 2
Moss’s plea agreement includes a broad appeal waiver, but he still filed a notice
of appeal. His appointed lawyer (who represented Moss below) has concluded that the
case is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744
(1967). Moss opposes counsel’s motion. See C IR . R. 51(b). Counsel has submitted a brief
that explains the nature of the case and addresses issues which an appeal of this kind
might be expected to involve. Because the analysis in the brief appears to be thorough,
we limit our review to the subjects the lawyer discusses, plus the issue Moss raises in
opposition. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v.
Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).
Moss’s attorney says that his client does not wish to challenge his guilty plea,
and thus counsel appropriately forgoes any discussion of the adequacy of the plea
colloquy. See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002). Although Moss
now wishes to challenge his sentence as unreasonable, counsel properly concludes that
this argument would be frivolous because the guilty plea is valid and thus, so is the
appeal waiver, see United States v. Zitt, 714 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v.
Sakellarion, 649 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2011), and counsel has not identified any
exception that would apply here, see United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 176, 192–93 (7th
Cir. 2014).
Finally, Moss tells us that he wishes to challenge counsel’s performance as
deficient; he vaguely asserts that his attorney failed to “explain everything about [the]
case” and provide him with full access to discovery before he pleaded guilty. But we
have emphasized that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be reserved for
collateral review, so that a record may be developed in the district court. See Vinyard v.
United States, 804 F.3d 1218, 1227 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Flores, 739 F.3d 337,
341–42 (7th Cir. 2014).
Accordingly, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED and the appeal is
DISMISSED.

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