United States of America v. Juwan A. Sturdivant

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 15-1059
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JUWAN A. STURDIVANT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
No. 1:12-cr-10079-JES-JEH-1 — James E. Shadid, Chief Judge.
ARGUED JUNE 4, 2015 — DECIDED AUGUST 4, 2015
Before BAUER, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
BAUER, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant, Juwan A.
Sturdivant, pleaded guilty to four counts of interfering with
commerce by robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and one count of using
and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of
violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Sturdivant appeals the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress, having reserved the
right to do so in his plea agreement. Sturdivant moved to
suppress post-arrest inculpatory statements that he made

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to law enforcement, claiming that the statements were the
involuntary result of coercive police tactics and his weakened
physical condition as an insulin-dependent diabetic. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Over a two week period in April 2012, two men committed
four armed robberies of various businesses located in Peoria,
Illinois. At the fourth and final robbery, the two robbers left a
plastic bag at the scene of the crime. Law enforcement recov-
ered the bag and sent it to the Illinois State Bureau of Forensic
Science for processing. On April 27, 2012, the Peoria Police
Department was notified that a latent fingerprint impression
lifted from the bag matched to Sturdivant. Later that day,
Sturdivant was arrested and taken to the Peoria Police Depart-
ment for questioning. On April 28, 2012, Sturdivant made a
video recorded statement admitting to his involvement in the
four armed robberies.
On June 20, 2012, a grand jury returned an indictment
charging Sturdivant with four counts of armed robbery and
four counts of using a firearm in connection with a crime of
violence. Sturdivant pleaded not guilty and filed a motion
to suppress, challenging the voluntariness of his post-arrest
confession. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing
on Sturdivant’s motion on April 23, 2014.
At the suppression hearing, five police officers and Sturdi-
vant’s mother testified. The following evidence was presented
through their testimony: On April 27, 2012, Detective Timothy
Moore obtained a no-knock search warrant to search Sturdi-
vant’s residence in connection with the string of robberies.
Before the warrant could be executed, officers stationed

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No. 15-1059 3
outside the target residence observed Sturdivant and another
individual (later identified to be Sturdivant’s juvenile accom-
plice, who we will refer to as JW) leaving the home. When
officers approached the two suspects, Sturdivant fled. After
a brief footrace, Sturdivant was apprehended and placed under
arrest. He and JW were then taken to the Peoria Police Depart-
ment and placed in separate interview rooms.
Sergeant Ruth Sandoval and Detective Keith McDaniel
interviewed Sturdivant. The interview began at approximately
7:15 p.m. on April 27. Sandoval collected various background
information, including Sturdivant’s age (18 years old), where
he lived, and his education level (he dropped out of high
school in the 11th grade, but was then attending alternative
school). Sturdivant informed the officers that he was an
insulin-dependant diabetic and that he was feeling “real tired.”
Sandoval then advised Sturdivant of his Miranda warnings and
asked if he would be willing to speak with her and Detective
McDaniel. Sturdivant agreed to talk. During this interview,
which lasted approximately 45 minutes, the officers confronted
Sturdivant with various details from the four armed robberies,
including the fact that his fingerprint matched to a fingerprint
impression lifted from a bag that the robbers left behind at the
fourth robbery. Sandoval also told Sturdivant that officers had
recovered DNA evidence from the bag, even though she
knew no such DNA evidence existed. Throughout the inter-
view, Sturdivant repeatedly denied any involvement in the
robberies.
Around 45 minutes into questioning, Sturdivant said that
he was not feeling well and needed his insulin. The officers, in
response, broke from questioning and told him that his insulin

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4 No. 15-1059
was available; it had been brought to the station by Detective
Robert McMillion, who obtained the insulin from Sturdivant’s
home while executing the search warrant. Sandoval then asked
Sturdivant if he thought he needed his insulin and he said no.
Sandoval offered to get him a medic because protocol would
not permit the officers to let Sturdivant inject himself, but
Sturdivant declined; instead he asked to smoke a cigarette. Per
Sturdivant’s request, the officers moved him into another room
and allowed him to smoke a cigarette; also per his request, the
officers gave him a glass of water. At this time, Sturdivant was
also provided with a meal from Steak ‘n Shake.
After the break, which lasted about an hour to an hour and
a half, Sandoval and McDaniel resumed questioning for about
20 to 30 minutes. During this interview, Sturdivant responded
to a few of the officers’ questions by referring to himself in the
third person. For example, when again confronted with the
fingerprint evidence from the fourth robbery, Sturdivant
responded, “Ya’all didn’t get Juwan’s fingerprint.” Because
Sturdivant continued to deny his involvement in the robberies,
and since the officers had exhausted their line of questioning,
the officers decided to stop for the evening.
Both Sandoval and McDaniel testified that they were
familiar with the symptoms exhibited by a diabetic with low
blood sugar, including profuse sweating, lethargy, slurred
speech, flushed coloring, and a confused state. They both
testified that Sturdivant exhibited none of these symptoms
on April 27, aside from him saying he was “real tired.” He did
not outwardly appear ill or fatigued, he exhibited no problems
with his memory, and he was able to carry on a conversation
with the officers.

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No. 15-1059 5
The following day, April 28, Sandoval had Sturdivant
transported back to the Peoria Police Department at approxi-
mately 2:30 p.m. for further questioning. Detective Moore was
present with Sandoval at the time. Sandoval again advised
Sturdivant of the Miranda warnings prior to asking him any
questions. The first question Sandoval asked Sturdivant was
how he spent the evening. Sturdivant replied, “not good.”
Sandoval then asked him if he felt bad for scaring people
during the robberies, and Sturdivant nodded his head affirma-
tively. He then told Sandoval and Moore about his involve-
ment in each of the four armed robberies. At some point
during the interview, Sturdivant asked if he could see his
mother, Aneyshia Thomas. According to Moore, Sandoval told
Sturdivant, “we need to get down to the bottom of these
robberies before … we do anything like that.” Sandoval twice
denied that she agreed or even offered to let Sturdivant see his
mother in return for his cooperation. Moore also testified that
Sandoval made no offer or promise to Sturdivant about seeing
his mom. During the interview, Sturdivant did not tell the
officers or otherwise indicate that he was suffering from the
effects of diabetes. Neither Sandoval nor Moore observed any
signs that Sturdivant was suffering from such effects; he was
not sweating, did not appear confused, was able to articulate
and recount the details of the robberies, and he never asked for
medical help or insulin.
After Sturdivant confessed to his involvement in the armed
robberies, he agreed to take the officers to the location where
he discarded the firearm that he discharged in each of the four
robberies. Sturdivant left the police department in a car with
Sandoval, Moore, and Detective Erin Barisch at approximately

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6 No. 15-1059
3:55 p.m. All three officers testified that Sturdivant did not
exhibit any signs that he was suffering from diabetes during
the trip to find the gun. Barish testified that Sturdivant gave
directions in a “very clear, very concise, [and] very matter of
fact” manner. The police searched the area that Sturdivant
directed them to and found the discarded firearm. Sturdivant
then asked if he could see his mother and the officers drove
him to his home and allowed his mother, Thomas, to sit with
him for about 20 minutes in the backseat of the officers’ car.
Sandoval testified that “[i]t wasn’t determined to go see his
mother or decided until the handgun was recovered within
a block, a block or two radius of his home, and I think that’s
when we decided to take him to his mom’s.” As she put it on
cross-examination: “We were dealing with an 18-year-old man.
He was cooperative. We had some compassion. His mom was
very cooperative during the search warrant, almost sorrowful
that her son had been involved in the things, so we took him.”
Thomas testified that she received a phone call from
Sandoval, during which “[Sandoval] said that … [Sturdivant]
asked them [the officers] if he would be able to see his mom,
and she said that if he will cooperate then they would bring
him by the house to see me, and she said that he had cooper-
ated so they keep their promises, so she was going to bring him
by to see me.” She testified that Sturdivant was allowed to sit
in the backseat of the officers’ car with her for about 20
minutes. At that time, she said “[Sturdivant] looked like he was
stressed. He looked like he didn’t feel well, like he hadn’t had
any sleep. His eyes were kind of red. He just didn’t appear
well.” When Thomas stepped out of the car to leave, Sturdi-
vant told her he felt like he was going to throw up. He then

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No. 15-1059 7
proceeded to vomit. Sandoval, who stood outside the car as
Thomas visited with her son, testified that she could not tell “if
[Sturdivant] vomited or [was] spitting but he was quite upset
seeing his mom.”
Thomas, who worked as a surgical tech for 15 years, further
testified to her son’s diabetic condition. When his blood
glucose levels were very high, she said that Sturdivant some-
times acted grouchy, sleepy, or just not himself. She testified
that vomiting indicated that Sturdivant’s blood sugar level
was “[v]ery, very low.” In addition, when his blood sugar was
low, Sturdivant would act confused and exhibit flu-like
symptoms and nausea. Thomas, who testified that she could
always tell if Sturdivant’s diabetes was under control, did
not tell Sandoval or any other officer that Sturdivant was ill or
suffering from diabetes.
Sturdivant was taken back to the police department,
arriving at approximately 4:45 p.m. Sandoval had a meal from
Steak ‘n Shake ordered for Sturdivant and asked him if he
would be willing to discuss on video “everything that [they]
had already discussed up to that point … .” Sturdivant said he
would. The interview began at approximately 6:20 p.m. and
ended just before 7:00 p.m. Sandoval informed Sturdivant that
the interview was being video and audio recorded and read
him the Miranda warnings from a form as Sturdivant read
along. Sturdivant said he understood his rights and agreed to
speak with the officers. He also signed a written Miranda
waiver and a consent form to allow videotaping of the interro-
gation.

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8 No. 15-1059
Once the recording had begun, McDaniel confirmed that
Sturdivant was an insulin-dependent diabetic and asked how
he was feeling. Sturdivant answered, “I’m feeling alright.”
McDaniel asked Sturdivant if he was in the “right frame of
mind” and if he understood what was going on, and Sturdi-
vant nodded in affirmation and answered, “Yes, sir.” Sturdi-
vant also stated that he had been allowed to use the bathroom,
drink water, and eat prior to the interview. Over the next 25
minutes, Sturdivant answered the officers’ questions and made
a full confession to all four armed robberies.
Sturdivant’s recorded statement was admitted into evi-
dence at the suppression hearing. Also admitted into evidence
was a discharge summary from the Methodist Medical Center
of Illinois, in Peoria, Illinois. The discharge summary showed
that Sturdivant was admitted to the hospital on May 1, 2012,
with nausea, vomiting, stomach pains, and difficulty breathing.
He was found to have diabetic ketoacidosis, which develops
when the body is unable to produce enough insulin. Sturdivant
told the medical staff that his symptoms began about seven
days prior to his admission and that he had been “vomiting all
week, not keeping anything down.” His medical charts
revealed that at the time of admission he was: “Able to
ambulate without difficulty. Oriented X3 (Person, Place, Day).
Cooperative. Fully verbal.” His speech was normal, and his
breathing sounded clear and was “regular and unlabored.”
Sturdivant was discharged from the hospital on May 2, 2012.
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the district
court orally denied Sturdivant’s motion. The district court
viewed Sturdivant’s video recorded statement, finding that
Sturdivant appeared to have “his faculties about him,” he “sat

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No. 15-1059 9
upright” and “[h]e seemed to understand the questions and he
was able to articulate the answers.” The court further found
that Sturdivant did not appear “in any way to be physically ill”
or “to be in a mental state that was any kind of weakened
condition either.” The court considered Sturdivant’s age and
level of education, finding that neither of these factors sup-
ported a “finding that he was coerced or somehow misled in
th[e] interrogation.” With respect to Sturdivant’s diabetes, the
court found that Sturdivant did not appear to display the
effects that one would expect to see from a person “suffering
from the ill effects of insulin.”
II. DISCUSSION
Sturdivant argues that he gave his post-arrest confessions
involuntarily and that the district court erred in rejecting his
motion to suppress. We review de novo the district court’s
determination that Sturdivant’s confessions were voluntary,
United States v. Montgomery, 555 F.3d 623, 629 (7th Cir. 2009),
and we review the district court’s relevant factual findings for
clear error, giving “special deference to the district court’s
credibility determinations,” United States v. Villalpando, 588
F.3d 1124, 1127 (7th Cir. 2009). The government bears the
burden of proving the voluntariness of a defendant’s statement
by a preponderance of the evidence. Lego v. Twomney, 404 U.S.
477, 489 (1972).
We have held that “a confession is voluntary if, in
the totality of circumstances, it is the product of rational
intellect and free will and not the result of physical abuse,
psychological intimidation, or deceptive interrogation tactics
that have overcome the defendant’s free will.” United States v.

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10 No. 15-1059
Gillaum, 372 F.3d 848, 856 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations
and citation omitted). “[C]oercive police activity is a necessary
predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167
(1986). “[W]e analyze coercion from the perspective of a
reasonable person in the position of the suspect,” United States
v. Huerta, 239 F.3d 865, 871 (7th Cir. 2001), and consider the
following factors: “the defendant’s age, education, intelligence
level, and mental state; the length of the defendant’s detention;
the nature of the interrogations; the inclusion of advice about
constitutional rights; and the use of physical punishment,
including deprivation of food or sleep.” Id. Sturdivant claims
that a number of factors combined to render his confessions the
involuntary product of police coercion. We discuss each in
turn.
Sturdivant asserts that the “most significant” factor
demonstrating that his confessions were coerced was the
“relative indifference” that the officers displayed to his
diabetes and the “obvious physical distress it caused.” The
record reveals that on April 27, Sturdivant told officers he was
“real tired,” asked officers for his insulin, and responded to
some of the officers’ questions in the third person; on April 28,
he vomited after speaking with his mother. Sturdivant argues
that these facts show that he was suffering from the effects of
diabetes and, therefore, confused to the point that his confes-
sions were rendered involuntary.
As an initial matter, we note that Sturdivant did not make
any incriminating statements on April 27. Instead, he repeat-
edly denied his involvement in the robberies that night.

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No. 15-1059 11
Accordingly, it is hard to see how the symptoms he claims to
have experienced on April 27—his tired condition and the use
of the third person—demonstrate that he was confused to the
point that his confessions, which occurred the following day,
were involuntary. Furthermore, when Sturdivant asked for
his insulin on April 27, the officers broke from questioning and
offered him his insulin along with the assistance of a medic.
Sturdivant declined, instead opting to smoke a cigarette.
Simply stated, the officers were anything but indifferent to his
condition on April 27. Thus, we turn to April 28—the date of
his confession.
Two interview sessions occurred on April 28. During the
first session, Sturdivant made an unrecorded oral confession to
his involvement in the robberies; during the second session, he
made a video recorded confession to the same. Between these
two interview sessions, Sturdivant vomited while speaking to
his mother. This fact, he asserts, demonstrates that he was
suffering from the effects of diabetes when he made his
confessions. In support of his claim, he points out that his
mother, Thomas, testified that vomiting generally indicated
that Sturdivant’s blood sugar was “[v]ery, very low.” Al-
though Thomas testified that she would “always know” if her
son’s diabetes was under control, she never expressed any
concern, or otherwise told officers, that Sturdivant was ill, that
he needed sugar or insulin, or that he was suffering from the
effects of diabetes; nor did she testify that her son was indeed
suffering from the ill effects of diabetes at the time he vomited.
At any rate, even if Sturdivant’s diabetes caused him to vomit,
the record does not support the conclusion that Sturdivant’s
confessions were the involuntary product of coercion. With

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12 No. 15-1059
respect to his initial confession, which occurred before he
vomited, Sturdivant did not tell the officers that he was
suffering from the effects of diabetes or ask for his insulin (as
he had during the April 27 interview), and neither of the
interviewing officers, Sandoval and Moore, saw any signs that
Sturdivant was suffering from the effects of diabetes—he was
not sweating, did not appear confused, and was able to
articulate and recount the details of the robberies. As for his
second confession, Sturdivant confirmed on video that he was
in the right frame of mind, was “feeling alright,” and that he
understood what was going on. Furthermore, after viewing the
video recorded confession, we agree with the district court’s
findings that Sturdivant was attentive; he seemed to under-
stand all of the officers’ questions and was able to articulate
clear answers, he did not appear to be ill, and he did not
appear to be suffering from any sort of weakened mental
condition. Also evidencing that Sturdivant had his mental
faculties about him when he gave his second confession is the
fact that, shortly before he vomited and merely hours before
the second confession occurred, he was able to direct officers
in a very clear, very concise, and very matter of fact manner to
the gun he discarded the prior day. In sum, there is no basis to
conclude that Sturdivant’s diabetes led to an involuntary
confession. Every witness who addressed the issue testified
that Sturdivant appeared to understand what was going on
and did not act or appear to be confused or lethargic or exhibit
any other signs that he was suffering from the effects of
diabetes. And, as already noted, the video recorded confession
corroborated this testimony. For these reasons, the district

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No. 15-1059 13
court did not err in determining that Sturdivant’s confessions
were not rendered involuntary on account of his diabetes.
Sturdivant next argues that he was coerced by Sandoval’s
false representations that officers had recovered Sturdivant’s
DNA from the crime scene. This argument is also unpersua-
sive. “[W]e have repeatedly held that a law-enforcement agent
may actively mislead a defendant in order to obtain a confes-
sion, so long as a rational decision remains possible.” Conner v.
McBride, 375 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations
and citations omitted). We have also held that “a lie that relates
to the suspect’s connection to the crime is the least likely to
render a confession involuntary.” United States v. Ceballos, 302
F.3d 679, 695 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Sandoval’s
statement, although false, did not override Sturdivant’s free
will and coerce him into confessing. In fact, when confronted
with the false DNA evidence, Sturdivant denied his involve-
ment in the robberies, and he continued to deny his involve-
ment for the remainder of the interviews that occurred on
April 27, when the false statement was made.
Sturdivant also argues that the officers’ method of advising
him of his Miranda warnings was coercive. Notably, Sturdivant
does not claim that the officers failed to advise him of the
Miranda warnings before any of the interviews, nor does he
claim that he did not understand his rights or that his waivers
were not knowingly and voluntarily made. Rather, he takes
issue with the fact that Sandoval gave him his Miranda warn-
ings orally during the unrecorded interviews, using a written
Miranda waiver only after he confessed. Sturdivant does not
direct our attention to any case law, from this court or any

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14 No. 15-1059
other court, in support of his position. At any rate, the absence
of a written Miranda waiver did not render Sturdivant’s oral
waivers or subsequent confessions involuntary products of
coercion. See United States v. Murdock, 491 F.3d 694, 700 (7th
Cir. 2007) (holding officers’ failure to obtain a written waiver
from defendant did not render his oral waiver or subsequent
confession involuntary).
Sturdivant next claims that Sandoval promised him that he
could see his mother in exchange for his cooperation and that
this promise coerced him into confessing. The government
disagrees with Sturdivant’s contention that Sandoval made
such a promise. The record reflects that both Sandoval and
Moore testified there were no offers or promises made to
Sturdivant about seeing his mother. According to Moore, when
Sturdivant broached the subject, Sandoval told him “we need
to get down to the bottom of these robberies before … we do
anything like that.” Thomas, however, testified that she
received a call from Sandoval, during which:
She [(Sandoval)] said that she was going to bring
Juwan back to the house to see me because they had
a discussion about whether or not he would cooper-
ate and he told them – he asked them if he would be
able to see his mom, and she said that if he will
cooperate then they would bring him by the house
to see me, and she said that he had cooperated so
they keep their promises, so she was going to bring
him by to see me.
The district court did not make any factual findings on
whether or not a promise was made. However, we do not

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No. 15-1059 15
believe remand is necessary because, even accepting Thomas’
version as true, Sandoval’s purported promise did not override
Sturdivant’s free will and coerce him into confessing. After
having received and waived his Miranda warnings for the
second time in as many days, it was Sturdivant who broached
the subject of seeing his mother. Sturdivant had no right to see
his mother, but Sandoval allegedly made a gratuitous promise
to take him by his mother’s house if he cooperated. Sandoval
did not harp on the subject or hang it over Sturdivant’s head,
she merely responded to Sturdivant’s request and that ended
the matter. Plainly stated, Sandoval’s purported promise was
not so powerful or overwhelming such that it prevented
Sturdivant from exercising his rational intellect. Furthermore,
Sandoval’s purported promise was not an empty promise; it
did not falsely skew the calculus on which Sturdivant made his
decision to cooperate. See Villalpando, 588 F.3d at 1128 (explain-
ing that “[a]n empty prosecutorial promise could prevent a
suspect from making a rational choice by distorting the
alternatives among which the person under interrogation is
being asked to choose” (citation omitted)). All in all, assuming
that Sandoval promised to take Sturdivant to see his mother in
exchange for his cooperation, this promise did not override
Sturdivant’s rational intellect and free will so as to make his
confessions involuntary.
Finally, Sturdivant contends that his age, education level,
and lack of experience with police interrogations, when con-
sidered in combination with the aforementioned factors, render
his inculpatory statements the product of coercion. Sturdivant
was 18 years old and, although he dropped out of high school
in the 11th grade, he was attending alternative school at the

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16 No. 15-1059
time of his arrest. As for his prior experience with law enforce-
ment, Sturdivant is correct that the record does not show he
had ever before experienced a custodial interrogation; but this
was not his first encounter with the criminal justice system—he
was a felon at the time of his arrest. The district court found
that there was nothing about Sturdivant’s age or education that
supported the conclusion that his confessions were coerced.
Given the standard of review to which we must adhere, and
the manner in which Sturdivant conducted himself on video,
we see no reason to upset the district court’s finding on this
point.
III. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the district court’s denial
of Sturdivant’s motion to suppress is AFFIRMED.

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