DEMETRIUS STAPLES, BABATUNDE OWOSENI, and ANDREW DILLON v. Paragon Systems, Inc.

# NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 1, 2015*
Decided June 5, 2015

Before

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 14-3608
DEMETRIUS STAPLES, BABATUNDE OWOSENI,
and ANDREW DILLON,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
PARAGON SYSTEMS, INC., et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United
States District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois.

No. 13-cv-911-JPG-PMF
J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.

## Order

The three plaintiffs work for Security Consultants Group as security officers. Their
work requires that they be armed, which in turn requires a license that the employer
acquires on each worker's behalf. 68 Ill. Admin. Code 1240.530(a). Licenses must be re-
newed every three years. According to the complaint, Security Consultants did not pro-

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary.
See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f).

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cess the paperwork on time in 2013, and each plaintiff lost two or three weeks' work un-
til his license was renewed. They asked their union (Committee for Fair and Equal Rep-
resentation) for assistance, but the union declined to file grievances. Plaintiffs contend
in this hybrid suit under §301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §185,
that the union violated its duty of fair representation by not grieving the loss of work
and that the employer violated the collective bargaining agreement by not ensuring the
licenses' timely renewal (or compensating them for work lost because of the employer's
delay). Plaintiffs must show both of these things in order to prevail. See, e.g., DelCostello
v. Teamsters Union, 462 U.S. 151, 164-65 (1983). The district court began and ended its
analysis with the union's potential liability; having concluded that the union did not
violate the duty of fair representation, the court did not need to address any other issue.

Some passages in the district court's opinion suggest that it found the complaint in-
adequate because plaintiffs do not "plead facts" showing that the union's decision was
"arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith", the legal standard. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171, 190 (1967). Intent may be pleaded generally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), and it does not
take much to allege discriminatory conduct either. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534
U.S. 506 (2002). The federal rules establish a system of claim pleading, not fact pleading.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). What's more, courts are supposed to give the
benefit of the doubt to litigants representing themselves, as the three plaintiffs are. But
the district court's decision is nonetheless correct, though perhaps better understood as
a dismissal on the pleadings, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), than as dismissal for failure to
state a claim on which relief may be granted, see Rule 12(b)(6).

Plaintiffs' problem is not that they pleaded too little. It is that they pleaded too much
and in doing so showed why they cannot prevail. The complaint explains that the union
gave them a reason for not pursuing grievances, and plaintiffs do not contend that the
reason is a phony one. The reason: in 2010 the union had filed a grievance on behalf of
other workers who lost time because of the employer's delay in renewing their licenses
to carry firearms. When the employer rejected that grievance, the union took it to arbi-
tration, and the arbitrator ruled in the employer's favor. The arbitrator concluded that
the collective bargaining agreement provides back pay for employees wrongfully sus-
pended, but not for employees who (like plaintiffs) lacked a license necessary to contin-
ue working.

Plaintiffs contend that the union should take additional cases to arbitration until it
finally finds someone willing to rule in their favor (if indeed an arbitrator would disre-
gard a predecessor's interpretation of the same contract). But federal labor law does not
require this; it is not "arbitrary" (in the language of Vaca) to accept an arbitrator's ad-
verse decision. (Plaintiffs do not maintain that the union has violated their rights by fail-

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ing to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement changing the language on which
the arbitrator relied.) Unions must decide how best to expend limited resources, and re-
arbitrating the same issue usually has poor prospects. Given the "highly deferential"
approach judges must take to unions' operational decisions, see Air Line Pilots Associa-
tion v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 78 (1991), accepting an arbitrator's decision is permissible.
Plaintiffs do not allege that the union discriminated against them; they contend that
since the arbitrator's decision it has not pursued grievances on behalf of any worker
who loses time because of a delayed license renewal. So plaintiffs cannot prevail. Their
other arguments need not be discussed. The district court's judgment is

AFFIRMED.