Obbie Ward, Jr. v. Bradley Kelly

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 7, 2015 *
Decided April 7, 2015
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
No. 14‐1929
OBBIE WARD, JR.,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
BRADLEY KELLY,
Defendant‐Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 10‐CV‐00862
Lynn Adelman,
Judge.
O R D E R
This case involves the timeliness of a notice of appeal. Obbie Ward, Jr., a former
Wisconsin inmate whose civil‐rights suit against his probation officer ended in
summary judgment, filed his notice of appeal two days late. We dismiss the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction.
In 2010, Ward sued several Wisconsin officials and the Wisconsin Department of
Corrections under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging state‐law negligence (in connection with
damages to his wheelchair while he was in prison) and retaliation against his probation
* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is
unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. A PP. P.
34(a)(2)(A).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 14‐1929 Page 2
officer, Bradley Kelly, who changed his conditions of supervision. A magistrate judge
screened the complaint and allowed Ward to proceed only on his retaliation claim.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The district judge then concluded that Ward presented no
evidence that he had been injured by Kelly, and on March 24, 2014, granted Kelly’s
motion for summary judgment.
Ward, however, did not file his notice of appeal until April 25, two days beyond
the permitted thirty days. See FED. R. A PP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Because of his untimeliness, we
ordered Ward to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. He responded in May by filing a cursory motion in the district court for
more time, asserting that he had mailed the notice “early enough” and that the court
had to accommodate him under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court
denied the motion, finding that Ward had demonstrated neither good cause nor
excusable neglect for his late filing. See FED . R. A PP. P. 4(a)(5)(A)(ii). The court
acknowledged that the two‐day delay in filing was “minimal” and did not prejudice
Kelly, but concluded that Ward did not justify the delay.
In June, Ward sought reconsideration on the basis that he “didn’t receive the
[summary judgment] decision in time” and that he was suffering from a foot injury. The
district court promptly denied this motion, noting that Ward’s proposed ground for
relief was new and, in any event, he had dated and signed his notice of appeal on
March 29, 2014,“plenty of time” in which to deliver the notice to the clerk’s office by the
April 23, 2014 deadline.
We ordered the parties to brief the issue of the appeal’s timeliness and
specifically whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Ward’s motion to
extend time. Ward then sent the district court a one‐line submission saying that he
failed to file on time because he “read the due date wrong.”
Without an extension of time from the district court, Ward’s notice of appeal is
untimely. See Thomas v. Butts, 745 F.3d 309, 311 (7th Cir. 2014). And the district court
acted within its discretion in denying the motion for more time because Ward provided
insufficient explanation for his failure to file a timely notice of appeal. We therefore lack
jurisdiction over this appeal. Further, Ward’s perfunctory brief makes no argument of
any kind; although we construe pro se filings liberally, pro se litigants must give some
reason to disturb the district court’s decision. See FED. R. A PP. P. 28(a)(8)(A); Anderson v.
Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2001).
DISMISSED.

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