Appeal from the DAVID L. BENTON, SR. v. CLARK COUNTY JAIL and CLARK COUNTY COMMISSIONERS’ OFFICE

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 26, 2014 *
Decided December 1, 2014
Before
ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
No. 14‐2578
Appeal from the
DAVID L. BENTON, SR.,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
CLARK COUNTY JAIL and CLARK
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS’ OFFICE,
Defendants‐Appellees.
United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana,
New Albany Division.
No. 4:14‐cv‐20‐TWP‐WGH
Tanya Walton Pratt,
Judge.
O R D E R
David Benton appeals from the dismissal of his civil‐rights suit alleging that the
Clark County Jail and Clark County Commissioners’ Office violated his Eighth
Amendment rights during his overnight detention by denying him medication and
subjecting him to unsanitary conditions. Because Benton’s claims are precluded by a
previous state‐court judgment against him, we affirm.
* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is
unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. A PP.
P. 34(a)(2).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

-- 1 of 2 --

No. 14‐2578 Page 2
In Indiana state court, Benton sued Clark County Jail for civil‐rights violations
arising out of his detention on the night of December 17, 2012; he alleged that the jail did
not give him pain medication for his osteoporosis and forced him to stand barefoot on an
unsanitary floor. The state court granted summary judgment to the defendant, and
Benton did not pursue an appeal.
Benton then filed his federal suit, repeating his constitutional claims, attaching a
copy of his state‐court complaint, and adding the Clark County Commissioners’ Office
as a defendant. The district court screened his complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), and
dismissed it, concluding that the Commissioners’ Office was in privity with the jail and
that Benton’s claims against both parties were precluded by the prior state‐court
judgment. We note that the jail is a building and not a proper party, see Smith v. Knox
Cnty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037 (7th Cir. 2012), but here the court appears to have treated the
complaint as a suit against the county and its officials.
The district court is correct that Benton’s claims are precluded. State‐court
judgments are afforded the same preclusive effect in federal court that they would have
under the law of the state that rendered judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Migra v. Warren
City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984); DeGuelle v. Camilli, 724 F.3d 933, 937 (7th
Cir. 2013). In Indiana claim preclusion applies when (1) a court of competent jurisdiction
(2) rendered judgment on the merits; (3) the matter presently at issue was, or could, have
been addressed in the prior action; and (4) the prior case involved the parties to the
present suit or their privies. Geico Ins. Co. v. Graham, 14 N.E.3d 854, 858 (Ind. App. Ct.
2014); see also Jarrard v. CDI Telecomms., Inc., 408 F.3d 905, 916 (7th Cir. 2005) (applying
Indiana law). Benton suggests that claim preclusion is inapplicable because he has added
the Commissioners’ Office as a party, but the office is in privity with the jail because
Benton’s allegations against the office stem from his treatment at the jail. See Becker v.
State, 992 N.E.2d 697, 700–01 (Ind. 2013).
AFFIRMED.

-- 2 of 2 --