United States of America v. David Lindsay

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 14, 2010
Decided April 16, 2010
Before
WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge
RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge
TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge
No. 09‐3906
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
DAVID LINDSAY,
Defendant‐Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana,
Indianapolis Division
No. 2:08CR00014‐004
William T. Lawrence,
Judge.
O R D E R
David Lindsay pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute in excess of 500 grams of
methamphetamine and possessing with intent to distribute at least 5 grams of
methamphetamine, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, and was sentenced to 204 months’
imprisonment. In the plea agreement he waived his right to appeal his conviction and
sentence. He filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed counsel now seeks to withdraw
under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), because he cannot identify any nonfrivolous
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 09‐3906 Page 2
argument to pursue. Lindsay did not accept our invitation to respond to his lawyer’s
submissions, see CIR. R. 51(b), so we limit our review to the potential issues identified in
counsel’s facially adequate brief. See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973‐74 (7th Cir.
2002).
Lindsay does not seek to have his guilty plea set aside, so counsel rightly omits a
discussion of the plea’s voluntariness or the plea colloquy. See United States v. Knox, 287
F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002).
Counsel considers whether Lindsay could challenge the reasonableness of his
agreed‐upon sentence, but properly concludes that such a challenge would be foreclosed by
the appeal waiver. Because the guilty plea stands, so does the waiver. See Nunez v. United
States, 546 F.3d 450, 453 (7th Cir. 2008).
Finally, counsel correctly points out that any challenge to the effectiveness of his
representation in the district court should be explored in a collateral proceeding so that a
more complete record can be developed. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504‐05
(2003); United States v. Harris, 394 F.3d 543, 557‐58 (7th Cir. 2005).
For the foregoing reasons, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS
Lindsay’s appeal.

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