Randall Minniefield v. Bruce Lemmon

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is
unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See F ED. R. APP. P.
34(a)(2).
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 8, 2009 *
Decided October 9, 2009
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge
RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge
TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge
No. 09‐1669
RANDALL MINNIEFIELD,
Petitioner‐Appellant,
v.
BRUCE LEMMON,
Respondent‐Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana,
Terre Haute Division.
No. 2:08‐cv‐276‐RLY‐WGH
Richard L. Young,
Judge.
O R D E R
Randall Minniefield, an Indiana prisoner, petitioned under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a
writ of habeas corpus, challenging a prison disciplinary hearing in which he lost earned
good‐time credit. The district court denied the petition. Minniefield appeals, and we
affirm.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 09‐1669 Page 2
Inmates with the Indiana Department of Corrections are not allowed to have cell
phones. Last year a disciplinary board deducted 120 days of earned credit from
Minniefield for possession of a cell phone. At Minniefield’s hearing prison officials
presented as evidence the underlying conduct report, the statement of the officer who
conducted the search in which the phone was discovered, a confiscation report, and photos
of the phone and battery pack. The board’s stated rationale for its decision was curt:
“board find c/r True & factual Board finds guilty.” The board also specified the evidence it
relied on—staff reports, the phone, etc.—and the reason for the sanction
imposed—seriousness of charge, etc. Minniefield administratively appealed the decision,
raising four arguments: 1) insufficient evidence; 2) the non‐credible conduct report; 3)
biased decision maker; and 4) retaliatory discipline. His appeals were unsuccessful.
Minniefield renewed his arguments in his petition to the district court and, after the
state responded, raised a new argument: the record was constitutionally inadequate because
“the ‘Reason for Decision’ section was not completed with enough details.” According to
Minniefield, “The ‘rubber stamp claim’ that ‘Board finds c/r true & factual,’ yields no insight
into the Disciplinary Hearing Body’s rationale in finding guilt.” The district court found
that the board “issued sufficient statements of its findings,” then analyzed Minniefield’s
original four claims and denied the petition.
Minniefield limits his appeal to the lone argument he raised after the state responded
to his § 2254 petition—that the disciplinary board violated due process by failing to
adequately explain its decision. But Minniefield waived this argument by not raising it
first in the petition. See R ULES G OVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE U NITED STATES
D ISTRICT COURTS, R ULE 2( C)(1) (“the petition must: (1) specify all grounds for relief available
to the petitioner”); McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994) (“Habeas corpus petitions
must meet heightened pleading requirements and comply with this Courtʹs doctrines of
procedural default and waiver.”) (citations omitted); Jackson v. Duckworth, 112 F.3d 878, 881
(7th Cir. 1997) (“because Jackson failed to put these issues before the district court in his
habeas petition, he cannot do so here on appeal”). And, even if we were to address
Minniefieldʹs argument on the merits, we would still affirm; the boardʹs abbreviated
statement was sufficient. Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 981 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Saenz v.
Young, 811 F.2d 1172 (7th Cir. 1987)).
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment.

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