Automotive Finance Corp. v. Bahig Bishay

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is
unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R. A PP. P.
34(a)(2).
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 12, 2009 *
Decided August 12, 2009
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge
MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
No. 08‐3310
AUTOMOTIVE FINANCE CORP.,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
BAHIG BISHAY,
Defendant‐Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:06‐cv‐1025‐LJM‐JMS
Larry J. McKinney,
Judge.
O R D E R
Automotive Finance Corporation brought this diversity suit against Bahig Bishay to
collect $162,212.56 he owed on a promissory note. The district court granted AFC’s motion
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 08‐3310 Page 2
for summary judgment, and Bishay appealed, but his notice of appeal was untimely and we
dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. Bishay then filed a motion in district court under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) asking the court to vacate its judgment, order AFC to
disclose any payments that it received on the debt from third parties, and subpoena
unnamed third parties. He also submitted an affidavit detailing his post‐judgment
communications with AFC’s counsel regarding his requests for the disclosure of more
documents. The court denied the motion, finding that Bishay’s contacts with AFC’s
attorneys had “no conceivable relation to the resolution of the case.” We agree.
A judge may relieve a party of judgment under Rule 60(b) based only on mistake,
excusable neglect, surprise, inadvertence, newly discovered evidence, or a manifest error of
fact or law. See Hicks v. Midwest Transit, Inc., 531 F.3d 467, 474 (7th Cir. 2008). Bishay did
not point to any such error or relevant evidence in his motion. Bishay is really seeking an
an end‐run around his untimely notice of appeal. His brief revisits the merits of the case,
asserting claims based on res judicata, improper venue, and discovery abuse, but Rule 60(b)
is not a substitute for filing a timely appeal. See Stoller v. Pure Fishing, Inc., 528 F.3d 478, 480
(7th Cir. 2008); Bell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 214 F.3d 798, 801 (7th Cir. 2000). In fact, Bishay
mentions the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion very briefly, and then only to reiterate his
argument that AFC continues to improperly withhold documents from him. As the district
court correctly concluded, however, these documents have no relevance to the judgment.
Because our review is limited to the denial of Bishay’s 60(b) motion, and he has presented
us with no reason to set that decision aside, the judgment is
AFFIRMED.

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