Frederick Wright v. Jimmy Stegall

The Honorable Thomas W . Phillips, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Tennessee,
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sitting by designation.
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 07a0655n.06
Filed: September 5, 2007
Case No. 05-2419
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FREDERICK WRIGHT,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
JIMMY STEGALL,
Respondent-Appellee.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
BEFORE: BATCHELDER and COLE, Circuit Judges; PHILLIPS , District Judge.*
THOMAS W. PHILLIPS, District Judge. Frederick Wright was convicted in a Michigan
state court of armed robbery and being a third felony offender. He was sentenced to 30-60 years
imprisonment. After exhausting his direct appeals in state court, Wright petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising ten assignments of error. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied petitioner’s claims, but granted a
certificate of appealability on the issue of whether he is entitled to relief based upon his claim of
newly discovered evidence. Because petitioner’s claim of actual innocence is not cognizable, he is
not entitled to habeas corpus relief, and the judgment of the district court will be affirmed.

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I. Background
Petitioner was convicted, after a jury trial, of the robbery of a Zephyr gas station in Fruitport,
Michigan on August 6, 1986. Petitioner was also found guilty of being a third felony offender and
sentenced to prison for 30-60 years. After exhausting his direct appeals in state court, Wright filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal court raising ten assignments of error. On
September 30, 2005, the district court denied all ten of petitioner’s claims on the merits, but granted
a certificate of appealability limited to petitioner’s freestanding actual innocence claim.
Specifically, petitioner contends that two other individuals, Larry Boyles and Elson Earl Gee,
committed the Zephyr robbery. In support of his claim, petitioner submitted an affidavit from Gee,
an inmate at the Saginaw Regional Correctional facility, in which Gee claimed that he and Boyles
committed the Zephyr robbery in August 1986. Petitioner submitted a second affidavit from an
individual named Frank Grays, a fellow inmate of Boyles, stating that Boyles told him that he told
the police that petitioner committed the Zephyr robbery in retaliation for petitioner’s identification
of Boyles as the perpetrator of another robbery at Ray’s Mini Mart.
Petitioner also submitted an affidavit from Larry Boyles in which Boyles confessed to
committing the armed robbery of the Zephyr station in August 1986. Boyles stated that he identified
petitioner as the perpetrator of the Zephyr robbery because he wanted to get back at him for
informing the police that Boyles committed the Ray’s Mini Mart robbery.
The state court found that some of the information contained in Gee’s and Gray’s affidavits
was not “newly discovered” and that the information in both affidavits was cumulative in the respect
that it supported the alibi petitioner asserted at trial. The state court further questioned the affiants’

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reliability in light of their prior criminal histories. Gee’s affidavit indicates that Boyles and
petitioner knew each other, and that Boyles turned in petitioner in retaliation for a similar action by
petitioner against Boyles. Moreover, the state court held that it was not obligated to accept the
claims in the affidavits as true, noting that the new evidence contained serious flaws. Gee had
several convictions (larceny, retail fraud, armed robbery) that the state court found could be used to
impeach his testimony. Grays also had a prior conviction (armed robbery) which made his testimony
less convincing. The court also noted that the statute of limitations had run on any new prosecution
for Gee and Boyles for the Zephyr robbery. The state court concluded that the new evidence offered
by petitioner would not cause the trier of fact to reach a different verdict at a separate trial.
II. Analysis
This action is governed by the Antiterrorism, and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub.L. 014-
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA). See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001). The AEDPA
“prevents federal habeas ‘retrials,’” and ensures that state court convictions are given effect to the
extent possible under the law. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-94 (2002). An application for writ
of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a state conviction cannot be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the
adjudication (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or (2)
resulted in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A federal habeas court may not find a state adjudication to be “unreasonable” “simply

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because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state court decision
applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
411 (2000); accord Bell, 535 U.S. at 699. Rather, the issue is whether the state court’s application
of clearly established federal law is “objectively unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 409.
The AEDPA requires heightened respect for state factual findings. Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d
1131, 1134 (6 Cir. 1998). A determination of a factual issue made by a state court is presumed toth
be correct, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing
evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Lancaster v. Adams, 324 F.3d 426, 429 (6 Cir. 2003); Bailey v.th
Mitchell, 271 F.3d 652, 656 (6 Cir. 2001). This presumption of correctness is accorded to findingsth
of state appellate courts, as well as the trial court. See Summer v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47
(1981); Smith v. Jago, 888 F.2d 399, 407 n. 4 (6 Cir. 1989). Applying the foregoing standardsth
under AEDPA, the court finds that petitioner is not entitled to relief.
In his motion, petitioner does not seek excusal of a procedural error so that he may bring an
independent constitutional claim challenging his conviction or sentence, but rather argues that he is
entitled to habeas relief because newly discovered evidence shows that his conviction is factually
incorrect. In Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993), the Supreme Court explained that
“claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a
ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the
underlying state criminal proceeding.” A claim of actual innocence can only serve to excuse a
procedural default so that a petitioner may bring an independent constitutional claim challenging his
conviction or sentence. Id. at 404. “The rule is grounded in the principle that federal habeas courts

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sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution – not to correct errors
of fact.” Id.
In House v. Bell, 126 S.Ct. 2064 (2006), the Supreme Court declined to answer the question
left open in Herrera – whether a habeas petitioner may bring a freestanding claim of actual
innocence. House, 126 S.Ct. at 2086-87 (noting that “in a capital case a truly persuasive
demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial would render the execution of a defendant
unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such
a claim” (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417)). Since the Supreme Court has declined to recognize
a freestanding innocence claim in habeas corpus, outside the death-penalty context, this court finds
that petitioner’s claim is not entitled to relief under available Supreme Court precedent. In any
event, as the district court noted, there appears to be a state avenue open to petitioner. In denying
petitioner’s second motion for relief from judgment, the Circuit Court for the County of Muskegon
explained that it “would be willing to revisit this matter if . . . Boyles’s testimony, through excerpts
from a deposition properly noticed, [were] presented, or accompanied by tangible physical evidence
supporting the claims.” Thus, we are precluded from considering petitioner’s freestanding innocence
claim.
III. Conclusion
Because petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to relief on his application for a writ of
habeas corpus, we affirm the district court’s denial of relief based on newly discovered evidence.

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ALICE M. BATCHELDER, concurring. I concur in the majority’s judgment and write
separately to elaborate on the actual-innocence exception. In Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400
(1993), the Supreme Court stated: “Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence
have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional
violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding.” But the Herrera Court did not close
the door completely, stating in dicta: “in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual
innocence’ made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant
federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim.” Id. at 417. Thus,
even without the occurrence of any independent constitutional violation during the state criminal
proceeding, federal habeas relief might be warranted for “truly persuasive demonstration of actual
innocence,” provided: (1) the habeas petition seeks relief in a capital case, in which case such a
demonstration of actual innocence “would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional”; and
(2) there is “ no state avenue open to process such a claim.” Id.
This Herrera exception has never been applied and, moreover, the Court emphasized that
“the threshold showing for such an assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high.” Id.;
see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. --, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 2087 (2006) (“In Herrera, however, the Court
described the threshold for any hypothetical freestanding innocence claim as ‘extraordinarily
high.’”); Cress v. Palmer, 484 F.3d 844, 854-55 (6th Cir. 2007). Therefore, to invoke this exception
and obtain habeas relief on his freestanding innocence claim, Wright must meet both pre-conditions
and then overcome the “extraordinarily high” threshold.
Wright fails the first precondition. This is not a capital case, and hence, the concern about

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the unconstitutionality of executing a defendant who has shown persuasive evidence of actual
innocence is not implicated. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417; Cress, 484 F.3d at 855 (“We first point
out the obvious -- that this is not, in fact, a capital case.”). Therefore, Wright cannot avail himself
of this actual-innocence exception, and his habeas petition is without merit.

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ALICE M. BATCHELDER, concurring. I concur in the majority’s judgment and write
separately to elaborate on the actual-innocence exception. In Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400
(1993), the Supreme Court stated: “Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence
have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional
violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding.” But the Herrera Court did not close
the door completely, stating in dicta: “in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual
innocence’ made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant
federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim.” Id. at 417. Thus,
even without the occurrence of any independent constitutional violation during the state criminal
proceeding, federal habeas relief might be warranted for “truly persuasive demonstration of actual
innocence,” provided: (1) the habeas petition seeks relief in a capital case, in which case such a
demonstration of actual innocence “would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional”; and
(2) there is “ no state avenue open to process such a claim.” Id.
This Herrera exception has never been applied and, moreover, the Court emphasized that
“the threshold showing for such an assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high.” Id.;
see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. --, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 2087 (2006) (“In Herrera, however, the Court
described the threshold for any hypothetical freestanding innocence claim as ‘extraordinarily
high.’”); Cress v. Palmer, 484 F.3d 844, 854-55 (6th Cir. 2007). Therefore, to invoke this exception
and obtain habeas relief on his freestanding innocence claim, Wright must meet both pre-conditions
and then overcome the “extraordinarily high” threshold.
Wright fails the first precondition. This is not a capital case, and hence, the concern about

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the unconstitutionality of executing a defendant who has shown persuasive evidence of actual
innocence is not implicated. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417; Cress, 484 F.3d at 855 (“We first point
out the obvious -- that this is not, in fact, a capital case.”). Therefore, Wright cannot avail himself
of this actual-innocence exception, and his habeas petition is without merit.

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