DELORES EGGERSON, Personal Representative of the Estate of Leon Dandredge v. United States of America

The Hon. W illiam W Schwarzer, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California,
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sitting by designation.
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 07a0373n.06
Filed: June 1, 2007
No. 06-2021
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
DELORES EGGERSON, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Leon
Dandredge,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Before: DAUGHTREY and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges, and SCHWARZER, District*
Judge.
PER CURIAM. The plaintiff, Delores Eggerson, appeals from the district court’s
order granting the government’s motion to dismiss this action, brought under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680, for damages arising from the fatal shooting of
Leon Dandredge by Deputy United States Marshal Mark Hessler. Eggerson v. United
States of America, No. 05-594, 2006 WL 1720252 (W.D. Mich. June 22, 2006) (Eggerson
II). The district court’s decision was based on its determination that the current action, filed
a week after the dismissal of Eggerson v. Hessler, No. 04-425, 2005 WL 2035049 (W.D.

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No. 06-2021
Eggerson v. Unites States
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Mich. Aug. 23, 2005) (Eggerson I), was barred by collateral estoppel. Eggerson I was filed
pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971), and resulted in a ruling that Hessler’s use of deadly force against
Dandredge during an attempt to arrest him was not unreasonable under the circumstances
outlined in the district court’s opinion. The court’s order granting summary judgment to
Hessler was recently affirmed by this court, based on our determination that Hessler’s use
of deadly force was justified as self-defense and was, therefore, reasonable. Eggerson v.
Hessler, No. 05-2333, 2007 WL 579545 at *5 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 2007) (Eggerson III).
The plaintiff’s appeal appears to be based on nothing more than mere semantics.
She argues that the first suit was dismissed “because the district court found no
constitutional tort, but . . . made no determination with respect to negligence,” and that the
doctrine of collateral estoppel is, therefore, inapplicable. But this contention is in direct
conflict with the plaintiff’s concession in the district court, as reflected in the district court’s
opinion, “that unless the [district] court change[d] its ruling in [Eggerson I], collateral
estoppel bars her from relitigating the issue of how the shooting occurred.” As the district
court noted, no motion to reconsider the Eggerson I decision was filed in that court, and
we have since approved it. Moreover, the plaintiff’s current attempt to backtrack on her
concession – by arguing, in effect, that the issue in Eggerson I was “intent” while in
Eggerson II it is “negligence” – overlooks the fact that both actions are based on the same
facts and that the finding of reasonableness forecloses liability under both theories of
recovery.

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No. 06-2021
Eggerson v. Unites States
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In short, we find that the appeal in this case borders on the frivolous and, given the
full legal analysis provided by the district court in Eggerson II, we conclude that another
detailed discussion of the case is obviously unnecessary. We therefore AFFIRM the
judgment of the district court for the reasons given in its opinion and order in Eggerson II,
dated June 22, 2006.

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