Irving Frank Kramer, Jr. v. REGINALD A. WILKINSON and RONALD C. MOOMAW

Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”).1
Director of Clinical Services, ODRC Bureau of Mental Health Services.2
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 07a0206n.06
Filed: March 21, 2007
No. 05-4363
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
IRVING FRANK KRAMER, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
REGINALD A. WILKINSON and RONALD C.
MOOMAW,
Defendants-Appellees.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
OHIO
Before: SILER, MOORE, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. Plaintiff Irving F. Kramer, Jr. appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging that the quality of mental health services provided by the Ohio
prison system has decreased, that he was treated inappropriately by staff, and that he has been forced
to take psychotropic medication. We reverse and remand in light of recent authority.
BACKGROUND
In 2005, Kramer filed a pro se complaint against Reginald Wilkinson and Dr. Ronald1
Moomaw (collectively, “Defendants”) in district court, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment2
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Kramer’s complaint alleges that “[m]ental

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No. 05-4363
Kramer v. Wilkinson, et al.
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health in the Ohio prison system has gone down . . . ” and that “two doctors [have said he] would
have to go off [his] medication (lithium) because of kidney failure.” Kramer also claims that he was
placed in solitary confinement, sprayed with mace, and given shots against his will, all in an effort
to force him to “conform to his meds.” In March 2005, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss,
arguing, inter alia, that Kramer failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Three days later, the
district court, sua sponte, dismissed Kramer’s complaint without prejudice for failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. The district court then denied Defendants’
motion to dismiss as moot.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the dismissal of a prisoner’s civil rights claim for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies de novo. Boyd v. Corrs. Corp. of America, 380 F.3d 989, 993 (6th Cir. 2004).
DISCUSSION
The district court below dismissed Kramer’s complaint for failure to prove exhaustion of
administrative remedies pursuant to the Sixth Circuit’s heightened pleading standards that were
designed to facilitate the screening requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 110
Stat. 1321-71, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1997e et seq. See Knuckles El v. Toombs, 215 F.3d 640, 642
(6th Cir. 2000); Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1103-04 (6th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Under
these heightened pleading standards, prisoners bore the burden of pleading and proving exhaustion.
See Brown, 139 F.3d at 1104.
In Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910 (2007), however, the Supreme Court recently invalidated
these heightened pleading standards, holding that “failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under

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No. 05-4363
Kramer v. Wilkinson, et al.
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the PLRA, and that inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their
complaints.” Id. at 921. Although Jones was not decided at the time the district court dismissed
Kramer’s complaint, it is now controlling precedent. Thus, Kramer does not bear the burden of
specially pleading and proving exhaustion; rather, this affirmative defense may serve as a basis for
dismissal only if raised and proven by the defendants.
We therefore REVERSE the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of Kramer’s complaint and
REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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