Doug Hagood, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee

*The Honorable Lawrence P. Zatkoff, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting
by designation.
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 06a0325n.06
Filed: May 9, 2006
Case No. 05-5845
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
DOUG HAGOOD, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF
NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY,
TENNESSEE,
Defendants-Appellees.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE MIDDLE
DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
BEFORE: BATCHELDER and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges; ZATKOFF, District Judge. *
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Doug Hagood appeals the
district court’s dismissal of his discrimination claim against the Metropolitan Government of
Nashville, Tennessee, brought under Titles I and II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Hagood is a disabled former police officer who was injured
in the line of duty in 1973 and is unable to work in any significant capacity. He receives disability
pension benefits through the defendant’s disability benefits pension program. He brought this action
as a purported class action on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, claiming that the
defendants violated both Title I and Title II of the ADA by using a single formula to calculate

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disability benefits for disabled employees regardless of their respective degrees of disability, which
results in a lower standard of living for more severely disabled employees.
The district court granted the defendant’s motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted and dismissed the action. The court held that Hagood had failed to demonstrate that
he is a “qualified individual with a disability” as defined by Title I of the ADA, and that he therefore
could not meet the threshold requirement for stating a claim under Title I. The court further held
that the binding precedent of this circuit holds that employment discrimination claims, including
claims regarding such fringe benefits as long-term disability benefits, are exclusively the province
of Title I of the ADA, and that Hagood therefore could not bring his claim under Title II. Finally,
the district court held that even if the claims could properly be brought under Title II, he could not
meet the requirements of a prima facie case of discrimination because he does not claim that he is
being denied access to disability benefits or is being discriminated against under the terms of the
disability benefits program solely because of his disability, but rather, claims that the benefits under
the plan should discriminate on the basis of the degree of disability. Hagood timely appealed.
After carefully reviewing the record, the applicable law, the parties’ briefs and counsels’
arguments, we are convinced that the district court did not err in its conclusions. As the district
court’s opinion carefully and correctly sets out the law governing the issues raised, and clearly
articulates the reasons underlying its decision, issuance of a full written opinion by this court would
serve no useful purpose. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the district court’s opinion, we
AFFIRM.

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