DARRY GREER and MICHELLE GREER v. Ford Motor Credit Company

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 06a0089n.06
Filed: February 2, 2006
No. 05-5165
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
DARRY GREER and MICHELLE GREER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
Before: MARTIN, NORRIS, and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. The plaintiffs, Darry and Michelle Greer, appeal from the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant, Ford Motor Credit Company, on the
plaintiffs’ claims of racial discrimination, retaliation, and loss of consortium under Title VII,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17, under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, under the Tennessee Human
Rights Act, T.C.A. §§ 4-21-101 - 4-21-1004, and under Tennessee state tort law. They
maintain that Darry Greer was subjected to racial harassment and to a hostile work
environment at Ford Motor Credit and that the defendant then retaliated against him for
filing a claim of racial discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Michelle Greer also derivatively alleges loss of her husband’s companionship and services
as a result of the harassment and discrimination.

-- 1 of 2 --

No. 05-5165
Greer v. Ford Motor Credit Co.
- 2 -
In addressing the plaintiffs’ claims, the district court painstakingly analyzed each of
the allegations of harassment, discrimination, and retaliation. The court concluded that the
hostile work environment assertions under Title VII, § 1981, and the Tennessee Human
Rights Act were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. The district judge then
determined that Ford Motor Credit was entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs’
retaliation claims because the Greers failed to establish either that Darry Greer suffered an
adverse employment action or that he was subjected to severe or pervasive retaliatory
harassment by a supervisor. In any event, the district court held, even if the plaintiffs had
made a prima facie showing of retaliation, the defendant established that it “had installed
a readily accessible and effective policy for reporting and resolving complaints of
harassment,” and that Darry Greer failed to utilize those mechanisms. Finally, the court
properly noted that the state law claim of loss of consortium is considered a derivative claim
in Tennessee and that “Darry Greer has alleged no tort claim from which his wife’s loss of
consortium claim may derive.”
Having studied the record on appeal and the briefs of the parties, we are not
persuaded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment and dismissing the
complaint. Because the reasons why judgment should be entered for the defendant have
been fully articulated by the district court, the issuance of a detailed opinion by this court
would be duplicative and would serve no useful purpose. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the
judgment of the district court upon the reasoning set out by that court in its memorandum
opinion entered December 21, 2004.

-- 2 of 2 --