John G. Spirko, Jr v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN MARGARET BRADSHAW, Warden, DISTRICT OF…

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 05a1011n.06
Filed: December 22,2005
Case No. 05-4356
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
JOHN G. SPIRKO, JR., )
)
Appellant, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
MARGARET BRADSHAW, Warden, ) DISTRICT OF OHIO
)
Appellee. )
)
__________________________________________
BEFORE: BATCHELDER, DAUGHTREY, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Appellant John Spirko, a convicted murderer,
appeals the district court’s orders denying him relief from that court’s judgment dismissing his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Spirko v. Anderson, No. 3:95CV7209, 2000 WL 1278383 (N.D.
Ohio July 11, 2000), aff’d sub nom. Spirko v. Mitchell, 368 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied
sub nom. Spirko v. Bradshaw, 125 S. Ct. 1699 (2005). Spirko’s basic contention is that, for various
reasons, the judgment dismissing his habeas petition should be vacated due to fraud on the federal
habeas court. The district court rejected Spirko’s claims of fraud in an Order denying his motion
for relief from judgment, Spirko v. Bradshaw, — F. Supp. 2d—, No. 3:95CV7209, 2005 WL
3370823 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 28, 2005), and in a subsequent Order denying his motion for vacatur of
the prior Order. Spirko v. Bradshaw, —F. Supp. 2d—, No. 3:95CV7209, 2005 WL 3370049 (N.D.
Ohio Dec. 13, 2005). Because the district court thoroughly addressed Spirko’s arguments and

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persuasively demonstrated that there was no fraud on the federal habeas court, we will affirm that
court’s judgment on the basis of its two well-reasoned opinions.
But for purposes of clarity and completeness, we will add a few comments regarding certain
of Spirko’s contentions. First, as a general matter, we note that many of Spirko’s arguments are
more accurately characterized as attacks on his conviction or sentence, or on the resolution of his
habeas claims on the merits, rather than genuine claims of fraud on the federal habeas court.
Although attacks on Spirko’s conviction or sentence, or the resolution of his habeas claims on the
merits, would constitute a second or successive habeas petition that is generally barred from federal
court adjudication, see Gonzalez v. Crosby, 125 S. Ct. 2641, 2646-48 (2005); Post v. Bradshaw, 422
F.3d 419, 424-25 (6th Cir. 2005), we conclude that the district court was correct in addressing
Spirko’s fraud claims on their merits.
We also note that Spirko argues on appeal, inter alia, that the district court improperly
applied the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), Pub.L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), to his case even though his federal habeas petition was filed before
that law’s enactment, and that the district court erroneously held that a state prosecuting attorney
was not an officer of the federal habeas court for purposes of a fraud-on-the-court claim. It is not
necessary for us to resolve these issues because their resolution would not affect our determination
of the claims on appeal. AEDPA’s application to this case has no effect upon the district court’s
persuasive analysis demonstrating that, at bottom, no fraud was committed on the federal habeas
court warranting the re-opening of Spirko’s habeas action. And the district court also correctly
explained that, even if the Van Wert County prosecuting attorney (first, Stephen Keister, and then
his successor, Charles Kennedy) were an officer of the federal habeas court, and even assuming that

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he made the misrepresentation or concealment of information in this case that Spirko claims, it does
not constitute fraud, and that in any event the information at issue did not bear upon the outcome
of the federal habeas proceedings.
Furthermore, Spirko’s argument that the district court reversibly erred by not treating his
claim as “an independent action for relief from judgment on the basis of fraudulent misconduct” is
unavailing. The district court recognized its authority to treat Spirko’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion
as one for such equitable relief “in cases of unusual and exceptional circumstances,” and although
it did not mechanistically apply the relevant test, the district court’s convincing explanation that it
was not defrauded at all–much less in a way that would have altered its adjudication of Spirko’s
habeas petition–demonstrates that it could not have abused its discretion by denying equitable relief
on the basis of fraud, a claim whose standard is in most respects more difficult to meet than that
under Rule 60(b)(3). See Barrett v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 840 F.2d 1259, 1263 (6th Cir.
1987).
In short, the district court’s two orders denying Spirko relief from judgment clearly
demonstrated that no fraud occurred in the procurement of the habeas court’s judgment, much less
fraud that would have affected that court’s adjudication so as to justify its exercising its discretion
to re-open Spirko’s habeas case. Finding no abuse of discretion, we therefore AFFIRM on the basis
of its two orders the district court’s judgment denying Spirko’s motion for relief from judgment.
See Spirko v. Bradshaw, — F. Supp. 2d—, No. 3:95CV7209, 2005 WL 3370823 (N.D. Ohio Oct.
28, 2005); Spirko v. Bradshaw, —F. Supp. 2d—, No. 3:95CV7209, 2005 WL 3370049 (N.D. Ohio
Dec. 13, 2005).

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RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring. Although I adhere to the position
expressed in my opinion dissenting from the denial of Spirko’s original habeas corpus petition,
Spirko v. Mitchell, 368 F.3d 603, 614-18 (6th Cir. 2004) (Gilman, J., dissenting), I agree with my
colleagues and with the district court that Spirko has not met the high burden of proving fraud on
the habeas court either under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or via an
independent action for relief from judgment. I therefore agree that the judgment of the district court
should be affirmed.

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