Vanissa L. Sharp, and others similarly situated; LARRY M. CAMP; MARISSA JILL CLAYTON v. EASY MONEY TITLE PAWN, INC. d/b/a EASY MONEY TITLE PAWN; CAREY BROWN

*The Honorable Thomas B. Russell, United States District Judge for the Western District of Kentucky, sitting
by designation.
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 05a0354n.06
Filed: May 4, 2005
Case No. 03-6581
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
VANISSA L. SHARP, and others similarly
situated; LARRY M. CAMP; MARISSA
JILL CLAYTON,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
EASY MONEY TITLE PAWN, INC. d/b/a
EASY MONEY TITLE PAWN; CAREY
BROWN,
Defendants-Appellants.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
BEFORE: BATCHELDER and COLE, Circuit Judges; RUSSELL*, District Judge.
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Easy Money Title Pawn, Inc. (“EMTP”) and
its owner, Carey Brown, appeal from various orders of the magistrate judge and the district court
in this action alleging common law fraud and violations of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1601 et seq., and Title 12, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 226, also known as Regulation Z; the
Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, T.C.A. § 47-18-101 et seq.; and the Tennessee Usury Statute,
T.C.A. § 47-14-101 et seq. EMTP appeals from the orders granting the plaintiffs’ motion to proceed
as a class; ruling that Plaintiff Vanissa L. Sharp had standing to pursue claims on behalf of the class;
granting summary judgment to Plaintiff Marissa Jill Clayton on her usury claim pursuant to the

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Tennessee Usury Statute, T.C.A. § 47-14-101 et seq.; finding that EMTP had engaged in
unconscionable conduct under T.C.A. § 47-14-117(c); and awarding attorney fees based on both
statutory fee shifting provisions and out of the common fund. Brown separately appeals from orders
of the magistrate judge and the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the class
plaintiffs on their claim that Brown violated the civil provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et. seq.
We have carefully reviewed the record presented on appeal, and have examined each of the
opinions from which these appeals are taken. Now, having reviewed the briefs of the parties and
the applicable law, and having had the benefit of oral argument, we are satisfied that, with one
exception that we will address below, we cannot improve upon the careful and thorough analysis
provided by the magistrate judge and the district court. Because the lower court opinions contain
no clearly erroneous findings of fact, carefully and correctly set out the law governing the issues
raised, and clearly articulate the reasons underlying the decisions, issuance of a full written opinion
by this court would serve no useful purpose. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the opinions of
the magistrate judge and the district court, we AFFIRM.
We add only that, although we agree with the magistrate judge’s conclusion that because the
trustee in Sharp’s bankruptcy abandoned any interest in this cause of action, Sharp has standing to
bring this action and to represent the class, we would find that Sharp has standing principally on the
ground that Sharp’s interest in this action was never the property of the bankruptcy estate. See In
re Young, 66 F.3d 376, 378-79 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that the 1994 amendment to § 348 of the
Bankruptcy Code should control in pre-amendment ongoing cases, and that the debtor’s tort causes
of action that accrued while the case was proceeding under Chapter 13 did not become property of

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the estate or subject to the bankruptcy proceedings upon conversion of the case to Chapter 7
proceedings.)

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