Ronald Moore v. Fairfield County Sheriff

* The Honorable Myron H. Bright, Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
1 The Honorable George C. Smith, United States District Judge for the Southern District of
Ohio.
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 05a0254n.06
Filed: April 4, 2005
No. 04-3174
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
RONALD MOORE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
FAIRFIELD COUNTY SHERIFF; DAVE
PHALEN; FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO;
FAIRFIELD COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
Defendants - Appellees.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF OHIO
Before: Boggs, Chief Judge, Cook and Bright *
, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. Ronald Moore, appellant, filed suit against Fairfield County Sheriff’s
Department, Fairfield County Sheriff Dave Phelan, Fairfield County and the Board of
Commissioners of Fairfield County (collectively Fairfield), alleging they violated the Fair Labor
Standards Act by failing to pay him for compensatory time and overtime. The United States District
Judge 1 granted summary judgment to Fairfield, determining that Moore’s claims were time-barred
and equitable tolling does not apply. Moore v. Fairfield County Sheriff’s Dep’t, et al., No. C-2-02-
748 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 6, 2004).

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No. 04-3174
Moore v. Fairfield County Sheriff, et al.
Page 2
Moore appeals, contending that the district court erred in considering Fairfield’s late
summary judgment motion and response memorandum and in considering Fairfield’s exhibits.
Moore also argues the district court erred in granting Fairfield summary judgment and determining
Moore’s claims were time-barred and equitable tolling does not apply.
We review the district court’s decision with respect to Fairfield’s excusable neglect in filing
a late motion for summary judgment and response memorandum for abuse of discretion. See Allen
v. Murph, 194 F.3d 722, 724 (6th Cir. 1999). We review the grant of summary judgment de novo
and affirm if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Rannals v. Diamond Jo Casino, 265 F.3d 442, 447 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1132
(2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
After carefully reviewing this case, we conclude the district court thoroughly analyzed the
issues and properly applied the law. The district court has written a comprehensive, well-reasoned
opinion covering all issues presented on this appeal, with which we agree.
The district court noted that it had previously granted Fairfield’s motion for leave to enlarge
the time period for filing, because Fairfield’s late “filing was a result of excusable neglect.” The
district court then denied Moore’s motion to strike. After carefully reviewing the record, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining Fairfield’s late “filing was
a result of excusable neglect.”
The district court granted Fairfield’s motion for summary judgment, relying on this court’s
decision in Archer v. Sullivan County, Nos. 95-5214, 95-5215, 1997 WL 720406 at *2 (6th Cir.

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No. 04-3174
Moore v. Fairfield County Sheriff, et al.
Page 3
Nov. 14, 1997). The district court properly determined that Moore “is in the same position as the
plaintiffs in Archer” and Moore, “like the plaintiffs in Archer, . . . is time-barred from asserting
claims for compensatory time worked in excess of 480 hours.” The district court noted that Fairfield
had “already compensated [Moore] for 562 compensatory hours, in excess of the 480 hours that he
could demand in the complaint.” We affirm.
Finally, the district court properly and thoroughly addressed the five equitable tolling factors
in determining that equitable tolling does not apply to this case.
Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the district court’s opinion.

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