Tahler Macboyle v. City of Parma

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0290P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 04a0290p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
TAHLER MACBOYLE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF PARMA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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No. 03-3784
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Akron.
No. 02-01487—James Gwin, District Judge.
Argued: August 5, 2004
Decided and Filed: September 1, 2004
Before: KENNEDY, SUTTON, and COOK, Circuit
Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Brent L. English, LAW OFFICE OF BRENT L.
ENGLISH, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Michael P.
Maloney, LAW OFFICE, Westlake, Ohio, for Appellees.
ON BRIEF: Brent L. English, LAW OFFICE OF BRENT
L. ENGLISH, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Michael P.
Maloney, LAW OFFICE, Westlake, Ohio, Timothy G.
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1Patrolmen Edward Pinc, Kenneth Chihil, Daniel Heinz, Daniel
Ciryak, Christopher Dillenbeck, Victor Beleske, Wayne K resak, and
Joseph Duganier; and Sergeants James Blair and Gary Kuchta.
Dobeck, OFFICE OF THE LAW DIRECTOR, Parma, Ohio,
for Appellees.
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OPINION
_________________
KENNEDY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff appeals an order
granting summary judgment to Defendants City of Parma and
individual Parma Police Officers1 in this § 1983 action based
on the alleged use of excessive force during the arrest.
Plaintiff argues that the district court erred when it upheld the
validity of a release-dismissal agreement in granting the
motion for summary judgment. Finding the release met the
requirements of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987), we
affirm.
BACKGROUND
This § 1983 case stems from the arrest of Plaintiff Tahler
MacBoyle on the night of July 29, 2000. Plaintiff sued
Defendants City of Parma and several Parma Police Officers
for using excessive force and causing permanent injuries, in
carrying out that arrest. Plaintiff claims that the Parma Police
Officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights, and that City of Parma is liable for malicious
prosecution, negligence, and failure to train.
On July 29, 2000, at approximately 11:30 p.m., Parma
Police Department dispatched Defendants Pinc and Ciryak to
the home of Kimberly Guder, 6511 State Road, apartment
204, in Parma, Ohio, to investigate a noise disturbance.
Ms. Guder was hosting a surprise party for her boyfriend,
Paul Kopin, who had recently turned nineteen. Ms. Guder

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2Apparently, the male was a party guest to whom Ms. Guder had
given the keys so he could get back inside the apartment.
invited about thirty people to the party, including Mr. Kopin’s
mother, Shirley Kopin, and Ms. Kopin’s boyfriend, Plaintiff
MacBoyle. Plaintiff was thirty-four at the time of the party.
Ms. Kopin and Plaintiff both attended the party and were at
the apartment when the police officers arrived. Several guests
had brought alcohol to the party, and the party goers were
consuming alcohol. According to Defendants, when they
arrived at the apartment complex, they observed a female and
male noticing them and running to the second floor of the
apartment complex. As the Defendants approached the
apartment, a male with keys to the apartment2 let the police
officers into Ms. Guder’s apartment. The officers believed
they entered the apartment with consent. At the time of the
entry, Plaintiff was on the apartment’s balcony with Ms.
Kopin and Ms. Guder.
Inside the apartment, the police officers observed fifteen to
twenty individuals. Many of those individuals in the
possession of alcoholic beverages appeared to be underage.
When the officers requested the name of the apartment’s
owner, no one responded. When the officers began
requesting identification from the individuals present, no one
responded. During this period, several individuals, including
Plaintiff, entered the living room. Defendants claim that
Plaintiff began using vulgarities and demanding to know who
let the officers in. Plaintiff claims that it was the police
officers who used vulgarities while questioning the party
goers and that he, Plaintiff, was attempting to diffuse the
situation by politely asking the police officers why they were
in the apartment. Plaintiff further claims that he asked the
police officers to leave only when they failed to respond to his
inquiries, and that the police offices declined to leave.
Defendant Pinc asked Plaintiff for identification.
Defendants claim that Plaintiff refused to give any
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3Plaintiff later pleaded no contest to minor misdemeanor disorderly
conduct.
identification, and, instead, continued with loud vulgarities
and demanded that the officer produce a search warrant.
Plaintiff claims that another guest, Mr. Kopin, and not he,
used profanities and that Defendants confused the two of
them. Defendants claim that at one point during the
discussion, Plaintiff moved toward Defendant Pinc.
Defendant Pinc put his hand up to stop Plaintiff from
approaching and called for backup police officers. One of
those officers, Defendant Chihil, went to the apartment’s
balcony and instructed the individuals to return into the
apartment for identification purposes. Defendants claim that
Plaintiff began walking toward the balcony, that they advised
him to remain inside the apartment three times, and that he
refused to obey their instructions. Plaintiff, on the other hand,
claims that, at this point, he decided to call the Mayor’s
office. Plaintiff also says that the officers, using more
profanity, instructed him to get off the phone, and when he
refused, one of the officers grabbed the phone and threw it
across the room. Plaintiff further says that an officer struck
him on the head with a flashlight and that the officers
continued their assault on him by throwing him on to a table
and then to the floor, and then running him out of the
apartment head first into the apartment’s metal door.
Plaintiff was charged with obstructing official business,
resisting arrest and disorderly conduct. Mr. Kopin and two
other guests were also charged with various offenses. The
cases were consolidated for trial. While his criminal case was
pending, Defendant, on advice of his counsel, entered into a
release-dismissal agreement with all Defendants (the “Release
Agreement”). Pursuant to the Release Agreement, Plaintiff
waived all rights to sue Defendants. The City agreed to
dismiss the charges of resisting arrest and obstructing official
business and to amend the disorderly conduct charge.3
Notwithstanding the Release Agreement, Plaintiff filed the

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No. 03-3784 MacBoyle v. City of Parma, et al. 5
instant action. Defendants argued, and the district court
found, that the Release Agreement prevents Plaintiff from
bringing this action.
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court has upheld the validity of release-
dismissal agreements whereby a criminal defendant releases
his right to file a civil rights action in return for a prosecutor’s
dismissal of pending criminal charges, as long as the
agreement meets certain criteria. See generally Town of
Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987). The enforcement of
such an agreement is appropriate if a court decides that (1) it
was entered into voluntarily; (2) there is no evidence of
prosecutorial misconduct; and (3) the enforcement furthers
the public interest. Id. at 398. The burden of proof in this
analysis “falls upon the party in the § 1983 action who seeks
to invoke the agreement as a defense.” Coughlen v. Coots,
5 F.3d 970, 974 (6th Cir. 1993). We derived the rationale for
this allocation of the burden of proof from Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence in Rumery:
Permitting such releases may tempt public officials to
bring frivolous criminal charges in order to deter
meritorious civil complaints. The risk and expense of a
criminal trial can easily intimidate even an innocent
person whose civil and constitutional rights have been
violated. The coercive power of criminal process may be
twisted to serve the end of suppressing complaints
against official abuse, to the detriment not only of the
victim of such abuse, but also of society as a whole.
Rumery, 480 U.S. at 400 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part)
(quoted in Coughlen, 5 F.3d at 973). As the district court
correctly noted, a court may not, in conducting its Rumery
analysis, “prejudge the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim and will look
for ‘the existence of substantial evidence of police
misconduct in a particular case . . . since [such evidence]
could be probative of the motives of the prosecutor for
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seeking such an agreement, as well as the degree to which
enforcing the agreement would serve the public interest.’”
MacBoyle v. City of Parma, No. 1:02-CV-1487, slip op. at 7
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2002) (citing Coughlen, 5 F.3d at 974).
The district court conducted the three-factor Rumery
analysis and concluded that the Release Agreement should be
upheld.
With respect to the voluntariness prong, the district court
stated:
Plaintiff MacBoyle was thirty-four years old and
represented by an attorney when he signed the Release
Agreement. He is a college graduate who has been
employed since 1989 and takes part in continuing
professional education seminars. Plaintiff MacBoyle was
not incarcerated when he signed the Release Agreement,
and there is no evidence that MacBoyle did not have
ample time to consider the agreement before signing it.
In fact, Plaintiff MacBoyle claims that he signed the
release out of concern for Shirley Kopin, Paul Kopin and
Kim Guder, who also had all the criminal charges
besides minor misdemeanor criminal conduct dismissed
as a result of Plaintiff’s and their releases. Plaintiff
MacBoyle’s signing of the Release Agreement was
undeniably voluntary.
MacBoyle v. City of Parma, No. 1:02-CV-1487, slip op. at 7-
8 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2002). Plaintiff presents a number of
objections to this conclusion. Because these objections lack
any merit, we conclude, without unnecessary discussion, that
the district court properly found that Plaintiff voluntarily
signed the Release Agreement. We emphasize that the fact
that Plaintiff signed the release out of concern for the others
charged in the event does not affect the voluntariness of his
act.

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With respect to the prosecutorial misconduct prong, the
district court stated:
. . . Plaintiff MacBoyle offers no real evidence of
prosecutorial misconduct. Plaintiff MacBoyle does not
claim that any of the charges against him were in any
way trumped up. In fact, given the police officers [sic]
version of the incident, the criminal charges seem
reasonable. MacBoyle claims that the prosecutor
changed his mind from dismissing all the charges to
wanting the Plaintiff and the other indicted party goers to
plead to one charge of minor misdemeanor disorderly
conduct. Plaintiff MacBoyle also says that the
prosecutor should not have conditioned the dismissal on
all the indicted party goers signing the release. This
Court finds that such evidence, even if true, does not rise
to the level of prosecutorial misconduct. There is no rule
against a prosecutor changing his mind. Plaintiff
MacBoyle does not claim that he accepted an earlier
offer whereby all claims were dismissed, and then the
prosecutor changed his mind and forced him to accept
another offer. Rather, Plaintiff claims that the prosecutor
contemplating dismissing all charges, thought better of
it, and changed his mind. Such activity is not
misconduct. Linking the agreements was also not
misconduct. All the charges against the party goers were
reasonable in light of the police officers [sic] description
of the incident. MacBoyle was free to not sign the
Release Agreement if he chose not to.
MacBoyle v. City of Parma, No. 1:02-CV-1487, slip op. at 8
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2002). The district court’s decision on
this point was, thus, a legal one. Plaintiff has presented us
with no legal authority to conclude that what the prosecutor
did in this case amounted to misconduct. Plaintiff simply
contends that the presence of conflicting testimony amounts
to “substantial evidence” of prosecutorial misconduct under
Coughlen. However, we have already held that the mere
“existence of discrepancies among the accounts of
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prosecution witnesses does not amount to ‘substantial
evidence’ of police misconduct such that an inference of
prosecutorial misconduct under Coughlen arises.” Burke v.
Johnson, 167 F.3d 276, 286 (6th Cir. 1999). If the
discrepancy among the prosecution witnesses is not sufficient
to constitute prosecutorial misconduct, then certainly a
discrepancy between the prosecution witnesses and Plaintiff’s
witnesses is not enough to rise to the level of prosecutorial
misconduct. Accordingly, we find that the district court
properly found that there was no prosecutorial misconduct.
With respect to the public interest prong, the district court
found that:
. . . enforcing the Release Agreement serves public
interest in that such agreements enable parties to resolve
issues ami[c]ably themselves, weed out unmeritorious
claims and charges, and conserve[] precious judicial
resources. The evidence shows that Plaintiff MacBoyle
agreed to the Release Agreement voluntarily without any
prosecutorial misconduct. Public interest mandates
holding parties to the agreements they enter into on their
own volition. Nullifying the Release Agreements would
provide a disincentive to prosecutors from agreeing to
release-dismissal agreements in the future. Therefore the
public interest is served by enforcing the Release
Agreement.
MacBoyle v. City of Parma, No. 1:02-CV-1487, slip op. at 8-
9 ( N.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2002). The district court’s recital of
factors would apply to every release-dismissal agreement. It
is true of all such agreements that they “enable parties to
resolve issues ami[c]ably themselves, weed out unmeritorious
claims and charges, and conserve[] precious judicial
resources.” It is also true that nullifying such agreements
“would provide a disincentive to prosecutors from agreeing”
to them in the future. However, in the absence of a
determination by the district court that Plaintiff’s claims were
“unmeritorious,” a finding that the Release Agreement in this

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4W e continue to remind the district courts to make such findings to
make it easier for this Court to evaluate the district court’s decision.
case would not adversely affect relevant public interests
requires some further analysis.
As we noted in an earlier opinion, this element is the “least
well-defined element of a Rumery analysis.” Coughlen,
5 F.3d at 975. We explained that “this standard can be
satisfied if the prosecutor demonstrates that obtaining the
release was motivated by an independent, legitimate criminal
justice objective” and that this “does not appear to create a
particularly difficult hurdle for the prosecutor to clear.” Id.
(noting that “the reason proffered by the prosecutor for the
release-dismissal agreement in this case–‘to aid in the
disposition of its heavy case load’–would probably suffice
under ordinary circumstances.”) In Coughlen, we also
provided a non-exhaustive list of circumstances in which
“[r]elease dismissal agreements [] can be legitimate criminal
justice tools . . .” Id. (offering as examples, situations where
(1) “police misconduct is alleged, but the prosecutor is
genuinely unable to ascertain the truth surrounding the
allegation”; (2) “the cost of prosecution would outweigh the
benefit accruing to the public from a conviction; [3] the
strength of evidence of criminal conduct is doubtful even
though charges were filed in good faith . . .”; (4) “criminal
charges are not the product of prosecutorial misconduct and
both sides benefit substantially from a balanced settlement in
the sense that both avoid exposure to potential liabilities and
expenses.”)
The district court’s failure to make adequate findings of
fact, however, does not warrant a remand. We have, in the
past, determined whether the public interest prong was
satisfied even in the absence of a district court finding when
there was sufficient evidence in the record to do so. Hill v.
Cleveland, 12 F.3d 575, 579 (6th Cir. 1993).4 We will do so
in this case. In Hill, a panel made an independent finding
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5The trial court declared a mistrial in the first trial because it was
discovered that a police report had been improperly placed in the jury
room. Apparently, there either was an eight-person jury or the alternate
jurors had not been excused when the mistrial was ordered. In any case,
the release-dismissal agreem ent was signed in anticipation o f a retrial.
under the following circumstances: (1) the failure of a state
trial court to reach a decision on the merits of a criminal case
(7-1 vote to acquit)5; (2) the conflicting and adversarial
positions taken by the parties on the proof; (3) the connection
between the civil rights action and the criminal charges;
(4) the lack of prosecutorial overreaching; (5) the nature of
charges brought. Our case is very similar with respect to
factors (2) through (5). We do have an absence of an
apparent, albeit legally nonexistent, acquittal. However, this
difference weakens the position of Plaintiff in the instant case.
The Hill plaintiff was likely to be believed and thus acquitted
in a retrial, and nevertheless lost in his attempt to void the
release-dismissal agreement. Plaintiff in the instant case has
merely asserted his innocence. The record reflects that the
testimony of the parties was in direct conflict as to what had
indeed occurred. Accordingly, we find that Plaintiff in this
case has an even weaker argument than the Hill plaintiff and
we make an independent determination that enforcing the
agreement would not adversely affect the relevant public
interests.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court’s
order granting summary judgment to all Defendants.

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