SEFIT RAMANI; LINDITA RAMANI; and ARDIT RAMANI v. JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General of the United States

*The Hono rable Danny C. Reeves, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0260P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 04a0260p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
SEFIT RAMANI; LINDITA
RAMANI; and ARDIT RAMANI,
Petitioners,
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney
General of the United States;
IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Respondents.
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No. 02-4362
On Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Nos. A77 621 623; A77 621 624; A77 621 625.
Argued: June 9, 2004
Decided and Filed: August 4, 2004
Before: SILER and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges; REEVES,
District Judge.*
2 Ramani, et al. v. Ashcroft, et al. No. 02-4362
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Richard A. Kulics, IMMIGRATION LAW
CENTER, Birmingham, Michigan, for Petitioners. Daniel E.
Goldman, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., for Respondents. ON BRIEF: Richard
A. Kulics, IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, Birmingham,
Michigan, for Petitioners. Alison Marie Igoe, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.,
for Respondents.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
DANNY C. REEVES, District Judge. Petitioners Sefit
Ramani (“Ramani”), Lindita Ramani, and Ardit Ramani seek
review of the Board of Immigration’s (“BIA”) decision
affirming the denial of their requests for asylum, withholding
of removal, and protection under the Convention Against
Torture. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the BIA’s
decision.
BACKGROUND
The Ramanis are ethnic Albanians and citizens of
Macedonia who entered the United States without inspection
on or about October 19, 1999. Subsequently, on October 21,
1999, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”)
charged Ramani with being an alien present in the United
States without having been admitted or paroled into the
country and instituted removal proceedings against him. At
the initial removal hearing, Ramani requested permission to
file a written application for asylum, which was submitted
September 19, 2000. The court set a hearing date on the
merits of Ramani’s application for April 13, 2001.

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No. 02-4362 Ramani, et al. v. Ashcroft, et al. 3
Approximately two weeks before the merits hearing,
Ramani sought to offer two documents for admission into
evidence to support his request for asylum. The first
document was represented to be a copy of a legal summons
from a Macedonian court directing Ramani to appear on
October 12, 1999. The second document was a purported
copy of an extract from the Macedonian penal code. At the
April 13, 2001 hearing, the INS objected to the introduction
of these documents. After the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) asked
about the location of the originals of the documents, Ramani
testified that he had given the summons to his attorney who
claimed to have misplaced it. Ramani further testified that his
uncle mailed a copy of the penal code extract to him after
obtaining it from an attorney in Macedonia. He stated that he
had torn off the portion of the document that he felt was
irrelevant. Ramani’s attorney admitted that he had made no
attempt to obtain a copy of the Macedonian law from a source
from which the IJ could have taken judicial notice.
During the hearing Ramani testified that he is a citizen of
Macedonia but that he is an ethnic Albanian. He stated that
prior to arriving in the United States he lived in Tateshposto,
Struga, which is approximately twenty kilometers from the
Albanian border. Ramani testified that his association with
the police began in 1997 when he began to participate in
demonstrations that promoted rights for ethnic Albanians. He
indicated that the group that typically organized the
demonstrations was “some kind of a party, VDSH,
Democratic Party of Albania.” Although Ramani testified
that he was a member of this group, he claimed that he had
left his membership card at his mother’s house in Macedonia.
He stated that the group conducted several additional
gatherings in 1998. He further claimed that his problems with
the police resurfaced in 1999 after a group of Albanian
refugees arrived from Kosovo. Ramani stated that, in
September 1999, following a demonstration in Valesht, he
was stopped by the police as he was returning home.
According to Ramani, the officers beat him several times over
a thirty minute period. As a result of this incident, he stated
4 Ramani, et al. v. Ashcroft, et al. No. 02-4362
that he was supposed to appear in court on October 12, 1999,
but he was afraid to do so. Specifically, he testified that he
was fearful of being “torture[d] while in the custody of the
police.”
Lindita Ramani testified that the police came to her house
and arrested her husband on two occasions. While she could
not remember the dates of those arrests, she estimated that it
was from “1997 and on.” She indicated that the last
demonstration she recalled her husband attending was in
1999. However, she could not recall how long after this
demonstration they came to the United States.
After evaluating the testimony presented at the hearing, the
IJ denied Ramani’s request for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against
Torture. Specifically, the IJ found that Ramani was not a
credible witness. He noted that Ramani could not remember
any of the organizers of the July 1997 demonstration other
than Rufi Osmani. Also, he pointed out that Ramani’s
references to his arrests were very general and that his
testimony was vague, in that he could not specifically
remember the dates of his alleged arrests.
The IJ also concluded that Ramani’s story was not
corroborated by the Country Report for Macedonia, which
was offered into evidence by the INS. Although the IJ
acknowledged that this report related to incidents occurring
in 2000, not 1999 (the general period when Ramani claimed
his problems arose), he found that the report did not
corroborate Ramani’s claim that ethnic Albanian minorities
were tortured by police for participating in demonstrations.
The IJ noted that the Country Report indicated that the
Macedonian government generally respected its citizens’ right
to freedom of assembly and that demonstrations regularly
occurred there without incident.
The IJ declined to admit into evidence the purported copy
of the legal summons and the alleged extract of the

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No. 02-4362 Ramani, et al. v. Ashcroft, et al. 5
Macedonian penal code because the translation of these
documents did not comply with 8 C.F.R. § 3.33. In addition,
the IJ found that the document purporting to be a copy of a
legal summons was not the original and had not been properly
authenticated. The IJ also refused to take judicial notice of
the document purported to be an extract from the Macedonian
penal code. He noted that Ramani’s attorney had made no
attempt to produce the law from available, admissible
sources.
Ramani filed a notice of appeal of the IJ’s decision with the
BIA and objected on two grounds. Specifically, he stated that
[t]he Immigration Judge erred in finding that Respondent
did not qualify as a refugee and that [he] did not show
that he had a well founded fear of persecution, despite
the fact that Respondent presented substantial testimony
that [he] did qualify as a refugee and had a well founded
fear of persecution.
The Immigration Judge erred in finding that
Respondent’s testimony, and demeanor was of
questionable credibility even though at trial
Respondent’s testimony, and demeanor was credibile
[sic], and that it was believable, consistant [sic] and
sufficiently detailed to be found credible.
In his BIA brief, however, Ramani simply alleged that the IJ
was biased. Notably, Ramani did not object in his BIA
appeal brief to the IJ’s refusal to admit the two documents
that were at issue at the merits hearing. In addition, Ramani
did not challenge the IJ’s finding that he was not a credible
witness in his brief to the BIA.
Ultimately, the BIA rejected Ramani’s claim of prejudice
stating that
any opinion formed by the Immigration Judge on the
basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course
6 Ramani, et al. v. Ashcroft, et al. No. 02-4362
of the current proceedings may not constitute a basis for
a finding of bias in the absence of a display of a deep-
seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair
judgment impossible.
The Board further concluded that Ramani received a full and
fair hearing and agreed with the IJ that he had not met his
burden of proving eligibility for asylum, withholding of
removal, or relief under the Convention Against Torture.
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court has jurisdiction over Ramani’s request for
asylum pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 242(a)(1). See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(1). However, to the
extent that Ramani has failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies with respect to certain claims, this court does not
have jurisdiction to address those claims, as discussed infra.
Perkovic v. INS, 33 F.3d 615, 619 (6th Cir. 1994); Dokic v.
INS, 899 F.2d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 1990). Upon review of the
claims that are properly before the court, the panel must
consider whether the BIA correctly determined that Ramani
failed to sustain his burden of establishing eligibility for
asylum. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (an alien applying for
asylum bears the burden of demonstrating that he or she is a
refugee). In reviewing decisions rendered by the BIA that an
alien is not eligible for asylum, this court reviews
administrative findings of fact concerning whether the alien
qualifies as a refugee under a substantial evidence test. Yu v.
Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 700, 702-703 (6th Cir. 2004) (“findings of
fact are [reviewed under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B), which]
basically codifies the Supreme Court’s substantial evidence
standard”). Thus, an IJ’s factual determinations will be
reversed only if “any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B).

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No. 02-4362 Ramani, et al. v. Ashcroft, et al. 7
THE USE OF A SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE
Ramani argues that the BIA’s brief dismissal of his appeal
constituted a violation of due process. He concedes, however,
that the BIA “certainly has the authority to affirm, without
opinion, or issue a brief opinion, in any case in which the
Board member concludes that there is no legal or factual basis
for reversal of the decision by the Service or the [IJ],” citing
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1, which provides for summary affirmance.
This provision permits the BIA to issue summary
affirmances, with little or no discussion, as well as decisions
without opinion in immigration appeal cases meeting certain
criteria. Ramani suggests that the use of these affirmances
can violate due process in certain circumstances. This court,
however, has recently examined the use of summary
affirmances, concluding that their use does not violate due
process. Denko v. INS, 351 F.3d 717, 726-30 (6th Cir. 2003).
IMPROPER CONSIDERATION OF EVIDENCE
Before a federal court may assert jurisdiction over an alien
removal appeal, the alien must have exhausted all
administrative remedies. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). The United
States argues that Ramani’s claim that the IJ improperly
considered and disregarded certain evidence was not properly
presented to the BIA and, therefore, is not subject to review
by this court.
Ramani argues that the IJ improperly relied “on evidence
which was not admitted[] in order to reach his decision” and
misused “the evidence which had been admitted.” Regarding
his first argument, he complains that the IJ did not receive the
Macedonian summons into evidence, yet used that exhibit to
impugn Ramani’s credibility. He next argues that the IJ
should not have relied upon the Country Report for
Macedonia, a political and social analysis of Macedonia
produced by the State Department. Ramani has numerous
complaints both about the State Department’s reliability as
well as the IJ’s “selective quotations” from the report.
8 Ramani, et al. v. Ashcroft, et al. No. 02-4362
None of Ramani’s arguments concerning the consideration
of evidence was properly presented to the BIA. It is proper
for an appellate court to consider waived all issues not raised
in an appellant’s briefs, even if the issue has been raised in the
notice of appeal. Farm Labor Organizing Comm. v. Ohio
State Highway Patrol, 308 F.3d 523, 528 n.1, 544 n.8 (6th
Cir. 2002); Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 374 (6th Cir.
1999). Neither Ramani’s notice of appeal to the BIA, nor his
BIA appeal brief, advanced his current argument that the IJ
misused certain evidence. While his BIA appeal brief did
discuss the use of the Country Report for Macedonia, noting
that “[t]hese reports are infamous for providing an overly rosy
picture of most countries,” it did not make his current
argument that “State Department Opinions are not always
reliable,” it provided no legal basis for this argument, and it
was mentioned only in the context of Ramani’s claim that the
IJ was biased. By failing to properly present these claims to
the BIA, Ramani failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
on these issues.
The purpose of Section 1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion
requirement is (1) to “ensure that the INS, as the agency
responsible for construing and applying the immigration laws
and implementing regulations, has had a full opportunity to
consider a petitioner’s claims,” Theodoropoulos v. INS, 358
F.3d 162, 171 (2d Cir. 2004); (2) to “avoid premature
interference with the agency’s processes,” Sun v. Ashcroft,
370 F.3d 932, 940 (9th Cir. 2004); and (3) to “allow the BIA
to compile a record which is adequate for judicial review.”
Dokic, 899 F.2d at 532. In this case, these goals would be
subverted by considering an issue that was not properly
presented to the BIA. Had Ramani presented his current
arguments to the BIA, this matter could have been properly
dealt with by immigration judges whose experience in these
matters is useful. In addition, the record on these issues could
have been more fully developed if they had been presented
below.

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No. 02-4362 Ramani, et al. v. Ashcroft, et al. 9
Unlike many contexts in which exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a court-created doctrine, Section
1252(d)(1) provides that federal courts are without
jurisdiction to hear an immigration appeal when
administrative remedies have not been exhausted. Perkovic,
33 F.3d at 619. In Chung Young Chew v. Boyd, the Ninth
Circuit held that
[f]ailure to take an available appeal to the Board from an
order of deportation constitutes a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, thereby depriving a court of
appeals of jurisdiction to review any aspect of such order.
It follows that failure to raise, on such an appeal, a
particular question concerning the validity of the order
constitutes a failure to exhaust administrative remedies
with regard to that question, thereby depriving a court of
appeals of jurisdiction to consider that question.
309 F.2d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 1962); accord Marrero v. INS,
990 F.2d 772, 779 (3d Cir. 1993); Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909
F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1990); Farrokhi v. INS, 900 F.2d 697, 700
(4th Cir. 1990); Youssefinia v. INS, 784 F.2d 1254, 1258 (5th
Cir. 1986); Bajwa v. Cobb, 727 F. Supp. 53, 56 (D. Mass.
1989). These cases provide a stricter requirement than merely
requiring an alien to exhaust all avenues of appeal; they
further require the alien to preserve each claim by presenting
it to the BIA.
In this circuit, several cases have suggested that Section
1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement mandates that only those
claims presented to the BIA may be appealed to this court.
Cf. Perkovic, 33 F.3d at 619 (finding that claims had been
exhausted because “they were presented to the immigration
judge and then to the [BIA], which definitively resolved the
claims on their merits”); Dokic, 899 F.2d at 532 (“[a]t no time
during the course of these administrative proceedings did
petitioners present their claims that counsel was ineffective
and that the record was inadequate” and thus the claims were
unreviewable because they had not been administratively
10 Ramani, et al. v. Ashcroft, et al. No. 02-4362
exhausted); Harchenko v. INS, No. 00-3789, 22 Fed. Appx.
540, 543 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[w]e shall only consider the
sufficiency of the IJ’s decision and the BIA’s affirmance of
that decision. Petitioner’s other arguments are precluded as
unexhausted issues, which this court has no jurisdiction to
review”).
In Perkovic, this court recognized that if an alien presents
both exhausted and unexhausted claims, only those claims
that are properly exhausted may be considered. 33 F.3d at
619. The Perkovic court also noted that in Dokic the court
had concluded that the alien’s claims were unexhausted
because the alien had not presented his present claims during
the course of administrative proceedings. Id. at 620 n.4; see
Ivezaj v. INS, 84 F.3d 215, 219 (6th Cir. 1996), superceded by
statute on other grounds as stated in Visha v. INS, No. 00-
3446, 51 Fed. Appx. 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2002), (“Perkovic
distinguished Dokic on the grounds that exhaustion was not
found in Dokic because Dokic was making a due process
argument not previously raised with the BIA, and so, by
holding Dokic’s appeal was barred by the exhaustion
doctrine, the Dokic court was really insisting that appellate
issues must be raised below.”).
Having considered these authorities, we hold that only
claims properly presented to the BIA and considered on their
merits can be reviewed by this court in an immigration
appeal. Because the arguments currently presented by
Ramani were not presented to the BIA, they are not subject to
review by this court.
REVIEW OF IMMIGRATION JUDGE’S OPINION
Ramani also argues that the court should not review the
BIA’s decision, but should review the IJ’s decision directly
since it was much more thorough than the BIA’s. When the
BIA utilizes a summary affirmance, it is proper to review the
IJ’s decision directly. Denko, 351 F.3d at 730. In this case,
however, the BIA did not utilize a summary affirmance.

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No. 02-4362 Ramani, et al. v. Ashcroft, et al. 11
Rather, it issued a decision disposing of the single issue
presented in Ramani’s BIA appeal brief, i.e., whether the IJ
was biased. In his BIA appeal brief Ramani simply claimed
that the “major stumbling block for this claim is the Court’s
overwhelming prejudice. . . . The result is a fundamental
denial of due process. . . . The aims of Justice, in this
administrative Court which is a part of the U.S. Department
of Justice, have been completely perverted in this matter.”
Ramani’s five-page BIA appellate brief was little more than
an attack on the IJ’s impartiality. While his BIA appeal brief
does briefly discuss the use of the Country Report for
Macedonia (an issue he now raises on appeal), this issue was
not discussed as a basis for his BIA appeal, as it was
mentioned only in passing, in reference to the IJ’s supposed
“biased rendition” of the Country Report. The thrust of the
BIA brief was that the IJ was biased. It was the only issue
clearly advanced by Ramani, and discussion of this issue
continued throughout the entire brief.
Ramani did briefly argue that he had a reasonable fear of
persecution in his BIA appeal brief. Perhaps because Ramani
provided little support for this argument, relying only on
conclusory statements, the BIA did not discuss this argument
in affirming the IJ. It is not necessary to directly review the
IJ’s decision on this issue, however, because Ramani did not
advance this argument in his current appeal to this court.
Regarding the issues the Petitioner did present to this court,
i.e., whether the IJ misused certain evidence, this court will
not review the IJ’s decision directly on these issues because
they were not presented to the BIA, and thus Ramani did not
exhaust his administrative remedies for these claims.
Therefore, in this case, review of the BIA’s opinion is
sufficient to resolve those issues properly before this court.
The petition for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals is DENIED.

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