Willie Jefferson v. Chattanooga Publishing Company

*The Honorable Gordon J. Quist, United States District Judge for the
W estern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0219P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 04a0219p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
WILLIE JEFFERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CHATTANOOGA PUBLISHING
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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No. 02-6239
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Chattanooga.
No. 01-00165—R. Allan Edgar, Chief District Judge.
Argued: June 8, 2004
Decided and Filed: July 9, 2004
Before: MARTIN and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; QUIST,
District Judge.*
2 Jefferson v. Chattanooga Publishing Co. No. 02-6239
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COUNSEL
ARGUED: Harry F. Burnette, BURNETTE, DOBSON &
HARDEMAN, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellant.
Matthew A. Salada, ZINSER LAW FIRM, Nashville,
Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Harry F. Burnette,
Anita B. Hardeman, BURNETTE, DOBSON &
HARDEMAN, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellant.
Matthew A. Salada, L. Michael Zinser, ZINSER LAW FIRM,
Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Willie Jefferson
appeals the district court’s order of summary judgment and
subsequent denial of his motion to vacate that order. Both
judgments were based on Jefferson’s failure to submit any
evidentiary support in response to Chattanooga Publishing’s
summary judgment motion as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(c) requires. Jefferson contends that he was not required to
submit evidence because Chattanooga Publishing actually
filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) and not a motion for summary judgment
under Rule 56. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo. See Gribcheck v. Runyon, 245 F.3d 547, 550 (6 th
Cir. 2001). We also review the district court’s denial of
Jefferson’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion de
novo, because the court’s analysis involved interpretation and
application of law. See Jalapeno Prop. Mgmt., LLC v. Dukas,
265 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2001). Affirmation of both orders
is appropriate if Jefferson failed to present evidence sufficient
to create a dispute of material fact and Chattanooga

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No. 02-6239 Jefferson v. Chattanooga Publishing Co. 3
Publishing is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R.
CIV. P. 56(c).
Jefferson argues: (1) Chattanooga Publishing’s motion for
summary judgment merely stated that “Jefferson failed to
state a claim . . . and . . . failed to allege facts on which relief
may be granted,” and therefore the district court should have
interpreted it as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion; (2) the motion lacked
documentary support and thus did not satisfy the movant’s
burden under Rule 56(c); and (3) the district court should
have converted the motion to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion because
it was filed prior to discovery. Jefferson’s first two arguments
can be rejected summarily: to meet its burden as the moving
party in a motion for summary judgment, Chattanooga
Publishing needed only to state that there is an absence of
facts or evidence to support Jefferson’s claims. Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Elkins v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 8 F.3d 1068, 1071 (6th Cir. 1993). The motion
states that Jefferson failed to allege facts on which relief may
be granted; thus, Chattanooga Publishing satisfied its burden.
We similarly reject Jefferson’s third argument, because it
is well-established that a motion for summary judgment may
be filed prior to discovery. Rule 56(b) allows a defendant to
file the motion at any time, so long as the non-moving party
has had sufficient time to engage in discovery. FED R. CIV. P.
56(b); White’s Landing Fisheries, Inc. v. Buchholzer, 29 F.3d
229, 232 (6th Cir. 1994). Under the facts of this case, where
the summary judgment motion was filed a full six months
after Chattanooga Publishing filed its answer to Jefferson’s
complaint, we conclude that Jefferson had sufficient time to
engage in the discovery process.
Furthermore, Jefferson never indicated, as Rule 56(f)
requires, that he did not have a sufficient opportunity for
discovery. Rule 56(f) provides that a party opposing a motion
for summary judgment is allowed to claim an inability to
present facts essential to justify its opposition to summary
judgment, and in certain cases the district court may postpone
4 Jefferson v. Chattanooga Publishing Co. No. 02-6239
the motion and permit further discovery. It is up to the party
opposing the motion to take advantage of Rule 56(f),
however, and to state why more discovery is needed. See
Good v. Ohio Edison Co., 149 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir. 1998)
(holding that a party invoking Rule 56(f) protections must
“affirmatively demonstrate . . . how postponement of a ruling
on the motion will enable him, by discovery and other means,
to rebut the movant’s showing of the absence of a genuine
issue of fact”). Jefferson made no such demonstration. Thus,
he cannot properly assert this argument on appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.

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