Geraldine Fuhr v. School District of the City of Hazel Park

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0084P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 04a0084p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
GERALDINE FUHR,
Plaintiff-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant,
v.
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE
CITY OF HAZEL PARK,
Defendant-Appellant/
Cross-Appellee.
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Nos. 01-2215/
2606; 02-1367
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 99-76360—George C. Steeh, District Judge.
Argued: September 16, 2003
Decided and Filed: March 24, 2004
Before: SILER, BATCHELDER, and COOK, Circuit
Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Timothy J. Mullins, COX, HODGMAN &
GIARMARCO, Troy, Michigan, for Appellant. Mark
2 Fuhr v. Hazel Park Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367
Granzotto, LAW OFFICE OF MARK GRANZOTTO, Royal
Oak, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Timothy J.
Mullins, COX, HODGMAN & GIARMARCO, Troy,
Michigan, for Appellant. Mark Granzotto, LAW OFFICE OF
MARK GRANZOTTO, Royal Oak, Michigan, Deborah L.
Gordon, LAW OFFICES OF DEBORAH L. GORDON,
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Defendant-
appellant School District of the City of Hazel Park (“Hazel
Park”) appeals from a jury award in favor of plaintiff-appellee
Geraldine Fuhr, in Fuhr’s sexual discrimination suit brought
under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq., and the Elliott-
Larsen Civil Rights Act of Michigan, MCL § 37.2101 et. seq.
Hazel Park also appeals the district court’s subsequent
injunctive order requiring the school district to hire Fuhr as
head coach of the school’s varsity male basketball team, as
well as the award of attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff. Plaintiff-
appellee Fuhr cross-appeals the district court’s order striking
the jury’s award of future damages following her installment
as the boys’ varsity basketball head coach. For the reasons
set forth below, we will AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court in all respects.
I.
This suit arises from Hazel Park’s 1999 decision to hire
John Barnett rather than Fuhr for the vacant position of boys’
varsity basketball coach. At that time, Barnett, a relatively
new male teacher at Hazel Park, had coached the boys’
freshman basketball team for two years. On the other hand,
Fuhr, a female teacher at Hazel Park, had been the head coach
of the girls’ varsity basketball team for some ten years, and

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Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367 Fuhr v. Hazel Park 3
1Through 1999, when this suit was filed, the high school girls’
basketball season in the state of Michigan was held d uring the fall, while
the boys’ basketball season took place during the winter.
2Grant admitted at trial that both Aldred and Kirkland supported Fuhr
for the coaching position. In subsequent testimony, however, Grant stated
that he received no formal endorsement of Fuhr from Aldred or Kirkland.
coach of the boys’ junior varsity and assistant coach of the
boys’ varsity basketball teams for eight years.1
In 1999, Charles Kirkland, the boys’ varsity basketball
coach, announced his intention to retire from coaching at the
end of the year. Fuhr and Barnett were the only individuals
who applied for the post. At the same time, David Aldred,
who had been the Hazel Park High School athletic director for
thirteen or fourteen years, announced that he was retiring on
July 1, 1999. The committee assembled to interview the
candidates for the position consisted of Superintendent James
Anker; Dan Grant, the district athletic director; Victor Mayo,
the assistant superintendent; Jim Meisinger, the high school
principal; and Tom Pratt, the individual replacing Aldred as
the high school athletic director. Neither Aldred nor
Kirkland, both of whom who supported Fuhr for the coaching
job, was on the committee.2 According to Aldred, Grant told
him that Anker did not want Aldred to participate in the
interviews.
The committee interviewed Barnett first, followed
immediately by Fuhr. Anker, who made the ultimate hiring
decision, left Fuhr’s interview shortly after it started and did
not return. In the committee conference following the
interviews, some members expressed concerns about
unspecified community complaints against Fuhr and the idea
that Fuhr would be coaching two major varsity sports in quick
succession. Anker eventually returned to the meeting and,
according to Meisinger, informed the committee that several
members of the school board did not want Fuhr to be named
the boys’ varsity basketball coach, and that “he had to comply
4 Fuhr v. Hazel Park Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367
with their request.” According to Aldred, this story was
supported by comments made by Clint Adkins, the board
president, who said he was “very concerned about a female
being the head boys’ basketball coach in Hazel Park.” A day
after the interview, Anker announced that Barnett would be
the new boys’ varsity basketball coach.
In October 1999, Fuhr filed suit in the Eastern District of
Michigan, seeking compensatory damages, punitive damages,
judgment for past and future lost wages and benefits, an order
of the court placing her in the position of boys’ varsity
basketball coach, attorneys’ fees, and any other appropriate
equitable relief. Hazel Park moved for summary judgment,
arguing that Fuhr had failed to establish a prima facie case of
sexual discrimination and that the District had legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons for the decision to hire Barnett.
The district court denied defendant’s motion, and the case
proceeded to jury trial.
The jury returned a verdict in Fuhr’s favor, awarding her
$245,000 in present damages and $210,000 in future
damages. The district court thereafter granted Fuhr’s request
for injunctive relief, ordering Fuhr named boys’ varsity
basketball coach. In an amended order, after receiving briefs
on the subject of future damages, the district court struck the
jury’s award of future damages in its entirety. The district
court also granted Fuhr attorneys’ fees, and denied Hazel
Park’s motion for a new trial, motion for remittitur, and
renewed motion for judgment.
Hazel Park now appeals the judgment, the award of
attorneys’ fees, and the denial of its motions for a new trial
and remittitur, and renewed motion for judgment. Fuhr cross-
appeals the district court’s order striking the award of future
damages.

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Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367 Fuhr v. Hazel Park 5
II.
Hazel Park argues on appeal that it is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law for two reasons: first, that Fuhr failed to
establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination; and
second, that Hazel Park offered legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for its failure to hire Fuhr. We review
de novo the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of
law. McCurdy v. Montgomery County, 240 F.3d 512, 517
(6th Cir. 2001).
Hazel Park’s first argument relies on its contention that
Fuhr did not suffer an adverse employment action, and
therefore could not prove a prima facie case of gender
discrimination. Because the case proceeded to trial, however,
we are no longer concerned with whether the plaintiff
established a prima facie case, but instead focus on the actual
question of discrimination. In Roh v. Lakeshore Estates, we
said:
“A Court of Appeals ‘should not review the case for
whether a prima facie case had been made, but rather,
whether the ultimate issue of discrimination falls in the
favor of the Plaintiffs or Defendant.’ EEOC v. Avery
Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 862 (6th Cir. 1997). ‘Of
course, evidence that bears upon elements of the prima
facie case can also come into play in assessing the
ultimate question of discrimination.’ Kovacevich v. Kent
State Univ., 224 F.3d 806, 825, 827 (6th Cir. 2000).”
Roh v. Lakeshore Estates, Inc., 241 F.3d 491, 498 (6th Cir.
2001).
The ultimate question of discrimination in this case is
whether Hazel Park “fail[ed] or refuse[d] to hire . . . or
otherwise . . . discriminate[d] against [Fuhr] with respect to
h[er] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of [Fuhr]'s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1). Under the circumstances of this case, that
6 Fuhr v. Hazel Park Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367
question includes a determination of whether there was
evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the
action of which Fuhr complains was adverse to her. Hazel
Park contends that there is not, arguing that the boys’ varsity
coaching position pays the same as the girls’ varsity position,
that the school considers the two positions to be equal, that
obtaining the position would have been only a lateral move
for Fuhr, and that denial of a lateral move is not “adverse” as
a matter of law. Fuhr, however, points to the evidence at trial
that clearly established a pay differential between the position
that she already had and the position that she sought. Both
before she applied for the varsity boys’ position and after she
was denied that job, Fuhr coached the boys’ junior varsity
team. In that job, she was paid 9% of her teacher’s salary.
Had she been hired for the boys’ varsity position, she would
have been paid 11% of her teacher’s salary.
The district court directly addressed this issue in its order
denying Hazel Park’s motion for a new trial:
“Defendant continues to argue that this is a failure to
transfer case, in spite of the court’s previous ruling that
what is at issue is either a failure to promote plaintiff
from coach of the boys’ junior varsity basketball team to
boys’ varsity coach, or a simple failure to hire case.
When viewed as a failure to promote or failure to hire
case, the pay differential between the boys’ junior varsity
and varsity positions makes it clear that plaintiff has
established adverse employment action.”
Fuhr v. Hazel Park, No. 99-76360, Order Denying
Defendant’s Motion (E.D. Mich., Feb. 21, 2002). We think
the district court was entirely correct here. Although Fuhr
stated during trial that she would be willing to quit coaching
the girls’ varsity team in order to coach the boys’ varsity, it is
clear from the testimony at trial that the decision-makers at
Hazel Park thought Fuhr intended to coach both teams. The
relevant inquiry is therefore not whether the boys’ varsity
position would have resulted in an increase in pay over that of

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Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367 Fuhr v. Hazel Park 7
the girls’ varsity position, but rather whether it would have
resulted in an increase in pay over that of the junior varsity
position. Clearly it would have. Contrary to Hazel Park’s
assertion, Fuhr did suffer an adverse employment action.
Hazel Park next argues that because it offered legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons for its failure to hire Fuhr as the
boys’ varsity basketball coach , it is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. According to Hazel Park, Fuhr was already the
girls’ varsity basketball coach, and the seasons overlapped;
the school anticipated that Michigan would move the girls’
season to the same time as the boys’, making it much more
difficult for Fuhr to coach both the boys’ and girls’ teams;
Hazel Park had a policy of permitting any one individual to
hold only one of four major varsity coaching positions; and
Barnett was well qualified for the position. Citing St. Mary’s
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993), Hazel Park
contends that the burden remained on Fuhr to prove the
school district’s reasons pretextual: “A reason cannot be
proved to be ‘a pretext for discrimination’ unless it is shown
both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the
real reason.” Id. at 515 (emphasis in original).
Hazel Park’s statement of the applicable law is correct, but
its application of that law is not. As the Supreme Court has
made clear, once the plaintiff has made out her prima facie
case and the defendant has articulated legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for its action, the framework of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), is
no longer relevant, and the presumption of discrimination
“simply drops out of the picture.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509
U.S. at 510-11. The factfinder must then determine whether
the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff
on the basis of—in this case—her gender. And while it may
be sufficient for a finding of intentional discrimination that
the factfinder does not believe the defendant’s proffered non-
discriminatory reason, such disbelief does not compel that
finding. Id. at 511. The burden is on the plaintiff to present
enough evidence to support her claim of intentional
8 Fuhr v. Hazel Park Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367
discrimination, and “a plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined
with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted
justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude
that the employer unlawfully discriminated.” Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000).
Here, in addition to her prima facie case, Fuhr presented
direct evidence that gender was a factor in the decision not to
hire Ms. Fuhr as the boys’ varsity basketball coach. There
was testimony that Clint Adkins, the President of the School
Board, had stated that he was “very concerned about a female
being the head boys basketball coach in Hazel Park.” The
Superintendent, James Anker, admitted that members of the
Board had indicated to him that they did not want Fuhr to get
the job as boys’ varsity coach. Following the decision not to
hire her, Fuhr also had conversations with Principal Jim
Meisinger, who confirmed that the reason she did not get the
job was her gender.
The standard for granting judgment as a matter of law
“mirrors” that for granting summary judgment, such that “the
inquiry under each is the same.” Id. at 150 (quoting Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986)). In
addressing Hazel Park’s motion for judgment as a matter of
law, we must review all of the evidence in the record, and we
“must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party . . . [T]he weighing of evidence, and the
drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge.” Id. (citation omitted). And
we must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party
that the jury is not required to believe. Id. Using this
standard, we conclude that the jury had sufficient evidence to
support its verdict. The jury was entitled not only to
disbelieve Hazel Park’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons
for denying Fuhr the position she sought, but to believe her
direct evidence that the school district’s true reason for that
action was her gender. Hazel Park’s contention that it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law is without merit.

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Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367 Fuhr v. Hazel Park 9
3Fuhr also argues that Hazel Park could have suffered no prejudice
from the statements because the district court ultimately struck the jury’s
award of future d amages when it granted Fuhr’s req uest for equitab le
relief. Indeed, the case was presented to the jury for an award of all Ms.
Fuhr’s injuries, past and future. The awards were separated, however,
because the propriety of future damages was “dependent on a court ruling
- whether Ms. Fuhr was entitled to instatement - which had not been made
at the time the jury was considering its verdict.” According to Fuhr it was
III.
Hazel Park next argues that a new trial should be awarded
on the basis of alleged misrepresentations committed by
Fuhr’s attorney during her closing argument. “Misconduct by
an attorney that results in prejudice may serve as a basis for
a new trial. The burden of showing prejudice rests with the
party seeking the new trial, and district courts have broad
discretion in deciding whether to grant a motion for a new
trial.” In re Air Crash Disaster, 86 F.3d 498, 524 (6th Cir.
1996) (citations omitted). The district court did not allow
counsel for Hazel Park to discuss during closing argument the
availability of injunctive relief. During plaintiff’s closing
argument, however, Fuhr’s attorney stated that “[t]he only
thing that I can ask you for is to award money. There is
nothing else that the person can ask . . . . [A]ll we can do is
award money damages.” Hazel Park argues that these
statements “are a misrepresentation of the law, and are false,”
and incorrectly led the jury to believe that the only remedy
available to Fuhr was money, and resulted in a higher award
of present damages than the jury would have awarded had it
known of the availability of injunctive relief.
In order to be entitled to a new trial, Hazel Park must show
both that the closing argument was improper and that Hazel
Park was prejudiced by the impropriety, that is, that there is
a reasonable probability that the jury’s verdict was influenced
by the improper argument. Fuhr has countered, however, that
the statements from her counsel were neither inaccurate nor
inflammatory.3 We agree. Fuhr’s counsel informed the jury
10 Fuhr v. Hazel Park Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367
understood by the court and counsel that the jury’s award of future
damages would be subject to later court review when Fuhr’s claims for
equitable relief were addre ssed post-trial. That is in fact precisely what
later occurred.
that the only thing she could ask the jury to award was
monetary damages. This statement is correct. She could not
ask the jury to grant equitable relief even if the jury were
inclined to do so. Hazel Park, furthermore, failed even to
object to the statements when they were made. We have
applied a high standard of review under such circumstances.
See Strickland v. Owens Corning, 142 F.3d 353, 358 (6th Cir.
1998) (stating that the failure to object “does raise the degree
of prejudice which must be demonstrated in order to get a
new trial”).
Hazel Park has failed to demonstrate a reasonable
probability that the jury was improperly influenced by these
comments. Hazel Park offers no support for its contention
that the jury would not have awarded $245,000 in present
damages, had the jury known that Fuhr could have sought
injunctive relief once the jury found that Hazel Park had
denied her the position on the basis of her gender. Hazel
Park’s assertions alone are not enough to establish reasonable
probability of improper influence.
IV.
Hazel Park also urges on appeal that the trial court erred
when it ordered the school to hire Fuhr as boys’ varsity
basketball coach; denied Hazel Park’s motion for remittitur;
and ordered Hazel Park to pay Fuhr’s attorneys’ fees. For the
reasons set forth below, we reject these arguments.

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Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367 Fuhr v. Hazel Park 11
The Order of Instatement
Upon a finding of invidious discrimination, a district court
has wide discretion to impose equitable remedies in order to
“fashion the most complete relief possible” designed to
“make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole.” Shore
v. Federal Express Corp., 42 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421
(1975)). The availability of instatement or reinstatement is
therefore entrusted to the sound discretion of the district
court, and a decision granting such relief is reviewed by this
Court only for abuse of discretion. Shore, 42 F.3d at 377-78.
Furthermore, as Fuhr has noted, the central purpose of the
state and federal anti-discrimination laws on which this suit
is based is “to make the person whole for injuries suffered on
account of unlawful employment discrimination,” and the
general rule is therefore that “[t]he injured party is to be
placed, as near as may be, in the situation [s]he would have
occupied if the wrong had not been committed.” Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-19 (1975). We have
held that victims of discrimination are presumptively entitled
to instatement or reinstatement, Thurman v. Yellow Freight
Systems, Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1171 (6th Cir. 1996); Shore v.
Federal Express Corp., 777 F.2d 1155, 1159 (6th Cir. 1985),
and that reinstatement is the preferred equitable remedy in
cases where discrimination has been proved. See E.E.O.C. v.
Yenkin-Majestic Paint Corp., 112 F.3d 831, 836 (6th Cir.
1997); Schwartz v. Gregori, 45 F.3d 1017, 1023 (6th Cir.
1995).
Hazel Park has established that trial courts have, in some
circumstances, not required employers to “bump” an innocent
third party in order to instate the plaintiff into the third party’s
position, see Kraemer v. Franklin and Marshall College, 941
F.Supp. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1996), and has noted that we have held
that where “reinstatement is not possible,” an award of front
pay is sometimes appropriate in order to effectuate the “make
whole” purposes of Title VII. Shore, 777 F.2d at 1159. The
school has also emphasized a number of cases where the
12 Fuhr v. Hazel Park Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367
courts have concluded that reinstatement was not proper, or
noted that it would be inequitable to remove an “innocent
incumbent” (such as John Barnett) from the position, and
therefore denied the plaintiff’s request for equitable relief.
See Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 717 F.2d 114 (4th Cir.
1983); Wangsness v. Watertown Sch. Dist., 541 F. Supp. 332
(D. S.D. 1982). These cases demonstrate only that the district
court probably would not have abused its discretion had it
denied Fuhr equitable relief. They do not support the
contention that the district court abused its discretion by
granting it.
In ordering instatement, the district court weighed “the
relative hardships that will be occasioned on Plaintiff and Mr.
Barnett [and] to the school district itself.” The district court
also made specific mention of the fact that it was considering
Barnett’s status as an innocent incumbent. The court
nonetheless recognized that denying Fuhr an equitable
remedy would perpetuate the effects of the discrimination
proved by Fuhr, and therefore found that instatement was
appropriate. The district court did not abuse its discretion by
ordering Ms. Fuhr’s instatement as the coach of the boys’
varsity team.
The Motion for Remittitur
Hazel Park has argued that it was entitled to remittitur with
respect to the jury’s award of $245,000 for damages that Fuhr
sustained through the date of the verdict. This Court reviews
the denial of remittitur for an abuse of discretion. Slayton v.
Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 206 F.3d 669, 679 (6th Cir.
2000); Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co., 96 F.3d 151, 156 (6th
Cir. 1996). “A trial court is within its discretion in remitting
a verdict only when, after reviewing all evidence in the light
most favorable to the awardee, it is convinced that the verdict
is clearly excessive.” Farber v. Massillon Bd. of Educ., 917
F.2d 1391, 1395 (6th Cir. 1990); see also Jackson v. City of
Cookeville, 31 F.3d 1354, 1359 (6th Cir. 1994); Slayton, 206
F.3d at 679 (holding that the district court should reduce a

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Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367 Fuhr v. Hazel Park 13
jury’s verdict only when the judgment “clearly exceeds” the
maximum amount of compensatory damages a jury could
reasonably award); Bickel, 96 F.3d at 156 (same); In re
Lewis, 845 F.2d 624, 635 (6th Cir. 1988) (same).
Hazel Park claims that Fuhr did not present any evidence at
trial of economic damages, and that Fuhr did not suffer any
non-economic damages related to the boys’ varsity basketball
coaching position. The record, however, is to the contrary.
There was testimony that Fuhr earned a lower percentage of
her teacher’s salary as coach of the boys’ junior varsity team
than she would have earned as the boys’ varsity coach. The
difference between these two figures represents the economic
loss directly attributable to Fuhr’s failure to obtain the
position of boys’ varsity basketball coach. While there is
conflicting evidence as to the existence of non-economic
damages sustained by Fuhr, the jury found that Hazel Park’s
discrimination caused Fuhr emotional injury. The district
court then found, quite reasonably, that the jury’s decision to
award $245,000 was not clearly excessive in light of the
evidence presented.
Hazel Park has also suggested that the jury’s award of past
damages should be stricken or reduced because Fuhr was
granted the post-trial equitable relief of instatement to the
position she had been denied by Hazel Park. Defendant cited
no authority for this proposition. Whatever effect the
equitable decree had on the propriety of future damages, it did
not affect the damages for injuries already suffered before the
order. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the defendant’s motion for remittitur.
Attorneys’ Fees
Hazel Park contended that Fuhr was not entitled to an
award of attorneys’ fees, or, in the alternative, that the
attorneys’ fees granted by the district court were “clearly
excessive in light of the average hourly billing rates in the
community.” The first argument is meritless. Both Title VII
14 Fuhr v. Hazel Park Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367
and Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Act give a court discretion to
award attorneys’ fees when appropriate. Fuhr prevailed on her
claim of discrimination, and an award of attorneys’ fees is
certainly appropriate. In making the latter argument, Hazel
Park emphasized that the hourly rates charged by Fuhr’s
attorneys were in excess of the average billing rates contained
in an economic survey of the Michigan Bar Journal. A
district court has broad discretion to determine what
constitutes a reasonable hourly rate for an attorney, Wells v.
New Cherokee Corp., 58 F.3d 233, 239 (6th Cir. 1995);
Wayne v. Village of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 533 (6th Cir.
1994), and we review such decisions only for abuse of that
discretion. Granzeier v. Middleton, 173 F.3d 568, 576 (6th
Cir. 1999); Phelan v. Bell, 8 F.3d 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1993).
The Supreme Court has stated that in awarding fees, courts
should look to the hourly rates prevailing in the community
for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable
skill, experience, and reputation. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S.
886, 896 n.11 (1984). Fuhr presented affidavits signed by
several attorneys attesting that the hourly rates requested by
her attorneys were appropriate. Finally, the Supreme Court
has expressly rejected Hazel Park’s argument that the district
court’s award was improper because plaintiff’s counsel was
retained on the basis of a contingency fee arrangement. “We
have never suggested that a different approach is to be
followed in cases where the prevailing party and his (or her)
attorney have executed a contingent-fee agreement . . . . To
the contrary . . . we have adopted the lodestar approach as the
centerpiece of attorney’s fee awards.” Blanchard v.
Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 94 (1989). In short, we are not
convinced that the fees granted by the district court were
clearly excessive, and we find no abuse of discretion here.
V.
The final issue before this Court is Fuhr’s cross-appeal of
the district court’s order striking her future damages award
following her post-trial instatement to the position of boys’
varsity coach. Although Fuhr admits that the jury’s award of

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Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367 Fuhr v. Hazel Park 15
future lost earnings had to be eliminated by the court’s
instatement order, she maintains that the same is not true of
her future emotional damages. She analogizes this case to
Hill v. Xerox, 998 F.Supp. 1378 (N.D. Fla. 1998), where the
court recognized that a successful plaintiff’s emotional
injuries resulting from defendant’s discriminatory conduct
continue even in the face of reinstatement. That case,
however, is easily distinguished from the instant matter. The
plaintiff in Hill sought front pay, but not reinstatement. The
court nevertheless ordered reinstatement, and noted that by
doing so it was granting plaintiff something less desirable
than what the jury had awarded him. Fuhr, on the other hand,
sought—and received—a court order requiring Hazel Park to
put her in the position of boys’ varsity basketball coach.
Furthermore, Fuhr herself has stated that the jury award was
intentionally separated into past and future damages because
the propriety of the future damages was “dependent on a court
ruling—whether Ms. Fuhr was entitled to instatement—which
had not been made at the time the jury was considering its
verdict.” According to Fuhr’s own briefs, it was understood
by the district court and counsel that the jury’s award of
future damages would be subject to later court review when
plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief were addressed post-
trial.
When the jury deliberated it had not been advised that Fuhr
could receive injunctive relief after the trial. The jury did not
distinguish between future economic and future emotional
harm; rather, it formulated its future damages award to
compensate plaintiff for not receiving the position. Plaintiff
has now obtained that position, and future compensation
received in lieu of that position is unwarranted.
Even if we could separate from the jury’s total award the
amount of future lost earnings (generously estimated by the
district court to be around $50,000), this Court cannot say,
based on the record, what the remaining amount of emotional
damages should be. Fuhr has argued that the school district
created an atmosphere at Hazel Park High School which will
16 Fuhr v. Hazel Park Nos. 01-2215/2606; 02-1367
make it difficult for her as boys’ varsity coach, and that she
will suffer future damages as a result of a hostile work
environment. But whether she will in fact suffer such harm
is entirely speculative and in any event, that kind of harm was
never considered by the jury, which considered only the harm
resulting from Fuhr’s not being the coach of the boys’ varsity
basketball team. The district court therefore did not err by
striking plaintiff’s future damages after granting injunctive
relief.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of
the district court.

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