Norma Jefferson v. Jefferson County Public School System

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0067P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 04a0067p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
NORMA JEFFERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JEFFERSON COUNTY PUBLIC
SCHOOL SYSTEM; STEPHEN
DAESCHNER, Superintendent
for Jefferson County Public
School System; CAROLYN
MEREDITH, Director of
Employee Relations for
Jefferson County Public
School System; GEORGE
BELL, Director of Security
Services for Jefferson County
Public School System; MAXIE
JOHNSON, Principal of
Chenoweth Elementary
School,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Nos. 02-5621/6038
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.
No. 00-00044—Jennifer B. Coffman, District Judge.
2 Jefferson v. Jefferson County
Public School, et al.
Nos. 02-5621/6038
1Although plaintiff’s constitutional claims were brought under the
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1983 provides the usual remedy for
constitutional violations by state officials and her complaint was
interpreted as an action und er that statutory provision.
2Plaintiff brought suit in state court against the Jefferson C ounty
Pub lic Scho ol System, Superintendent Stephen D aeschner, Carolyn
Mered ith, Director of Employee Relations for the school system, George
Bell, Director of Security Services, Lisa Qureshi, an assistant teacher, and
Argued: December 4, 2003
Decided and Filed: March 4, 2004
Before: MERRITT, DAUGHTREY, and GIBBONS,
Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: J. Key Schoen, SALES, TILLMAN &
WALBAUM, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellant. Michael
Keith Kirk, WYATT, TARRANT & COMBS, Louisville,
Kentucky, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: J. Key Schoen,
SALES, TILLMAN & WALBAUM, Louisville, Kentucky,
for Appellant. Michael Keith Kirk, Byron E. Leet, WYATT,
TARRANT & COMBS, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellees.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
MERRITT, Circuit Judge. In this case brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 plaintiff Norma Jefferson brought various
federal due process claims against a group of state defendants,
as well as defamation and other state law claims.2 The

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Hearst-Argyle Productions, Inc., the owner of a Louisville television
station. Defendants removed the action to federal court. The claims
against Qureshi were remanded to state court and the television station has
settled with plaintiff; those two defendants are not parties to this appeal.
3Plaintiff failed to include a copy of her complaint in the Joint
Append ix. In addition to constituting a violation of the rules for filings
in our circuit, 6th Cir. R. 30 (f)(1)(B ), the lack of a co mplaint made it
difficult for this court to untangle p laintiff’s multiple, overlapping claims
and allegations.
primary questions before us arise from three of her federal
due process claims: (1) whether she received an appropriate
predeprivation hearing before her five-day suspension and
alleged constructive discharge from her position as a school
teacher in the Louisville public school system; (2) whether
she was deprived without due process of law of her
constitutionally-protected property interest in her job; and
(3) whether she was deprived of a substantive liberty interest
– her asserted interest in her good name and reputation –
without due process.3 Plaintiff also has a pending arbitration
proceeding arising under the collective bargaining agreement
governing her employment with the Jefferson County Public
School System.
We agree with the district court that before plaintiff was
suspended and allegedly forced to retire she received an
appropriate predeprivation, right-of-reply hearing that
complies with the due process requirements for such hearings.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546
(1985) (before termination, a public employee with a property
interest in continued employment should receive
constitutionally adequate procedures, including “oral or
written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of
the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his
side of the story" to ensure due process of law). In addition,
we agree with the district court that plaintiff’s procedural due
process claim based on the deprivation of a property interest
4 Jefferson v. Jefferson County
Public School, et al.
Nos. 02-5621/6038
4In Hudson, the Supreme Court held that the
unauthorized intentional dep rivation of property by a state
employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural
requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendm ent if a meaningful [state] postdeprivation remedy for
the loss is available.
468 U.S. at 533 .
5In Vicory, a proced ural due pro cess case, we held as follows:
Section 1983 was not meant to supply an exclusive federal
remedy for every alleged wrong committed by state officials.
Rather, the statute is a remedy for only those wrongs which
offend the Co nstitution’s p rohib ition against property
deprivation without procedural due process. Thus we hold that
in § 1983 dam age suits claiming the deprivation of a property
interest without procedural due process, the plaintiff must plead
and prove that state remedies for redressing the wrong are
inadequate. In a proce dural due process case under § 1983 , the
plaintiff must attack the state’s corrective procedures as well as
the substantive wrong.
721 F.2d at 1066.
in her job also fails because she has not shown that state
remedies under Kentucky teacher tenure and breach of
contract statutes and cases are inadequate or incapable of
remedying the wrongs she alleges. Such a showing of
defective state remedies is required in procedural due process
cases like this one. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984);4
Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1065-66 (6th Cir. 1984).5
Finally, we agree with the district court that plaintiff’s
“liberty interest” due process claim for injury to reputation
must be dismissed as well. As the Supreme Court made clear
in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1976), there is no
viable, free standing, federal due process claim arising from
injury to one’s reputation. Such a claim is viable only in

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Public School, et al.
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combination with two other elements: “when there is some
injury to employment . . . in addition to damage to reputation
and a subsequent denial of procedural due process to redress
that injury.” In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 796 (5th Cir.
1983). In the instant case, as the district court concluded, not
only is there no showing that state remedies for defamation
and improper discharge are inadequate, nonexistent or unfair,
but plaintiff has pending claims in state court that have yet to
be adjudicated and she may yet be able to bring other claims
in state court that will adequately redress her injuries. In
addition, she has an arbitration proceeding that has apparently
been stayed pending the outcome of this litigation.
I. Predeprivation Due Process
It is necessary to understand the basic facts and the district
court’s ruling on plaintiff’s entitlement to a predeprivation
hearing before addressing her procedural due process and
liberty interest assignments of error. Plaintiff was a second-
and third-grade teacher at Chenoweth Elementary School in
the Jefferson County Public School District. On January 18,
1999, a group of parents with children in plaintiff’s classroom
met to discuss allegations of improper conduct brought to
their attention by plaintiff’s teaching assistant, Lisa Qureshi.
At the meeting, the parents agreed to meet at the school the
next day to confront school officials with their allegations.
One of the parents alerted a local television station about their
plans. The parents also contacted Kentucky Child Protective
Services to report allegations of abuse. The next day, the
parents met with Chenoweth principal, defendant Maxie
Johnson, and accused plaintiff of misconduct in the
classroom, including grabbing students by their arms or shirt
collars, using curse words, allowing students to watch
inappropriate television shows and allowing students to eat
throughout the day. At the end of the meeting, several parents
spoke with a local television reporter on camera.
6 Jefferson v. Jefferson County
Public School, et al.
Nos. 02-5621/6038
After the meeting, Johnson contacted Child Protective
Services about the allegations of child abuse and directed
defendant George Bell, Jefferson County Public School’s
Director of Security Services, to investigate the allegations.
Bell interviewed several students in plaintiff’s class, their
parents, and Lisa Qureshi, plaintiff’s teaching assistant who
had first made the complaints. On January 22, Bell met with
Johnson, plaintiff and plaintiff’s union representative, Ruby
Fitzgerald, before any action was taken against her. At that
hearing, plaintiff was verbally informed of the allegations
against her and she submitted a written response denying all
the allegations.
On January 27, 1999, Bell reported the results of his
investigation to defendant Carolyn Meredith, the school
system’s Director of Employee Relations. Bell concluded
that some, but not all, of the allegations against plaintiff were
substantiated. On February 2, following review of Bell’s
report by the school district’s Employee Practices Review
Committee, plaintiff received a letter listing the specific
improper conduct found by Bell’s investigation and informing
plaintiff that she would be suspended for five days without
pay, starting the next day. The superintendent of the
Jefferson County Public School System accepted Johnson’s
decision to suspend plaintiff and notified the Board of
Education about the suspension as required.
On February 5, 1999, two days into her suspension,
plaintiff and her union representative met with Carolyn
Meredith and Minor Daniels, the Executive Director of
Business Affairs, to discuss where plaintiff would be assigned
following her suspension. Meredith presented plaintiff with
a letter offering plaintiff a temporary assignment teaching
language arts at a different school in the system and stating
that she would be permanently reassigned the following
school year. It is not disputed that, instead of signing the
transfer letter, plaintiff submitted a letter at the end of the
meeting stating “I, Norma J. Jefferson, am submitting this

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letter of retirement which will go into effect at the end of the
1998-1999 contract year.” Plaintiff claims that the retirement
was coerced because she was forced to choose retirement
because the transfer was an unacceptable alternative.
Kentucky Child Protective Services also conducted an
investigation during the same time as Bell conducted his
investigation to determine whether plaintiff abused her
students. Students, their parents, school personnel and
plaintiff were interviewed. Child Protective Services issued
its report two months later exonerating plaintiff of any
criminal child abuse claims. The report also stated that the
agency’s findings indicated that some of the students’
comments were influenced by their parents and Qureshi. The
report criticized Bell’s investigation because (1) the parents
were present when Bell interviewed the children, (2) the
investigation lasted only a week, and (3) it relied too heavily
on the opinions and uncorroborated hearsay of Qureshi and
the complaining parents.
The collective bargaining agreement between the teachers’
union and the school board grants plaintiff a property interest
in continued pay and benefits because it provides that a
teacher may only be suspended for “just cause.” See
Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538-39. We will assume for purposes
of this appeal that the five-day suspension without pay and
coerced retirement constitute the deprivation of a property
interest requiring a preloss hearing, which requires an
opportunity to respond before any deprivation, as well as
postdeprivation process where necessary. Id. at 542. If
extensive postdeprivation procedures exist, as they do here,
the predeprivation process need not be elaborate.
Plaintiff conceded at oral argument that the predeprivation
hearing she received was adequate. She had notice of the
charges against her and an opportunity to respond both orally
and in writing, and she participated in at least one meeting
with decisionmakers before her suspension. Plaintiff then had
8 Jefferson v. Jefferson County
Public School, et al.
Nos. 02-5621/6038
the option of initiating a postdeprivation arbitration
proceeding under the grievance procedures of the teachers’
collective bargaining agreement or bringing an action in state
court pursuant to the state teacher tenure statute, Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 161.790, and common law tort and contract
theories.
II. Postdeprivation Procedural Due Process
If satisfactory state procedures are provided in a procedural
due process case, then no constitutional deprivation has
occurred despite the injury. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533;
Vicory, 721 F.2d at 1065-66 (in procedural due process cases
claiming deprivation of property interest, plaintiff must attack
the state’s corrective procedure as well as the substantive
wrong). Plaintiff may not seek relief under Section 1983
without first pleading and proving the inadequacy of state or
administrative processes and remedies to redress her due
process violations. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981),
overruled on other grounds, Daniel v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986); Mansfield Apt. Owners Ass’n v. City of Mansfield,
988 F.2d 1469, 1475 (6th Cir. 1993). The plaintiff must
prove the inadequacy of state remedies as an element of her
constitutional tort. See Marino v. Ameruso, 837 F.2d 45, 47
(2d Cir. 1988) (“Although one need not exhaust state
remedies before bringing a Section 1983 action claiming a
violation of procedural due process, one must nevertheless
prove as an element of that claim that state procedural
remedies are inadequate.” (emphasis added)).
Plaintiff had at least three options available to her once she
received notice of the suspension: (1) proceed with the
detailed grievance procedures set out in the collective
bargaining agreement governing the terms of her
employment; (2) bring suit in state court under Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann.§ 161.790, or (3) bring suit in state court for breach of
the collective bargaining agreement.

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Public School, et al.
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The collective bargaining grievance procedures provide for
several levels of review by school officials, culminating in the
availability of an arbitration hearing conducted by a neutral
arbitrator chosen by the parties. Once a teacher chooses the
grievance process, she must exhaust that process before
bringing an action in state court. The collective bargaining
agreement does not prohibit a teacher from then pursuing an
action in state court.
Section 161.790 sets out a detailed process and timetable
for notification, reply and hearing procedures before and after
a teacher has been terminated, suspended without pay or
publicly reprimanded. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 161.790(3)-(10).
Section 161.790(10) clearly states that the procedures set
forth in subsections (3)-(9) are available to teachers who have
been suspended without pay, such as plaintiff. The statute
provides for the right to a hearing before an impartial tribunal,
the right to have counsel present at the hearing and the right
to present and question witnesses. The teacher has the right
to appeal the tribunal’s decision to the Circuit Court in the
jurisdiction where the school district is located. Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 161.790(3)-(7).
Plaintiff first chose to pursue the grievance process under
the collective bargaining agreement. On February 11, 1999,
plaintiff filed a “Level I” grievance with the Board of
Education containing multiple claims for relief. The
grievance was denied four days later by the principal, Maxie
Johnson. Plaintiff then submitted a “Level II” grievance,
which was denied on March 8, 1999, by the Director of
Employee Relations, Carolyn Meredith, as the
superintendent’s designee. The union, with plaintiff’s
acquiescence, then requested that her grievance be submitted
to arbitration.
The district court concluded that plaintiff failed to
demonstrate the inadequacy of the panoply of remedies
available to her, including arbitration and a postdeprivation
10 Jefferson v. Jefferson County
Public School, et al.
Nos. 02-5621/6038
action in state court, whether brought as a common law
breach of contract claim or under Section 161.790 of the
Kentucky statutes. Jefferson v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 184 F. Supp. 2d 622, 625, motion to amend or alter
judgment granted in part and denied in part, 196 F. Supp. 2d
515, 516-17 (W.D. Ky. 2002). We agree with the district
court. Plaintiff offers no plausible explanation as to why
these remedies are inadequate.
The fact that plaintiff was required, as an initial matter, to
choose between proceeding under the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement’s grievance procedures or Section
161.790 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes does not make the
state statute “unavailable” to her. Nothing in the collective
bargaining agreement prevents a teacher from bringing an
action under Section 161.790 at the conclusion of the
grievance process. The collective bargaining agreement states
that a teacher will not “be deemed to have waived or
otherwise prejudiced” her rights by first seeking redress under
the collective bargaining agreement.
III. Liberty Interests
The plaintiff asserts no substantive due process claim under
the incorporation doctrine based on violation of a specific
provision of the First or any other amendment to the
Constitution. Plaintiff simply recites a combination of facts
that she claims constitutes a “substantive liberty interest” due
process cause of action: (1) delay in her arbitration hearing;
(2) defamation, and (3) forced retirement or constructive
discharge.
Plaintiff first claims that defendants intentionally delayed
her arbitration hearing. Plaintiff learned in December 1999
that the arbitration had been set for late January 2000. The
hearing never occurred, however, because on January 5, 2000,
plaintiff filed her complaint in Kentucky state court. Even
though her arbitration was not completed, plaintiff claims she

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6Before the motion for summary judgment was decide d, plaintiff
moved to compel the production of 112 teacher arbitration cases brought
against the Jefferson Public School System between 1990 and 2002 for
the purpose of demonstrating that her arbitration hearing had been
intentionally delayed. A magistrate judge conced ed the relevance of these
doc uments to plaintiff’s claim of delay and granted the motion with some
restrictions. However, the district court judge granted summary judgment
to defendants on the federal claims before the documents were produced
and those documents were never produced. In light of our holding that
plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law, the appeal concerning the motion
to compe l is moo t, as found by the district court.
had to file suit by that date to avoid statute of limitations
problems. As a result of filing suit, the arbitration hearing
was held in abeyance pursuant to an agreement signed by
school system officials and her own union representative.
Plaintiff claims that she did not agree to stay the hearing
pending her lawsuit and that the stay was imposed in
retaliation for filing a lawsuit. The school board and the
union respond that plaintiff knew that it was standard
procedure to hold these types of hearings in abeyance once a
lawsuit is filed. Plaintiff’s own union president testified that
he told plaintiff’s attorney before the suit was filed that filing
a complaint would likely result in the hearing being held in
abeyance.6
Second, plaintiff claims defamation as another element of
her constitutional tort. The complaining parents had
contacted the media and, after the February 5 meeting, Lauren
Roberts, a spokesperson for the school system, described the
allegations made against the plaintiff and stated that Bell’s
investigation had substantiated some of them. Roberts
informed the media that plaintiff had been suspended for five
days and stated that plaintiff had acted unprofessionally and
inappropriately. Roberts also related to the media that eight
students had been removed from plaintiff’s classroom because
of the alleged abuse. Plaintiff claims that the defendants’
failure to give her a timely arbitration hearing stigmatized her,
12 Jefferson v. Jefferson County
Public School, et al.
Nos. 02-5621/6038
harmed her reputation and caused her to be denied job
opportunities in her chosen field. The “liberty” interest that
plaintiff claims was abridged is, essentially, that her freedom
to pursue her chosen profession under the same conditions
under which she had been working was curtailed, in part
through injury to her reputation caused by the false and
stigmatizing publications. Assuming the combination of
arbitration delay, defamation and job loss, the question is
whether these facts constitute a valid liberty interest claim
and, if so, whether plaintiff must show that her state remedies
are inadequate.
In Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990), the
Supreme Court said that “the fact that a deprivation of liberty
is involved . . . does not automatically preclude application of
the Parratt rule” requiring a showing that state remedies are
inadequate. In Zinermon, the Court held that we should look
to the nature of the deprivation complained of and the
circumstances under which the deprivation occurred to
determine whether the rule of Parratt applies to defeat a
liberty interest claim. Subsequent to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Zinermon, we have held that Zinermon’s
extension of Parratt applies to some cases claiming
deprivation of due process where liberty interests are
concerned. Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1985) (en
banc) (arrestee brought suit against state police officer
seeking damages under § 1983 and under pendent state claim
of negligence and court held rule of Parratt applied to § 1983
suits alleging deprivation of a liberty interest); see also
Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737, 750 (6th
Cir.1999) (police chief brought § 1983 claim against city
arising from his suspension and investigation into alleged
misconduct and court held that a deprivation of liberty
interest based on damage to good name and reputation does
not automatically preclude application of Parratt rule),
overruled on other grounds, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema NA, 534
U.S. 506 (2002); Bacon v. Patera, 772 F.2d 259, 263-64 (6th
Cir. 1985) (private investigator’s liberty interest was infringed

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Nos. 02-5621/6038 Jefferson v. Jefferson County
Public School, et al.
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by damage to reputation and resulting loss of employment
due to police conduct, but remand necessary to ascertain
adequacy of state law remedies). Accord Hellenic Am.
Neighborhood Action Comm. v. City of New York, 101 F.3d
877, 880-82 (2d Cir. 1996) (following Parratt and Hudson,
due process rights held not violated where adequate
postdeprivation remedy was provided by New York law for
city contractor barred from bidding on government contracts
resulting in injury to liberty interest in good name and
reputation); Birkenholz v. Sluyter, 857 F.2d 1214, 1217 (8th
Cir. 1988) (state statute provided nursing director found
negligent in care of patients with adequate postdeprivation
remedy to adjudicate any challenge to misconduct finding);
Econ. Dev. Corp. of Dade County, Inc. v. Stierheim, 782 F.2d
952, 954-55 (11th Cir. 1986) (contractor § 1983 action
against county and county employee for deprivation of due
process rights arising from loss of contract and attendant
statements made to press dismissed due to existence of
adequate state remedies to redress injury); In re Selcraig,
supra, 705 F.2d at 796 (discharged school official alleged due
process violations for damage to reputation and employment
and denial of name-clearing hearing).
Plaintiff has already filed multiple claims under the state’s
defamation law and pursued the grievance procedures under
the collective bargaining agreement. She is pursuing actions
in two other forums in addition to federal court. There is no
showing that the remedies there are inadequate. Kentucky
law provides plaintiff with a panoply of postdeprivation
remedies sufficient to satisfy due process. The district court
properly dismissed her claims of deprivation of property and
liberty interests.
IV. Costs
The district court ordered plaintiff to pay $5,239.90 as costs
to the defendants. When reviewing an award of costs on
appeal, we look first to whether the expenses are allowable
14 Jefferson v. Jefferson County
Public School, et al.
Nos. 02-5621/6038
cost items and then to whether the amounts are reasonable
and necessary. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co. v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 924 F.2d 633, 643 (7th Cir. 1991).
Under Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
“costs other than attorneys’ fees shall be allowed as of course
to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.” If
authority exists to impose a cost, we reverse only for abuse of
discretion. The district court awarded costs to the defendants
for removal fees and witness fees, mileage reimbursement and
copying materials related to depositions. Statutory authority
exists for awarding all these costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.
Plaintiff argues that defendants cannot recover because they
did not “prevail” on all their claims. We do not agree.
Because all of plaintiff’s federal claims have been dismissed,
defendants are clearly the “prevailing party” in this action
under Rule 54(d) and are entitled to the reasonable costs
awarded by the district court.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is affirmed.

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