United States of America v. Ward Wesley Wright

1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0327P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 03a0327p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
WARD WESLEY WRIGHT,
Defendant-Appellant.
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No. 01-2569
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 96-80876—Patrick J. Duggan, District Judge.
Argued: August 5, 2003
Decided and Filed: September 12, 2003
Before: KEITH, COLE, and COOK, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Richard J. Amberg, Jr., Waterford, Michigan, for
Appellant. Joseph J. Allen, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
Richard J. Amberg, Jr., Waterford, Michigan, for Appellant.
Joseph J. Allen, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee.
2 United States v. Wright No. 01-2569
_________________
OPINION
_________________
R. GUY COLE, JR., Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant
Ward Wesley Wright appeals his jury conviction and sentence
for the use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission
of murder for hire, interstate travel in aid of a crime of
violence, and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
and to distribute cocaine. Wright raises four arguments on
appeal: (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss his indictment based on violations of the statute of
limitations and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment; (2) the Government is guilty of prosecutorial
misconduct; (3) the district court erred in denying his motion
to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant;
and (4) the district court erred in admitting hearsay evidence.
For reasons stated below, we AFFIRM the jury conviction
and sentence entered by the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Brian Chase, Raymond Kelsey, and William Arbelaez met
while serving time in a Minnesota prison. After all three had
been released in 1992, Chase met Wright while they were
both bouncers at a bar in Michigan. Wright was a member of
the Avengers Motorcycle Club (the “Avengers”) and was
involved with cocaine distribution through the club.
Arbelaez, a Colombian national who trafficked cocaine,
began supplying cocaine to Chase from Colombia, and Chase
in turn began selling cocaine to Wright.
In 1992, Arbelaez was arrested on drug charges in New
Mexico. He escaped from prison and sought to flee to
Colombia. Chase contacted Kelsey, a licensed pilot, and he

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No. 01-2569 United States v. Wright 3
agreed to fly Arbelaez out of the United States. Kelsey flew
Arbelaez to the United States-Mexico border, and Arbelaez
fled to Colombia from there.
In 1993, Arbelaez began supplying cocaine to Chase from
Colombia and Kelsey became the pilot of the operation. In
February, Kelsey flew to Los Angeles to retrieve a
fifty-kilogram shipment of cocaine and then flew to Detroit to
deliver it to Chase. Chase sold part of the shipment to David
“Slap” Moore, a member of the Avengers, who would
eventually become Chase’s primary distributor. Chase sold
the other part of his shipment to Wright, who delivered part
of his allotment to Chase’s customers and sold part of his
allotment to his own customers.
Shortly afterward, Kelsey flew twenty-five kilograms of
another shipment to Chase for distribution. Chase and Kelsey
decided not to pay Arbelaez for the cocaine and told him that
it had been seized by Canadian authorities. In the spring of
1993, Kelsey made another trip to Los Angeles and picked up
what was supposed to be seventy-five kilograms of cocaine.
However, Chase and Kelsey learned that the shipment
contained only sixty-six kilograms. Chase distributed the
drugs without notifying Arbelaez of the deficiency and
Wright received some of the shipment.
At this point, Moore was no longer distributing cocaine for
Chase. Instead, Moore introduced Chase to his main
customer in Detroit, and Chase supplied cocaine directly to
that customer. Moore wanted a commission from Chase for
the sales to his customer, but Chase refused. Moore told
Chase that he “knew how to take care of business,” and Chase
believed that this was a threat and that Moore intended to kill
him. Chase then discussed the “Moore problem” with Wright
and told Wright that he was willing to give Moore $40,000 to
end the dispute. Chase offered Wright $10,000 to broker the
deal with Moore, but Wright was unable to arrange a deal.
Wright then suggested, “Why don’t you just give me the
money and I’ll kill Mr. Moore.” A few days later, Wright
4 United States v. Wright No. 01-2569
told Chase that Moore had given another Avenger a gun and
$10,000 for a contract murder and that Chase was the target.
Chase and Kelsey then decided to kill Moore to end the
dispute and the perceived threat.
In July 1993, William Anderson Burke, a past national
president of the Avengers, was involved in a motorcycle
accident in Columbus, Ohio. Moore, as an officer in the
Avengers, traveled to Columbus to await Burke’s release
from the hospital. Chase and Wright decided that Wright
could kill Moore while he was in Columbus, and Wright
agreed to accept $50,000 to commit the murder. Wright’s
girlfriend, and later wife, Brenda Schneider, called Moore’s
wife to determine what hotel Moore was staying at in
Columbus.
On July 29, 1993, Wright obtained a .22-caliber pistol and
a car that had been purchased by Chase and Kelsey, and drove
to Columbus. Wright found Moore’s hotel room in the early
hours of July 30, and asked Moore if he could stay the night.
After Moore let him in and went back to sleep, Wright shot
Moore in the head twice. Before leaving, Wright “wiped
down” everything and took Moore’s wallet and pager. He
called Chase, told him everything was okay, and returned to
Chase’s house in Michigan.
Kelsey, who was at the house when Wright returned, used
a welding torch in Chase’s garage to melt the pager, the
wallet, and the gun. Kelsey then piloted a plane, with Chase
and Wright as passengers, and the three men dumped the
melted objects and Wright’s clothes over Lake Huron. Chase
paid Wright $50,000 for the murder on the evening of
July 30.
On August 10, 1993, Wright married his girlfriend, Brenda
Schneider, in Las Vegas using the alias Arthur Anderson.
Wright and his new wife stayed in Las Vegas gambling and
Larry Joe Powell, another Avenger, good friend of Wright,
and FBI informant, wired them money.

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No. 01-2569 United States v. Wright 5
After the murder, Arbelaez, who was still living in
Colombia, wanted Chase and Kelsey to pay him for the
twenty-five kilograms of cocaine “lost” to the Canadian
authorities and the nine kilograms of cocaine missing from
the seventy-five-kilogram shipment. Arbelaez devised a plan
for Chase and Kelsey to repay him for the missing cocaine.
He decided that they could steal airplanes and give them to
Arbelaez’s cocaine supplier, the Medellin Cartel in Colombia
(the “Cartel”).
In January 1994, Kelsey flew Chase and Wright, traveling
under the alias of Arthur Anderson, to the island of St. Martin
to meet with Arbelaez to discuss the plane-stealing scheme.
When Arbelaez failed to show, the three flew back to the
United States. Chase and Kelsey then traveled to Venezuela
and Colombia to meet with the Cartel regarding the types of
airplanes that they wanted stolen. In the spring of 1994,
Chase spoke with Kelsey, Wright and Burke and they decided
to steal planes together. Arbelaez also had his relative, Efrain
Ruiz, join the scheme. Kelsey scouted planes, and Wright
and Burke secured aviation fuel in a hangar for refueling the
plane on the way to Colombia. On May 7, 1994, the five of
them successfully stole a United States Forest Service plane
in Atlanta. They flew the plane to Florida where Chase,
Wright and Burke refueled the plane, which Kelsey then flew
to the Cartel in Colombia.
On October 6, 1994, Kelsey stole another plane in
Arkansas, refueled it in Florida, and flew it to Colombia.
Wright did not participate in this theft. In November 1994,
Kelsey picked up cocaine from Arbelaez, and flew it to Chase
and Burke in Michigan. However, Chase and Kelsey did not
pay Arbelaez the entire shipment, and were worried that
Arbelaez would retaliate. They decided to steal another plane
to make up for the missing payment. On February 18, 1996,
Kelsey stole a plane in Florida, and Wright and Burke set up
a refueling site. Kelsey and Chase then flew the plane to
Colombia for delivery to the Cartel.
6 United States v. Wright No. 01-2569
In April 1996, while attempting to return from Colombia,
Kelsey was arrested in St. Martin and he agreed to cooperate
with authorities. He then recorded several conversations with
Chase and Burke regarding drug shipments and Wright’s
involvement in the drug deals. In October 1996, Chase and
Burke went to Detroit, believing that they were to meet
Kelsey for a drug delivery. Instead they were arrested.
Kelsey pleaded guilty to several charges across several states,
including drug trafficking, stealing planes, and aiding and
abetting a murder for hire. He was sentenced to mulitple
terms of imprisonment. In April 1997, government agents
obtained a warrant to search Wright’s Las Vegas apartment
where they recovered evidence linking Wright to the Moore
murder.
B. Procedural Background
Wright was originally charged in an indictment with:
(1) the use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission
of murder for hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958;
(2) conspiracy in the use of interstate commerce facilities in
the commission of murder for hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1958; (3) interstate travel in aid of a crime of violence, in
violation of § 1952(a)(2); and (4) conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1). However, the Grand Jury
returned a First Superseding Indictment on April 22, 1997,
only charging Wright, Chase and Burke with Count Four,
participation in the cocaine conspiracy.
On September 9, 1997, the Government moved to dismiss
the indictment without prejudice as to Wright, arguing that
the prosecution of Wright would jeopardize an ongoing
investigation of the Avengers. The motion was granted. On
July 23, 1998, the Government obtained a Third Superseding
Indictment against Wright, charging Wright with all four
counts of the original criminal complaint. The Government
obtained an order sealing the indictment on the grounds that
the ongoing investigation of the Avengers and the protection

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No. 01-2569 United States v. Wright 7
1By stipulation of the parties, Co unt Two, co nspiracy to use interstate
commerce facilities in the commission of murder for hire, was dismissed
prior to the conclusion o f Wright’s trial.
of potential government witnesses and undercover agents
required that the indictment be sealed.
Chase pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute cocaine and the use of interstate commerce facilities
in the commission of murder for hire. Judgment was entered
against him on October 7, 1998.
In December 1998, Burke stood trial on the single count in
the First Superseding Indictment, participation in the cocaine
conspiracy. He was convicted by a jury and his conviction
was affirmed on appeal to this Court. United States v. Burke,
No. 98-1800, 2001 WL 392039 (6th Cir. Apr. 9, 2001)
(unpublished). In January 2000, the Government revealed the
identity of the informant being used in the investigation of the
Avengers, Powell, and on January 25, 2000, the Government
obtained an order unsealing the Third Superseding
Indictment. On April 3, 2001, the district court held a hearing
on Wright’s motion to suppress evidence, and that motion
was denied on April 4. On May 8, 2001, the district court
held a hearing on Wright’s motion to dismiss the indictment
based on violations of the statute of limitations, the Due
Process Clause, and his right to a speedy trial. On May 9,
2001, the district court denied that motion.
On June 11, 2001, following eight days of testimony, the
jury found Wright guilty of all three remaining counts of the
Third Superseding Indictment.1 Both Chase and Kelsey
testified against him. Wright was sentenced to two terms of
life imprisonment and one term of sixty months of
imprisonment.
8 United States v. Wright No. 01-2569
2Section 3282 read s in relevant part: “(a) In general.--Except as
otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried,
or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or
the information is instituted within five years next after such offense shall
have been committed.”
II. ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Dismiss
Wright argues that the district court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss the murder charges in the Third
Superseding Indictment. He argues that this indictment was
improperly sealed and challenges the denial of the motion to
dismiss based on the expiration of the statute of limitations
and violation of the Due Process Clause.
Wright was indicted pursuant to the First Superseding
Indictment on April 22, 1997. This indictment charged
Wright only with involvement in the cocaine conspiracy.
Upon motion by the Government and after a hearing, the
indictment was dismissed without prejudice on September 8,
1997. In support of its motion to dismiss, the Government
submitted affidavits from two FBI agents explaining that they
were conducting an ongoing investigation of the Avengers
and that their primary informant was Powell. The
Government argued that proceeding against Wright at that
time would require Powell to testify and thus jeopardize the
safety of Powell and the investigation of the Avengers.
Wright did not object to the Government’s request, but asked
for the dismissal to be with prejudice.
On July 23, 1998, just prior to the running of the five-year
statute of limitations on the murder for hire charges, see 18
U.S.C. § 3282,2 the Government obtained a Third
Superseding Indictment against Wright and moved to seal the
indictment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

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No. 01-2569 United States v. Wright 9
3Federal Rule o f Criminal Pro cedure 6(e)(4) read s in releva nt part:
“A magistrate jud ge to whom an indictment is returned may direct that the
indictment be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has been
released pending trial.”
6(e)(4).3 In its motion to seal the indictment, the Government
stated that the indictment should be sealed because “there is
danger of harm to potential government witnesses, and
undercover agents, if the indictment is disclosed prior to the
completion of a related criminal investigation.”
The indictments from the Lorain County, Ohio
investigations of criminal activities among the Avengers were
unsealed in September 1999, and in January 2000, Powell’s
identity as an informant was revealed. Wright’s indictment
was unsealed immediately and he was notified of the charges
against him. The Government states that the delay between
the unsealing of the indictments in the Ohio cases and the
unsealing of Wright’s indictment resulted from the
completion of the arrests of several members of the Avengers
in Ohio and Michigan, and the time it took to place Powell in
the Witness Protection Program and to secure the safety of
Powell’s family.
The decision of a magistrate judge to seal an indictment is
accorded “great deference.” United States v. Burnett, No. 91-
1693, 1992 WL 92669 (6th Cir. Apr. 24, 1992) (per curiam)
(unpublished) (citing United States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317,
321 (4th Cir. 1987)). We review a district court’s refusal to
dismiss an indictment for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Middleton, 246 F.3d 825, 841 (6th Cir. 2001); see
United States v. Bracy, 67 F.3d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir. 1995)
(holding that a district court’s decision to dismiss an
indictment based on a claim of improper sealing is reviewed
for abuse of discretion). The factual findings of the district
court are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Brown,
169 F.3d 344, 348 (6th Cir. 1999).
10 United States v. Wright No. 01-2569
1. Statute of limitations
The Third Superseding Indictment was unsealed and
reopened on January 25, 2000, eighteen months after the
statute of limitations on Count One, the use of interstate
commerce facilities in the commission of murder for hire, and
Count Three, interstate travel in aid of a crime of violence,
expired. This Court has addressed the legality of sealing
indictments only in a brief, unpublished opinion. Burnett,
1992 WL 92669, at *3 (“A sealed indictment that is not
opened until after the expiration of the statute of limitations
will not bar prosecution unless the defendant can show actual
prejudice.”) (citing United States v. Srulowitz, 819 F.2d 37,
40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 853 (1987)). Our opinion
in Burnett is consistent with other circuit courts that have
considered the issue of sealing indictments in more detailed,
published opinions. Several courts have held that when a
sealed indictment is not opened until after the expiration of
the statute of limitations, the statute ordinarily is not a bar to
prosecution if the indictment was timely filed. See Ramey,
791 F.2d at 320; United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041, 1041
(2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984 (1981).
Other courts also have held that the filing of an indictment
under seal will toll the statute of limitations if the indictment
was properly sealed. See Bracy, 67 F.3d at 1426; United
States v. Sharpe, 995 F.2d 49, 52 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam);
Srulowitz, 819 F.2d at 40. However, the Tenth Circuit holds
the minority position that the sealing of an indictment does
not toll the statute of limitations. See United States v.
Thompson, 287 F.3d 1244, 1251-52 (10th Cir. 2002) (refusing
to follow the other circuits and holding that the statute of
limitations is not tolled while an indictment is under seal).
We follow the rule in our decision in Burnett and the majority
of our sister circuits in finding that a timely filed and properly
sealed indictment tolls the statute of limitations. We therefore
must consider two factors when deciding if a sealed
indictment may be opened after the statute of limitation has
expired: (1) whether the indictment was properly sealed, and
(2) whether the defendant has shown actual prejudice from a

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No. 01-2569 United States v. Wright 11
4W right asks us to consider the three-part inquiry set forth in United
States v. Thompson, 104 F. Supp . 2d 1303 , 1306-07 (D . Kan.), modified
by, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1297 (D. Kan. 2000), aff’d by, 287 F.3d 124 4 (10th
Cir. 2002), to determine whether a sealed indictment tolls the statute of
limitations. The test instructs courts to consider: (1) was the original
decision to seal the indictment proper; (2) if properly sealed, was the
length of time the indictment was sealed reasonable; and (3) was the
defendant prejudiced by the sealing of the indictment. W e dec line this
invitation to adopt the test in Thompson because the facts of that case are
distinguishable. In Thompson, the court found that the government had
not shown that the indictment was sealed for a legitimate prosecutorial
purpose. Therefore, because we find the lengthy test in Thompson
unnecessarily cumbersome, we find that the question in this case is better
answered without the use of the test articulated by the district co urt in
Thompson.
sealed indictment being opened beyond the statute of
limitations.4
We first must determine whether the indictment against
Wright was properly sealed. The Government has the burden
of setting forth a justification for sealing the indictment. See
Srulowitz, 819 F.2d at 41. We have not specifically answered
the question of what is a proper purpose for sealing an
indictment. However, other circuits have held that any
legitimate prosecutorial purpose or public interest may
support the sealing of an indictment. See United States v.
DiSalvo, 34 F.3d 1204, 1218 (3d Cir. 1994) (an indictment
may be sealed for any legitimate prosecutorial purpose or in
the public interest); Sharpe, 995 F.2d at 52 (same); United
States v. Richard, 943 F.2d 115, 118-19 (1st Cir. 1991)
(same); United States v. Lakin, 875 F.2d 168, 170 (8th Cir.
1989) (same); Srulowitz, 819 F.2d at 40 (same); Ramey, 791
F.2d at 321 (same). Accordingly, we look to the
Government’s request to seal the indictment and evaluate that
request to determine whether any legitimate prosecutorial
purpose or public interest supports the sealing of the
indictment.
12 United States v. Wright No. 01-2569
The district court conducted a hearing on Wright’s motion
to dismiss and found that the indictment was sealed for a
valid purpose and that the length of the sealing was
reasonable: “The government’s reasons with respect to the
confidential informant as set forth today and as set forth in the
government’s response, in this Court’s opinion, justified the
18-month delay between the date of sealing and the date of
unsealing.” Wright argues that because Powell’s testimony
was unnecessarily cumulative to the testimony of Chase and
Kelsey, Powell’s protection was not a legitimate reason for
sealing the indictment.
We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
holding that the indictment was properly sealed. The
protection of Powell and the need to avoid compromising an
ongoing investigation falls within the range of permissible
reasons for sealing an indictment. See, e.g., Bracy, 67 F.3d at
1426 (finding that the need to protect the safety of potential
witnesses justified the sealing of an indictment); DiSalvo, 34
F.3d at 1219 (concluding that the sealing of an indictment to
avoid compromising an unrelated trial was a legitimate
prosecutorial purpose). The Government’s investigations of
the Avengers in Ohio, which involved Powell extensively,
were extremely important and resulted in the indictment and
conviction of nineteen individuals on various drug and
racketeering charges.
As discussed, an indictment may be sealed for a multitude
of reasons, including the protection of potential witnesses
involved in an unrelated investigation. At the time that the
indictment was sealed, the Government was conducting an
investigation of the Avengers in Ohio and Michigan and
Powell was an informant who was essential to the
investigation. As the Government noted at the hearing on the
motion to dismiss, it decided to dismiss the First Superseding
Indictment in order to protect the identity of Powell while the
investigation continued. The prosecutor argued that this
decision “was a collective decision up to the highest level of
my office, the U.S. Attorney’s office here, the U.S. Attorney’s

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No. 01-2569 United States v. Wright 13
office in Cleveland, the Federal Bureau of Investigation at the
highest levels in Detroit and Cleveland. . . .” The
Government concedes that it thought that the investigation of
the Avengers would end in 1997, but that it in fact did not end
until late 1999. When the indictment was issued and sealed
in 1998, the investigations were continuing and the
Government wanted the identity of Powell, an important
witness for the crimes allegedly committed by Wright, to
remain concealed.
The argument advanced by Wright misunderstands the law
relating to the sealing of an indictment. Wright asks this
Court to examine Powell’s testimony ex post facto and
determine whether the evidence he provided justified the
sealing of the indictment in the first instance. This we decline
to do. It is not our task to evaluate the testimony actually
provided by Powell at Wright’s trial and then ascertain
whether it was significant enough to justify the sealing of the
indictment. We look only to the evidence presented before
the magistrate judge and the district court to determine if the
indictment was sealed for a legally valid purpose. Given this
evidence, we find that the indictment was sealed for the
legitimate prosecutorial purpose of protecting the identity of
Powell, a Government informant who was involved in an
unrelated investigation and provided substantial corroborating
evidence in Wright’s trial regarding the murder of Moore.
Furthermore, courts have held that a defendant must show
“substantial, irreparable and actual prejudice” when a
properly sealed indictment is unsealed beyond the statute of
limitations. Edwards, 777 F.2d at 648; see also United
States v. Mitchell, 769 F.2d 1544, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985).
This Court in Burnett stated, “A sealed indictment that is not
opened until after the expiration of the statute of limitations
will not bar prosecution unless the defendant can show actual
prejudice.” 1992 WL 92669, at *3 (citing Srulowitz, 819 F.2d
at 40). The Defendant has the burden of showing that
prejudice occurred. Muse, 633 F.2d at 1043-44. The
discussion regarding actual prejudice is also relevant in
14 United States v. Wright No. 01-2569
discussing Wright’s Due Process claim and, accordingly, will
be discussed in the following section.
2. Due Process
A successful Due Process claim for pre-indictment delay
requires that a defendant establish: (1) prejudice to his right
to a fair trial, and (2) that the delay was intentionally caused
by the government in order to gain a tactical advantage.
United States v. Brown, 667 F.2d 566, 567 (6th Cir. 1982);
see also Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52
(1992); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324-25
(1971). The district court found that Wright failed to
establish prejudice:
Furthermore, the Court is not satisfied that the defendant
suffered substantial prejudice as a result of the delay. . . .
Defendant was aware as early as 1997 that the
government was, quote, accusing him, unquote, with
conduct relating to charges contained in the third
superseding indictment. . . . To the extent that the
defendant’s primary alibi witness is his wife, the Court is
not persuaded that her memory of relevant events has
been adversely affected by the passage of time. The
government alleges that, quote, her sworn [grand jury]
testimony regarding his alleged alibi was preserved in
April of 1997, unquote.
Wright argues that he was prejudiced by the delay between
the time of his initial arrest in April 1997 and the unsealing of
the indictment in January 2000 because: (1) his memory
regarding his alibi and the memories of other alibi witnesses
had faded; (2) the Government used the delay against him in
cross-examining his alibi witnesses, Scott and Charles
Ferguson, about their alleged loss of memory; (3) certain
Avengers refused to testify as witnesses; (4) records, such as
telephone records, were no longer available; (5) his wife had
a child in the belief that he would not be prosecuted; and
(6) his wife suffered emotional trauma.

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No. 01-2569 United States v. Wright 15
Wright’s first claim that he was prejudiced because of
witnesses’ loss of memory must fail as a matter of law. We
have held that loss of memory is an insufficient reason to
establish prejudice. Payne v. Rees, 738 F.2d 118, 121-22 (6th
Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). Moreover, as the district court
found, Wright can provide no evidence to support his
argument that the witnesses’ memories had faded. His wife,
Brenda, testified both at trial and before the grand jury that
she and Wright “partied” together at their home on the night
of Moore’s murder. It was not until trial that Brenda’s
memory “faded” and she testified that she was “later
informed” that Scott was partying with them on the night of
the murder. Scott and Ferguson, Wright’s other alibi
witnesses, testified in detail regarding the night of Moore’s
murder. Scott testified that she could not recall certain events
only after she was confronted with the contradictory
testimony of Powell regarding Moore’s whereabouts on the
day after Moore’s death. Furthermore, the record does not
support Wright’s assertion that the Government used Scott’s
lack of memory to impeach her. The trial record also lacks
evidence to support Wright’s argument that the Government
attempted to impeach Ferguson by challenging his memory.
As with Scott, the Government properly questioned Ferguson
to ascertain whether he was remembering the night that
Moore was killed or a different night that he spent partying
with Wright.
Wright’s claims that witnesses refused to testify is without
merit. He has presented no evidence concerning who these
witnesses are or how the delay in the indictment corresponds
to their inability to testify. Similarly, Wright has presented
no evidence that various records became unavailable to him
because of the delay. Indeed, he made no requests for any
records during the trial. He only vaguely references
“telephone records” in his brief on appeal, but presents
nothing to support his contention that either those records
were not available or that the allegedly unattainable records
were relevant to his defense.
16 United States v. Wright No. 01-2569
Wright’s next claims of prejudice are related to the alleged
effect of the delay on his family. First, Wright argues that he
had a child because he believed that he would not be
prosecuted. There is absolutely no case law to support the
argument that the birth of a child can be used to support a
claim of prejudice from a pre-indictment delay. Furthermore,
his wife became pregnant before the First Superseding
Indictment was dismissed in 1997 and therefore, the delay
had no bearing whatsoever on Wright’s family planning
decisions. Next, Wright claims that the delay caused
emotional strain on his wife, who testified that she was taking
antidepressants and other medications at the time of trial.
Again, Wright can cite to no case law that supports his
argument that emotional trauma to a witness establishes
prejudice. Furthermore, Wright cannot support his assertion
that his wife’s emotional trauma was a result of the delay, and
not simply the result of the stress of the trial and a 1999
automobile accident.
Wright is unable to satisfy his “heavy burden to prove that
pre-indictment delay caused actual prejudice.” United States
v. Butz, 982 F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th Cir. 1993). Because Wright
is unable to establish prejudice, we need not consider the
second part of the Due Process inquiry, in which a defendant
must establish that delay was intentionally caused in order to
gain a tactical advantage. Furthermore, Wright’s statute of
limitations claim also must fail because he is unable to show
actual prejudice. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying Wright’s motion to dismiss the
indictment based on violations of the statute of limitations
and the Due Process Clause.
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Wright argues that the improper reference to a Government
exhibit and statements made by the prosecutor during closing
arguments rose to the level of prosecutorial misconduct.
Where a defendant makes no objection to a prosecutor’s
statements at trial, the standard of review is plain error.

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No. 01-2569 United States v. Wright 17
United States v. Collins, 78 F.3d 1021, 1039 (6th Cir. 1996).
“To establish plain error, a defendant must show (1) that an
error occurred in the district court; (2) that the error was plain,
i.e., obvious or clear; (3) that the error affected defendant’s
substantial rights; and (4) that this adverse impact seriously
affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the
judicial proceedings.” United States v. Koeberlein, 161 F.3d
946, 949 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Johnson v. United States, 520
U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997)). A defendant has the burden of
proving that the obvious deviation from a legal rule was so
prejudicial as to affect the outcome of the district court
proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34
(1993).
1. Admission of a Government exhibit
Wright argues that the Government referenced documents
from the Internal Revenue Service in its closing argument that
were not admitted into evidence. However, at trial, defense
counsel acknowledged to the jury that the documents marked
Exhibit 56, had been admitted into evidence: “I didn’t have
on my exhibit list that I mark the exhibits that come in,
Number 56, and so that’s why I spoke out of turn.
Apparently, it has been put in, and I just screwed up and
missed it.” In his reply brief, Wright acknowledges that “[a]
closer examination of the record, after review of the
Government’s Brief on Appeal, indicates that the exhibit was
‘slipped in’ as Exhibit 56. . . .” Wright’s argument
concerning the exhibits clearly has been conceded and there
was no prosecutorial misconduct in this instance.
2. The Government’s closing argument
Wright also argues that the Government mischaracterized
evidence and demeaned his counsel in its closing argument.
First, Wright claims that the Government mischaracterized
the testimony of Powell regarding a conversation between
Powell and Wright. Presumably, Powell’s testimony was
offered to show that Wright acted suspiciously by refusing to
18 United States v. Wright No. 01-2569
return to Columbus, the city where Moore was murdered, a
few days after the murder. The Government stated that
“[w]hen Larry Joe Powell suggested [to Wright], ‘We better
go down and find out what happened, that’s your job,’
basically. What does he (the Defendant) say? ‘No, I’m not
going to Columbus.’” Wright argues that this was a
mischaracterization of his alleged conversation with Powell
because Powell testified that the conversation took place as
follows:
Q. What was your discussion with [Wright]?
A. I said something to the effect that maybe we should
go down there. And -
Q. Go where, to Columbus?
A. Yeah.
Q. For what purpose?
A. Just for support.
. . .
A. But [Wright] didn’t want to go down there and I
figured, well, he had his reasons for not wanting to go
down there.
Q. What did he say to you about why he didn’t want to
go down?
A. Just no. He was firm on not wanting to go down there.
Because Wright’s counsel did not object to the
Government’s statements, we review only for plain error.
Given the testimony of Powell, the Government’s statements
regarding that testimony were reasonable and there was no
obvious deviation from a legal rule. Accordingly, we do not
find prosecutorial misconduct based on the Government’s
characterization of Powell’s testimony.
Next, Wright argues that the Government demeaned
defense counsel in his closing arguments by stating to the
jury:
Mr. Amberg, I have a question for you. How can you be
so far off? What you just listened to had nothing to do

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No. 01-2569 United States v. Wright 19
with what went on in this case. Every representation he
made virtually was based on the questions he asked, not
from the answers that come from the stand.
Wright argues that our holding in United States v. Carter, 236
F.3d 777 (6th Cir. 2001), controls, and the conduct of the
prosecutor in this case is similar to that in Carter. In Carter,
the prosecutor misstated the testimony of a key identification
witness and repeatedly insisted that defense counsel was lying
about witnesses’ testimony. 236 F.3d at 784-85. We stated:
“When reviewing challenges to a prosecutor’s remarks at
trial, we examine the prosecutor’s comments within the
context of the trial to determine whether such comments
amounted to prejudicial error.” Id. at 783. “[W]e conclude[d]
that the prosecutor’s misstatement of the evidence in this case
. . . was not only error but also was plain error,” and “we also
conclude[d] that the prosecutor’s claims that defense counsel
was lying were not only error but also were plain error.” Id.
at 785. We ordered a new trial because we found that “the
prosecutor’s actions affected [the Defendant’s] substantial
rights and warrant reversal.” Id. at 785. No such
prosecutorial misconduct occurred during Wright’s trial.
The defense did not object to the Government’s rebuttal
argument and the statements made by the Government do not
rise to the level of plain error. See United States v. August,
984 F.2d 705, 714 (6th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (finding that
the defendant did not object and therefore waived any
objection to the remarks on appeal unless the remarks
constituted plain error or a defect affecting substantial rights).
In closing arguments the Government criticized defense
counsel for making representations based on questions posed
to witnesses rather than the answers that they provided. The
Government was attempting to show the jury that the
statements made by defense counsel were not supported by
actual testimony on the record and the Government’s method
of making this point was proper. Indeed, the Government
objected to defense counsel’s characterization of the facts
20 United States v. Wright No. 01-2569
during the defense’s closing statements and the district court
agreed that defense counsel mischaracterized facts:
[Prosecutor]: Oh, objection, Your Honor. This is enough
of this. Counsel, 90 percent of what he’s talking about is
not in evidence in this case.
THE COURT: Mr. Amberg, stay with the evidence that
came in this case and the jury will be instructed to base
their decision –
. . .
only on the evidence that came into this case and you
will be instructed that lawyer’s comments are not
evidence.
Accordingly, we find that the statements made by the
prosecutor during closing arguments do not constitute plain
error and we do not find prosecutorial misconduct.
C. Motion to Suppress
Next, Wright argues that the district court erred in denying
his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search
warrant. Wright argues both that the executing agents
conducted a general search that resulted in the seizure of
items not listed on the warrant and that the warrant was based
on a stale affidavit.
In reviewing a challenge to a motion to suppress, we review
factual findings for clear error and review legal
determinations de novo. United States v. Williams, 224 F.3d
530, 532 (6th Cir. 2000).
1. General search
Wright simply argues that he was the victim of a general
warrant because several pieces of evidence were seized from
his residence that were not listed with particularity on the
search warrant. Though Wright does not list the “illegally”
seized evidence, the Government concedes that “several

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No. 01-2569 United States v. Wright 21
items” were seized that were not specifically listed on the
warrant cover sheet. The Government argues that the items
were seized because they were clearly contraband or direct
evidence of the crime and subject to seizure under the “plain
view” doctrine. At the suppression hearing, the district court
found that agents “have a right to seize those things, number
one, that are evidence of a crime that are in plain view. And
secondly, in this situation, I believe had a right to seize items
that related to the two crimes that were identified as the basis
for the search warrant.”
It is well-settled that items to be seized pursuant to a search
warrant must be described with particularity to prevent “the
seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another” in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Marron v. United States,
275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). However, in United States v.
Brown, 49 F.3d 1162, 1169 (6th Cir. 1995), we held that
“even evidence ‘not described in a search warrant may be
seized if it is “reasonably related to the offense which formed
the basis for the search warrant.”’” (quoting United States v.
Fortenberry, 860 F.2d 628, 636 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting
United States v. Munroe, 421 F.2d 644, 646 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 851 (1970))).
The items seized in this case were sufficiently related to the
two crimes charged to fall within the scope of the search
warrant. Wright does not point to any specific items in his
brief on appeal; however, in his brief in support of his motion
to suppress, Wright claimed that the agents executing the
warrant illegally seized a leather vest in the Avenger’s colors,
a holster, a red address book, a brown address book, a
newspaper article, documents, and a letter.
All the items seized were related to the crimes charged in
the affidavit attached to the search warrant because they
indicated Wright’s involvement in the drug conspiracy and
the murder of Moore. The vest was evidence of Wright’s
involvement with the Avengers motorcycle club; the holster
indicated Wright’s possession of a gun; the address books
22 United States v. Wright No. 01-2569
contained the names and phone numbers of co-conspirators
including Chase and other Avengers; the newspaper article
about the murder of Moore showed that Wright had an
interest in the crime; the documents linked Wright to his alias
“Arthur Anderson”; and the letter from Chase described the
connection of Wright and Chase to the drug conspiracy.
Accordingly, the items were seized pursuant to a valid search
warrant and they related directly to the two crimes charged
and the information provided by the attached affidavit. See
United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 847 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(“[T]he common-sense reading of the warrant is that the
government could seize a variety of specifically identified
documents and any other records that related to the [crimes
described in the] affidavit.”). We affirm the decision of the
district court denying Wright’s motion to suppress based on
his allegation that agents conducted a general search.
2. Staleness of affidavit
Wright also argues that because the search warrant was
based on information that was stale, the magistrate judge did
not have probable cause to issue the warrant. Wright argues
that the information contained in the affidavit used to secure
the warrant was three years old and that there was no probable
cause to believe that Wright’s Las Vegas residence contained
any items related to the crimes charged. A magistrate’s
finding of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant is
accorded “great deference.” United States v. Blair, 214 F.3d
690, 696 (6th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). “[W]e must
determine whether, in light of the totality of the
circumstances, the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis’ for
concluding that ‘a search would uncover evidence of
wrongdoing.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Sonagere, 30
F.3d 51, 53 (6th Cir. 1994)). “[T]he duty of a reviewing court
is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis
for concluding that probable cause existed.” Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983).

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No. 01-2569 United States v. Wright 23
Moore was murdered in 1993 and the drug conspiracy took
place between 1993 and 1996. In United States v. Henson,
we stated that “[t]he function of a staleness test in the search
warrant context is not to create an arbitrary time limitation
within which discovered facts must be presented to a
magistrate.” 848 F.2d 1374, 1382 (6th Cir. 1988). Instead,
we held that the question of staleness depends on the
“inherent nature of the crime.” Id. In determining whether
the information provided to establish probable cause is stale,
we have held that many questions must be considered
including the nature of the crime and the nature of the items
to be seized. Id. (stating that courts should not determine
staleness “solely by counting the days on a calendar”). We
also have stated that “a court considers the following four
factors in determining whether a probable cause finding is
stale: ‘the defendant’s course of conduct; the nature and
duration of the crime; the nature of the relevant evidence; and
any corroboration of the older and more recent information.’”
United States v. Helton, 314 F.3d 812, 822 (6th Cir. 2003)
(citing United States v. Czuprynski, 46 F.3d 560, 567 (6th Cir.
1995) (en banc)).
In reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we find that
probable cause existed for the magistrate judge to issue the
warrant. The affidavit provided by Agent Gary Boggs
requested that agents be allowed to search Wright’s residence
for motel records/receipts, a medallion, a passport, and
identification in the name of Arthur Anderson. The affidavit
stated that Boggs and other DEA and FBI agents had been
conducting an investigation of a drug distribution
organization within the Avengers and that through this
investigation, they had learned that Wright was involved in a
cocaine distribution conspiracy and a murder for hire. The
affidavit described the nature of the drug operations with
which Wright was involved. The affidavit stated that Wright
and Moore were members of the Avengers, were involved in
the same drug conspiracy, and that the murder of Moore was
a part of a dispute within the drug conspiracy. The affidavit
also stated that Wright was using the alias of Arthur Anderson
24 United States v. Wright No. 01-2569
at the time of the murder and that Wright was presently using
the alias in Las Vegas, Nevada, where he resided at the time
of the warrant. Regarding the medallion, the affidavit stated
that Moore always wore a medallion with the Avengers’ logo
and that it had not been found at the murder scene. The
affidavit stated that investigators believed that Wright may be
in possession of the medallion as a “trophy” for the murder.
As the district court noted, the information regarding the
medallion may have been stale because it was unlikely that
Wright would have possession of such an item three years
after the crime. However, the other information contained in
the affidavit was sufficient to support a finding that Wright
was involved in a drug conspiracy and the murder of Moore.
Under the Helton factors, the probable cause determination
was not stale because of Wright’s conduct, the continuing
nature of the drug conspiracy, the nature of the evidence
regarding the crimes charged, and the corroboration of older
and more recent information about Wright’s crimes learned
through the investigation of the Avengers. In light of the
“great deference” we give to the magistrate judge’s decision,
there is nothing in the affidavit that leads us to conclude that
the magistrate judge did not have a substantial basis to issue
the warrant. There was extensive evidence provided in the
affidavit for the magistrate judge to conclude that a search of
Wright’s house would lead to the seizure of evidence of
wrongdoing. Accordingly, although several years passed
between the alleged crimes and the issuance of the warrant,
the information contained in the affidavit was relevant and
timely regarding the seizure of certain evidence from
Wright’s residence. We therefore affirm the district court’s
denial of the motion to suppress.
D. Admission of Evidence
1. Hearsay statements
All evidentiary rulings, including hearsay, are reviewed for
abuse of discretion. Trepel v. Roadway Express, Inc., 194

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No. 01-2569 United States v. Wright 25
F.3d 708, 716 (6th Cir. 1999). Wright argues that the district
court erred in admitting a hearsay statement made by Leah
Moore, the wife of Moore. The testimony was elicited to
show that Wright learned the whereabouts of Moore by
having his girlfriend call Leah. Leah testified that she had a
conversation with Brenda, then-girlfriend of the Defendant,
on the day of Moore’s murder. She also testified that she
heard Brenda relay the information regarding Moore’s
whereabouts to Wright. Defense counsel objected, but the
district court overruled the objection. Leah’s testimony was
as follows:
A. Brenda called me.
Q. Brenda who?
A. [Wright’s] girlfriend.
Q. Did you recognize her voice?
A. Yes.
Q. Was there anyone else in the area of the phone that
you could hear?
A. [Wright] was in the background.
Q. What did Brenda say?
Mr. Amberg: Hearsay. Objection.
[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, I believe again, the answer is
going to be a question. A question is not hearsay.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: She asked me where my husband was.
The Government argues that Leah’s testimony about Brenda’s
question was not hearsay because “a question is by definition
not hearsay.”
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, hearsay is defined as
“a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted.” 801(c). While this Court
has not specifically addressed the issue presented by Wright,
a question is typically not hearsay because it does not assert
the truth or falsity of a fact. A question merely seeks answers
26 United States v. Wright No. 01-2569
and usually has no factual content. See Quartararo v.
Hanslmaier, 186 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir. 1999) (“‘An inquiry is
not an “assertion,” and accordingly is not and cannot be a
hearsay statement.’United States v. Oguns, 921 F.2d 442, 449
(2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Inc. Pub. Corp. v. Manhattan
Magazine, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 370, 388 (S.D.N.Y.1985), aff’d,
788 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1986))”); see also United States v. Lewis,
902 F.2d 1176, 1179 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Vest,
842 F.2d 1319, 1330 (1st Cir. 1988).
In this case, Brenda’s question to Leah can be summarized
as “Where is your husband?” In making that statement,
Brenda is not asserting anything. She is only attempting to
extract information from Leah. This inquiry from Brenda is
not being used to prove the truth of the matter asserted and
therefore, as the Government argues, it is not hearsay.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing the testimony to be presented.
2. Co-conspirators statements
Wright argues that the district court erred in admitting tape
recordings that Kelsey made with Chase and Burke while
Kelsey was cooperating with the Government. Wright argues
that Exhibit 50(a), a recorded conversation between Kelsey
and Chase on August 2, 1996, and Exhibit 52, a recorded
conversation between Kelsey and Burke on September 18,
1996, were erroneously entered into evidence over the
defense’s objections. Wright makes three arguments
regarding the recordings: (1) that Kelsey was no longer a
conspirator when the recordings were made, (2) that Wright
was not a member of the conspiracy, and (3) that the taped
conversations were not in furtherance of the conspiracy, but
rather just “idle chatter.”
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) states that a
statement is not hearsay if “The statement is offered against
a party and is . . . (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” We

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No. 01-2569 United States v. Wright 27
review factual determinations underlying statements of
co-conspirators admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(E) for clear error. United States v. Gessa, 971 F.2d
1257, 1261 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
The district court admitted the recordings, stating:
The Court is satisfied . . . that there is sufficient evidence
to support a conspiracy, and the Court is satisfied that the
statements as described by Mr. Allen in Exhibits 50(a)
and 52, are in furtherance of the conspiracy and related
to the conspiracy and related to Mr. Wright’s
involvement in the conspiracy, if of course, the jury
believes those facts.
We have held that the Government may use the statements of
co-conspirators gained from a cooperating conspirator under
801(d)(2)(E) if the Government shows by a preponderance of
the evidence “(1) that a conspiracy existed, (2) that the
defendant against whom the hearsay is offered was a member
of the conspiracy and, (3) that the hearsay statement was
made in the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”
Hamilton, 689 F.2d at 1268 (quoting United States v. Vinson,
606 F.2d 149, 152 (6th Cir. 1979), following United States v.
Enright, 579 F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1978)).
Under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and Hamilton, the statements of
co-conspirators gained from a cooperating conspirator may be
used by the Government. Therefore, as a matter of law,
Kelsey’s statements may not be excluded solely because he
was cooperating with the Government at the time that the tape
recordings were made.
Wright also argues that the Government has not shown that
he was a member of conspiracy or that the statements on the
recordings were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. See
United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262 (6th Cir. 1982).
We disagree with Wright’s argument that the Government did
not show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was a
28 United States v. Wright No. 01-2569
member of the conspiracy. There was extensive evidence
presented that Wright, Kelsey, Chase, Ruiz, and Burke were
all involved in the cocaine conspiracy. Kelsey alone testified
to Wright’s extensive involvement in the drug conspiracy,
which included arranging storage facilities for the drugs and
assisting in the stealing of airplanes to pay for shipments of
cocaine. Wright was referenced in the conversations between
Kelsey and Chase and Wright’s role as a conspirator was
shown by the Government by a preponderance of the
evidence.
We also disagree with Wright’s argument that the
conversations were just “idle chatter.” In their conversations,
Kelsey and Chase discussed how Wright was demanding
either money or cocaine for the theft of a plane. In the
conversation between Kelsey and Burke, they discussed
paying Wright for the theft of an airplane with 100 kilograms
of cocaine from a transaction that they were considering. The
district court found these conversations were in furtherance of
the conspiracy as charged and not just “idle chatter.” This
finding of fact is not clearly erroneous given the evidence of
the conspiracy provided in this case. See Brown, 169 F.3d at
348. Accordingly, we find that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting the taped recordings.
E. Supplemental Arguments
Wright has submitted a pro se supplemental brief to this
Court. In his brief, Wright argues that the Government’s
application of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(4), the
rule authorizing sealing of the indictment, violates of the
statute of limitations, the Due Process Clause, and the
principles of separation of powers. Wright’s first two
arguments are merely reiterations of the arguments raised by
his attorney in his appellate brief and have already been
addressed. His last argument, that the sealing of the
indictment by the magistrate judge violates separation of
powers, has never been presented previously to the district
court or this Court.

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No. 01-2569 United States v. Wright 29
We do not review arguments that are raised for the first
time on appeal. See Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. Strand, 305 F.3d
580, 590 (6th Cir. 2002). This Court subscribes to the theory
that “[i]n order to preserve the integrity of the appellate
structure, we should not be considered a ‘second shot’ forum,
a forum where secondary, back-up theories may be minted for
the first time.” Isaak v. Trumbull Sav. & Loan Co., 169 F.3d
390, 396 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Estate of Quirk v.
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 928 F.2d 751, 758 (6th Cir.
1991)). Accordingly, we decline to review Wright’s
separation of powers argument.
Wright also submitted a pro se “motion for sanctions
pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 38 and
47(b)” on January 16, 2003. He argues that the Government
made “multiple errors” and “false, misleading statements” in
the proof brief it submitted to this Court. On January 29,
2003, the Government submitted its final brief to this Court
accompanied by a letter explaining that it had corrected the
two mistakes in its citations that Wright had noted in his
January 16 motion. On June 1, 2003, Wright submitted a
letter to this Court that was construed as a motion to issue
sanctions. In that letter, Wright argued that the Government
had made some corrections to citations in its brief, but that
several other factual mistakes existed and that the
Government’s brief is “riddled with errors.” He argues that
the changes made were insufficient to correct all of the errors
and therefore the Government should be sanctioned.
Rule 38 is a rule to protect appellees from frivolous
appeals. FED. R. APP. P. 38. Rule 47(b) states in relevant
part: “No sanction . . . may be imposed for noncompliance
with any requirement not in federal law, federal rules, or the
local circuit.” FED. R. APP. P. 47(b). As a matter of law, both
rules are wholly inapplicable to this case. Accordingly,
Wright’s motions for sanctions are meritless and we deny
both motions.
30 United States v. Wright No. 01-2569
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the jury conviction
and sentence entered by the district court.

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