United States of America v. Lance M. Freeman (98-6636), Donald W. Adams (98-6637)

*The Honorable Herman J. Weber, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0102P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 00a0102p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
UNITED S TATES OF AMERICA ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
LANCE M. FREEMAN
(98-6636), DONALD W.
ADAMS (98-6637),
Defendants-Appellants.
;>

1
Nos. 98-6636/6637
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis.
No. 97-20138—Julia S. Gibbons, Chief District Judge.
Argued and Submitted: December 16, 1999
Decided and Filed: March 23, 2000
Before: MARTIN, Chief Judge; CLAY, Circuit Judge;
WEBER, District Judge.*

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2 United States v. Freeman, et al. Nos. 98-6636/6637
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: April R. Ferguson, OFFICE OF THE
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR THE WESTERN
DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE, Memphis, Tennessee, for
Appellant in 98-6636. ON BRIEF: April R. Ferguson,
OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE, Memphis,
Tennessee, E. E. Edwards III, EDWARDS, SIMMONS &
OLIVER, Nashville, Tennessee, Wesley M. Oliver, TULANE
LAW SCHOOL, New Orleans, Louisiana, for Appellants.
Paul M. O’Brien, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellee.
MARTIN, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court, in
which WEBER, D. J., joined. CLAY, J. (pp. 6-15), delivered
a separate concurring opinion.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Chief Judge. Donald W. Adams
and Lance M. Freeman seek review of the district court’s
order denying their motions to suppress evidence seized
during an atypical traffic stop. The issue is whether the police
had probable cause to stop and search the vehicle driven by
Adams and Freeman. Because we find that the police did not
have probable cause, we reverse and direct that the evidence
be suppressed.
On the July 4, 1997 holiday, Memphis Police Officer David
Tate stopped a motor home traveling eastbound on heavily
traveled Interstate Forty for violating Section 55-8-123 of the
Tennessee Code, after he allegedly observed the vehicle cross
the white line separating the emergency lane from the right-
hand lane of traffic for an estimated twenty to thirty feet.
Section 55-8-123 provides that a vehicle “shall be driven as
Nos. 98-6636/6637 United States v. Freeman, et al. 15
appear to be alive and well to the extent that these drug
interdiction officers are stopping target vehicles based upon
subjective application of laws such as not driving “as
practicable as possible,” in order to gain suspicion to search
for narcotics. See id. at 556-62. Such stops and searches,
whether done under the guise of a vehicle checkpoint or a
traffic stop, fail constitutional muster.
D. Conclusion
While I have focused on what may appear to be the tactics
of the drug interdiction officers in Shelby County based upon
the cases reaching our Court from this area, cases have also
appeared from other areas within this Circuit in which
challenges to stops and searches are based on similar factual
scenarios. See, e.g., United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452
(6th Cir. 1999). The officers of Shelby County, Tennessee,
and drug interdiction officers everywhere in this Circuit
should understand that they are not to abuse the authority
provided to them to under Whren and Ferguson. Although
illegal narcotics have a widespread and devastating effect on
our country, the answer in controlling drug use does not lie in
sacrificing our precious Fourth Amendment constitutional
guarantees. The result of overzealous or even arrogant police
conduct that rises to the level of a Fourth Amendment
violation may be counterproductive where those individuals
actually transporting illicit narcotics may have the evidence
recovered against them suppressed – and charges
subsequently dismissed – as a result of an illegal stop.

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14 United States v. Freeman, et al. Nos. 98-6636/6637
2An issue raised by some defendants in the course of challenging the
initial stop of their vehicles in the cases cited herein is that the officers’
motivation in stopping their vehicles was not sparked by concern for the
enforcement of the traffic laws, but by the defendants’ Mexican or
Mexican-American ethnicity. See, e.g., United States v. Palomino, 100
F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 1996). In response to these “ethnic profiling” claims,
I note that although the Supreme Court has held that an officer’s
subjective motivations play no role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth
Amendment analysis, the Court has held that an officer’s actual
motivation is considered when a claim is brought under the Equal
Protection Clause for selective enforcement of the law based on
considerations such as race or ethnicity. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
occurred in the same area, we specifically expressed our
concern over the potential for abuse as it relates to “target”
vehicles such as U-Hauls. See 195 F.3d at 265-67 (citing
United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d at 460 (Guy, J., dissenting)).
Based upon the stream of cases reaching this Court since
Mesa, in which the defendants have specifically challenged
the search of their vehicles subsequent to a traffic stop along
Interstate 40 near Memphis, it appears that sheriffs of drug
interdiction units in this area may be doing precisely what
Mesa cautioned against – using the authority vested in them
under Whren and Ferguson as carte blanche to conduct
“fishing expeditions” to search for contraband, particularly
when a “target” vehicle such as a van, motor home, U-Haul,
truck, or automobile with an out-of-state license plate is
involved.2 See Mesa, 62 F.3d at 162-63; see also Hill, 195
F.3d at 266.
It also appears that, in effect, some of these officers may be
attempting to use the authority vested in them by Whren and
Ferguson to accomplish what this Court found to be an
unconstitutional practice by the State of Tennessee in United
States v. Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 1998). In other
words, the Tennessee vehicle checkpoints we found
unconstitutional in Huguenin on the basis that they were
being operated not to detect intoxicated drivers, but as a
pretext to stop drivers who had violated no traffic laws in
order to gain reasonable suspicion to search for narcotics,
Nos. 98-6636/6637 United States v. Freeman, et al. 3
nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane.” Adams
was the driver of the motor home and Freeman was the only
passenger. Officer Tate and Officer Michael McCord, who
arrived on the scene shortly after the initial stop, requested
registration and identification, which Adams and Freeman
produced. The officers then asked if there were any drugs or
weapons in the vehicle. After Adams stated that there were
no drugs or weapons, Officer Tate asked for permission to
“look around,” which Adams reluctantly granted. Without
anything further, the officers proceeded with a search of every
compartment of the motor home, where they did in fact find
marijuana hidden in several compartments.
Freeman and Adams filed motions to suppress the evidence
found in the search of their motor home, alleging that Officer
Tate lacked probable cause to stop the vehicle and that, even
if the stop was lawful, the search was beyond the scope of the
initial stop and there was no waiver. The magistrate, whose
report was adopted by the district court, concluded that the
stop was justified because the motor home’s partial entry into
the emergency lane constituted probable cause that either a
traffic violation had occurred or that the driver was
intoxicated. The district court then denied the motions to
suppress the evidence from the search. Freeman and Adams
pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute marijuana in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2,
reserving the right to revoke their pleas should this Court
reverse the district court and suppress the evidence discovered
during the search.
When reviewing the district court’s denial of a motion to
suppress evidence, this Court applies a clearly erroneous
standard to the district court’s findings of fact while
reviewing its conclusions of law de novo. See United States
v. Lumpkin, 159 F.3d 983, 986 (6th Cir. 1998). In doing so,
we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
United States. See United States v. Wellman, 185 F.3d 651,
655 (6th Cir. 1999). Stopping a vehicle and detaining its
occupants amounts to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). The

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4 United States v. Freeman, et al. Nos. 98-6636/6637
reasonableness of the stop is ascertained by determining first
“whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception,”
and second “whether it was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968). It is in this
context that we address the issue of whether Officer Tate had
probable cause to justify a stop of the motor home driven by
Adams.
It is true that “so long as the officer has probable cause to
believe that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring,
the resulting stop is not unlawful.” United States v.
Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 391 (6th Cir. 1993). We can not,
however, agree that one isolated incident of a large motor
home partially weaving into the emergency lane for a few feet
and an instant in time constitutes a failure to keep the vehicle
within a single lane “as nearly as practicable.” See United
States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 978 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding
that a similar one-time entry into the emergency lane failed to
constitute a violation of a Utah statute nearly identical to
Tennessee Code Section 55-8-123). We therefore find that
Officer Tate’s observation of the motor home briefly entering
the emergency lane is insufficient to give rise to probable
cause of a traffic violation and warrant an invasion of
Adams’s and Freeman’s Fourth Amendment rights. Because
Officer Tate’s stop of the motor home was not justified at its
inception, the evidence found in the subsequent search must
be suppressed.
Just as it does not constitute probable cause that a traffic
violation occurred, the motor home’s brief entry into the
emergency lane does not constitute probable cause that
Adams was intoxicated. As stated by the Tenth Circuit, “[i]f
failure to follow a perfect vector down the highway or
keeping one’s eye on the road were sufficient reasons to
suspect a person of driving while impaired, a substantial
portion of the public would be subject each day to an invasion
of their privacy.” Gregory, 79 F.3d at 978-79 (quoting United
States v. Lyons, 7 F.3d 973, 976 (10th Cir. 1993)).
Accordingly, Adams’s failure to follow a perfect vector down
Nos. 98-6636/6637 United States v. Freeman, et al. 13
C. The Apparent Pattern or Practice of Stopping and
Searching “Target” Vehicles as an Abuse of
Authority Under Whren and Ferguson
This Court has previously expressed its concern regarding
the potential for abusive police practices under Whren and
Ferguson, particularly as it relates to the actions of officers in
this area. For example, in United States v. Mesa, a case
involving an illegal search and seizure which took place
pursuant to a traffic stop along this very stretch of highway in
Tennessee, this Court warned against allowing police officers
to use the authority provided to them under Ferguson to
conduct “fishing expeditions” to search for contraband. See
62 F.3d at 162. The Mesa Court cautioned that because “we
[have given] the green light to police officers to stop vehicles
for any infraction, no matter how slight, even if the officer’s
real purpose was to hope that narcotics or other contraband
would be found as a result of the stop[, and because] . . . we
have extended this authority to the broadest extent possible,
. . . we have a duty to see that the authority is not abused.”
See id. The Court further cautioned as follows:
Although there is always temptation in cases of this
nature when a substantial quantity of drugs and firearms
are found to let the end justify the means, it must be
remembered that the courts only see cases in which the
conduct of the officer resulted in contraband being found.
If the officers had found no drugs in the defendant’s car,
obviously we would not even know that this traffic stop
had ever occurred. Therefore, we must accept that courts
will always be “thwarting” what some may view as a
good piece of police work when a motion to suppress is
granted in cases of this nature. Notwithstanding the
importance of drug interdiction, however, we are still
charged with the responsibility of seeing that the
interdiction occurs without the Constitution being
violated.
Id. at 163 (footnote omitted). Moreover, in Hill, a case
brought on a motion to suppress from a stop and search which

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12 United States v. Freeman, et al. Nos. 98-6636/6637
Although it is true that illegal narcotics were obtained as a
result of each of the searches in the above-referenced cases,
we must remain mindful of our duty to insure that traffic stops
and subsequent searches are conducted in accordance with
Fourth Amendment guarantees, and that we do not succumb
to the temptation of allowing the end to justify the means.
See Byars, 273 U.S. at 29; Akram, 165 F.3d at 457-60; United
States v. Mesa, 62 F.3d 159, 163 (6th Cir. 1995). As recently
cautioned, the Court must give the same critical scrutiny to an
officer’s credibility and reason for making the initial stop as
given to the defendant’s testimony. See Hill, 195 F.3d at 165-
67; Akram, 165 F.3d at 457-60; see also United States v.
Anderson, 42 F. Supp. 2d 713, 717-19 (E.D. Mich. 1999)
(recognizing the potential for abuse under Whren and
therefore “closely scrutiniz[ing] the government’s purported
reason for the stop”). In addition, as Chief Judge Boyce F.
Martin, Jr., once opined, the limits on police officers to detain
and search based upon reasonable suspicion incident to a
traffic stop must be sharply drawn so that law enforcement
officers do not extend the detention and increase the extent of
their search until they find conclusive evidence of
wrongdoing and elicit a consent from a detainee. See United
States v. Erwin, 155 F.3d 818, 825 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(Martin, C.J., dissenting); see also State v. McGinnis, ___
N.W.2d ___, 2000 WL 136818, at *5-*11 (Neb. Ct. App.
2000) (collecting cases regarding parameters on reason to
detain after purpose of initial stop completed).
It is not difficult to imagine, based upon the prodigious
sampling of cases provided above, that innocent persons
traveling along Interstate 40 in Tennessee have been stopped
and subsequently searched simply because they were traveling
in a “target” vehicle. However, because the questionable
stops and searches of innocent persons’ vehicles are usually
not brought to the court’s attention – inasmuch as no
contraband is recovered and no court case results – we may
never know the true extent of this apparent problem.
Nos. 98-6636/6637 United States v. Freeman, et al. 5
Interstate Forty did not give Officer Tate probable cause to
stop the motor home.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
REVERSED. This case is REMANDED for further
proceedings.

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6 United States v. Freeman, et al. Nos. 98-6636/6637
______________________
CONCURRENCE
______________________
CLAY, Circuit Judge, concurring. I concur in the majority
opinion reversing the district court’s denial of Defendants’
motion to suppress the evidence on the basis that the police
officers lacked probable cause to stop the Winnebago. I write
separately concerning what may be a troubling pattern or
practice by some members of the Shelby County Sheriff’s
Department drug interdiction squad of stopping “target”
vehicles on questionable probable cause grounds in this area
of Tennessee in order to search for contraband. Although it
is true that under Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)
and United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 391 (6th Cir.
1993) (en banc), a police officer may stop a vehicle for a
traffic offense when his or her actual motivation is to search
for contraband, it is also true that the officer must still have
probable cause to make the initial stop, and must not abuse
the Whren principle by using it as a subterfuge to justify the
recovery of contraband after an illegal stop and search.
Indeed, as the Supreme Court opined long ago, an illegal
search cannot be justified by the potent evidence that it
produces. See Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927).
A. “Probable Cause” for the Stop
In this case, Officer Tate’s purported reason for stopping
Defendant Adams as he was heading eastbound in a
Winnebago motor home along Interstate 40 near the Watkins
Road exit northeast of downtown Memphis, Tennessee was
because Officer Tate, who was later joined by Officer
McCord after the stop occurred, allegedly observed Adams
cross the solid white line separating the emergency lane from
the right-most lane of travel, and remain across the line for
about twenty to thirty feet. Officer Tate admitted that Adams
was traveling at the posted fifty-five miles per hour speed
limit. Based upon Tate’s observation of the Winnebago
crossing the white line for a distance of twenty to thirty feet,
Nos. 98-6636/6637 United States v. Freeman, et al. 11
446 (6th Cir. 1996) (involving car bearing Texas license
plates stopped for traveling 42 in a 55 zone and for changing
lanes without signaling along Interstate 40 by Shelby County
Sheriff’s Deputy Officer Kellerhall, wherein suspicion to
detain was based on chemical smell associated with ether-
based cocaine emanating from car; Kellerhall asked the
defendant to sign consent to search form while issuing
“courtesy citation”); United States v. Gonzalez, No. 94-6503,
1996 WL 626286 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 1995) (per curiam)
(involving motor home stopped for “weaving over the left and
right hand lane markers” while traveling on Interstate 40 by
Officer Kellerhall who was later joined by backup officers,
wherein suspicion to detain was based on smell of “raw”
marijuana; consent to search obtained while officer issued
“courtesy” citation); United States v. Mendoza, Nos. 93-
6228; 93-6356, 1994 WL 526711 (6th Cir. Sept. 27, 1994)
(per curiam) (involving truck stopped for traveling 63 in 55
zone along Interstate 40 by Officer Kellerhall, wherein
suspicion to detain was based on smell of “raw” marijuana
emanating from the truck and alleged inconsistent stories
provided by driver and passenger; obtained consent to search,
but twice advised the driver that if he did not consent,
Kellerhall would send for canine unit to conduct narcotics
sniff); United States v. Ledezma, 26 F.3d 636 (6th Cir. 1994)
(involving van stopped for “speeding” along Interstate 40 by
Shelby County Sheriff’s Deputy Officer Edmonds who was
later joined by Officer Lane, wherein suspicion to detain was
based on “nervousness” and “evasiveness” of the driver;
consent to search obtained); United States v. Barnes, No. 93-
5060, 1994 WL 75932 (6th Cir. Mar. 8, 1994) (involving car
bearing Texas license plates stopped along Interstate 40 by
Shelby County Sheriff’s Deputy Officer Tate for “following
too close on a small compact car,” wherein this Court
remanded the case back to the district court for further fact
finding regarding Officer Tate’s purported reason for initially
stopping the vehicle, while noting its concern with the
“subjective rule of reason in Tennessee on following too
closely”).

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10 United States v. Freeman, et al. Nos. 98-6636/6637
consent to search obtained; canine sniff conducted); United
States v. Wellman, 185 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 1999) (involving
motor home bearing Texas license plate stopped for traveling
63 in 55 zone along Interstate 240 near Watkins Road exit by
Shelby County Sheriff’s Deputy Officer Chris Jones who was
later joined by Officer Lane, wherein suspicion to detain was
based upon alleged inconsistent stories provided by the
defendant after Jones placed him in back of patrol car to issue
“courtesy” citation; consent to search obtained; canine sniff
conducted); United States v. Guimond, 116 F.3d 166 (6th Cir.
1997) (involving mini-van bearing Quebec license plate
stopped for traveling 65 in 55 zone along Interstate 40 by
Shelby County Sheriff’s Deputy Officer Tartera, wherein
suspicion to detain based on spare tire in back seat instead of
its proper storage compartment and vehicle had only two rows
of seats instead of three; Tartera placed driver in back of
patrol car to issue “warning” citation and questioned driver as
to travel plans, then went to van to question passenger;
consent to search obtained); United States v. Mamoth, Nos.
94-6315; 94-6364; 95-5048, 1997 WL 215511 (6th Cir. April
29, 1997) (involving motor home stopped for changing lanes
without signaling while traveling on Interstate 40 by Shelby
County Sheriff’s Deputy Officer Daniels and later joined by
Officer Dollahite, wherein officers’ suspicion to detain was
based on allegedly inconsistent statements made by driver and
passenger; this Court reversed denial of motion to suppress on
the basis that the driver was illegally detained); United States
v. Saez, No. 96-5168, 1997 WL 176434 (6th Cir. April 10,
1997) (per curiam) (involving van stopped for traveling 64 in
a 55 zone along Interstate 40 by Shelby County Sheriff’s
Deputy Officer Segerson, wherein officer’s suspicion to
detain was based on observation that rear portion of van had
been raised and a strong scent of air freshener emanated from
the van, along with Sergerson’s knowledge “[a]s a police
officer patrolling the interstate highways, he was aware that
drug traffickers often transported their wares along I-40";
canine sniff was done).
The cases bearing similar scenarios have further arisen
before the Court. See United States v. Palomino, 100 F.3d
Nos. 98-6636/6637 United States v. Freeman, et al. 7
1Defendants calculations are as follows:
Twenty to thirty feet equates to a distance between 0.0379 tenths of a mile
and 0.0568 tenths of a mile.
(20 feet) x (1 mile/5280 feet) = 0.00379 miles = 0.0379 tenths of a
mile
(30 feet) x (1 mile/5280 feet) = 0.00568 miles = 0.0568 tenths of a
mile
The amount of time that the Winnebago actually crossed the white line
based upon the fifty-five mile per hour speed limit at which the
Winnebago was traveling is calculated as follows:
(0.00379 miles) x (1 hour/55 miles) x (3600 seconds/hour) = 0.248
seconds
(0.00568 miles) x (1 hour/55 miles) x (3600 seconds/hour) = 0.372
seconds
Tate stopped the vehicle for violating Tennessee Code § 55-8-
123, which requires all vehicles to be driven “as nearly as
practicable entirely within a single lane.”
On appeal, Defendants argue, and we agree, that the mere
passage of their vehicle across the line separating the
emergency lane of a highway from the right lane of travel did
not constitute probable cause that Defendants were violating
Tennessee law. Based upon Officer Tate’s testimony that he
observed the Winnebago cross over the white line for about
twenty to thirty feet and that Defendants were traveling at the
posted speed limit, Defendants calculated the period of time
that Officer Tate observed the Winnebago cross over the line
to be about one-third of a second.1 We agree that such a brief
period of time where the Winnebago crossed over the line did
not provide Officer Tate probable cause to stop the vehicle for
a traffic violation, particularly where the weather conditions
on the day in question were windy, Adams was rounding a
curve in the road at the time, and Officer Tate admitted that
it would not be unusual for a Winnebago to cross over the
white line inasmuch as the vehicle is top-heavy and the
Memphis area gets a lot of high winds, especially in that area
of open highway.
To accept Officer Tate’s purported reason for stopping the
Winnebago as constituting probable cause for an alleged

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8 United States v. Freeman, et al. Nos. 98-6636/6637
traffic infraction would perpetuate what appears to be the
improper tactics sometimes employed by members of the
Shelby County Sheriff’s Department, see infra Part B., and
give credibility to an unreasonable basis for the stop. In
making credibility determinations as to an officer’s purported
reason for initially stopping a vehicle, the Court may use the
record in the case before it, what has been learned from other
similar cases, all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
therefrom, as well as its own common sense. See United
States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 266 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting
United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 458 (6th Cir. 1999)
(Guy, J. dissenting)). Indeed, as will be illustrated in Part B.,
this is not the first time Officer Tate’s credibility and
truthfulness for stopping a vehicle traveling along Interstate
40 in Shelby County, Tennessee have been challenged. See
United States v. Atkins, Nos. 98-5827; 98-5828, 1999 WL
1045942, at **2 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 1999) (noting that the
defendant contended that Officer Tate was not truthful in
claiming that he stopped the Blazer for speeding, wherein the
defendant submitted Tate’s record for untruthfulness in other
cases in support of this contention); United States v. Barnes,
No. 93-5060, 1994 WL 75932 (6th Cir. Mar. 8, 1994)
(remanding the case for further fact finding as to whether
Officer Tate had more objective reasons for stopping the
vehicle).
Considering the facts of this case along with what can be
learned from other cases arising out of this area of Tennessee
and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom, Officer Tate
did not have probable cause to stop the Winnebago, and may
have been using the Tennessee statute and the authority
provided to him under Whren as a subterfuge to search this
target vehicle for contraband. See Hill, 195 F.3d at 165-67
(noting that an officer’s credibility in making the initial traffic
stop must be scrutinized, particularly when a target vehicle
such as a U-Haul is involved); Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 388
(holding that traffic stop cases must be evaluated by
undertaking an objective assessment of an officer’s actions in
light of the facts and circumstances then known to him to
determine whether they were reasonable). The subjective way
Nos. 98-6636/6637 United States v. Freeman, et al. 9
in which the Tennessee statute was employed by Officer Tate
to claim that Adams was violating it at the time of the stop
raises the spectre that the statute may potentially be used by
these interdiction officers as a tool to engage in both legal and
illegal stops and searches.
B. Cases Suggesting a Possible Pattern or Practice by
Officers of the Shelby County Sheriff’s Department
of Stopping and Searching “Target” Vehicles
The following cases, presented in reverse chronological
order as decided by this Court, represent a sampling of what
may constitute an apparent pattern or practice of some drug
interdiction officers in this area of Tennessee where the
defendants involved have brought motions to suppress the
evidence. That is to say, the following cases involving
defendants’ motions to suppress are those in which the
interdiction officers stationed along Interstate 40 near
Memphis have stopped a target vehicle, often on questionable
or subjective probable cause grounds, and where the
subsequent sequence of events repeat in a manner apparently
crafted to justify a resulting detention and search.
The list of cases begins with those very recently decided.
See United States v. Atkins, Nos. 98-5827; 98-5828, 1999 WL
1045942, at **1 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 1999) (involving a
Chevrolet Blazer and a van both bearing Texas license plates
stopped for “speeding” by Officer Tate and Officer McCord,
respectively, wherein officers’ suspicion to detain and search
was based on smell of marijuana emanating from each
vehicle; at suppression hearing, evidence offered by the
defendant as to Tate’s untruthfulness); United States v. Hill,
195 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 1999) (involving U-Haul stopped for
traveling 63 in 55 zone along Interstate 40 by Shelby County
Sheriff’s Deputy Officer Whitlock who was later joined by
Officer Kellerhall, wherein suspicion to detain was based on
inconsistent stories allegedly provided by driver and
passenger after two had been separated when Whitlock placed
driver in patrol car, along with nervousness of driver and used
tissue on floorboard of U-Haul; “courtesy” citation issued;

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