Rangel v. Raines, et al

1 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-10731
Summary Calendar
RAYMOND VELA RANGEL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CRAIG RAINES; TEXAS DEPARTMENT
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,
STATE CLASSIFICATION COMMITTEE,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 1:98-CV-72-BG
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April 27, 2000
Before JONES, DUHÉ, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
Raymond Vela Rangel, Texas prisoner # 711230, appeals the
district court’s grant of defendant Craig Raines’ motion for
judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 50(a). Rangel alleged that Raines knew that Rangel had
been attacked previously by fellow inmates and was deliberately
indifferent to his safety and, as a result, Rangel was attacked in
the shower area of his unit by a fellow inmate on June 12, 1996.
At the time of the attack, Rangel was on close custody status and

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the unit was on institutional lockdown. Rangel testified that
despite the lockdown status, the cell doors on his unit were opened
and he was attacked when he and his cellmate entered the shower
area.
We review a district court's grant of a Rule 50(a) motion for
judgment as a matter of law de novo, using the same standard
applied in the district court. RTC v. Cramer, 6 F.3d 1102, 1109
(5th Cir. 1993). We have considered the evidence and all
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to
Rangel, the party opposing the motion, and find that reasonable
jurors could not have arrived at a contrary verdict. Id. As the
district court found, the most that could be inferred from Rangel’s
evidence was that the cell doors were open due to negligence, and
Raines did not act unreasonably in relying on the security measures
for close custody and institutional lockdown to keep Rangel safe.
See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1995); Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). The district court’s judgment
is AFFIRMED.
Rangel argues that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motions for the appointment of trial counsel. We find
no abuse of discretion in the denial of Rangel’s motion for trial
counsel. Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982).
AFFIRMED.

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