(caption unavailable)

*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 94-30056
Summary Calendar
NEIL A. DOPSON,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
VERSUS
WILRIG (USA) INC.,
Defendant/Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Louisiana
(CA-92-4091-E-4)
(October 25, 1994)
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, SMITH and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
The appellant, Neil A. Dopson, filed suit for Jones Act
negligence and unseaworthiness under the general maritime law
against his employer, Wilrig (U.S.A.) Inc., for injuries sustained

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1The primary duty of a watch-stander is to ensure that the rig
remains stable throughout the tow.
2
while acting as watch-stander. The jury returned a verdict finding
no liability for unseaworthiness, but returned a judgment in favor
of appellant for negligence and awarded him total damages of
$250,000. In addition, the jury found appellant to be
contributorily negligent and apportioned his fault at ninety (90)
percent. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Dopson for
$25,000. Moreover, the trial court denied Dopson's timely motion
for a new trial, wherein he contended that (1) the trial court
erred in not permitting him to produce evidence of unseaworthiness
and by interrupting his presentation of such evidence on cross-
examination; (2) the jury deviated from the instructions regarding
contributory negligence; and (3) the jury's monetary award was
grossly inadequate.
I. FACTS
Neil A. Dopson was a watch-stander1 employed by Wilrig as a
part of the crew of the TREASURE STAWINNER, a semisubmersible rig,
in tow from the Gulf of Mexico near Grand Isle to Macai, Brazil.
Wilrig hired Noble, Denton & Associates, Inc. ("Noble"), to provide
recommendations for the preparation of the rig and safe towage. To
safeguard the venture in all respects, Noble recommended a minimum
riding crew of 14 men, including four roustabouts, plus a catering
staff - a total of 19 men. Wilrig provided 20 men for the tow.
Wilrig designated several crewmembers as roustabouts to do heavy

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2A "roustabout" is the term applicable to individuals who are
hired to do heavy manual labor on rigs. Roustabouts are usually
unskilled or semi-skilled laborers who, after accumulating
sufficient experience, are elevated to higher positions.
3
labor.2 These men, however, were not "true" roustabouts. Although
they had once been roustabouts, due to their work experience they
were promoted to other positions, such as toolpusher and driller.
Noble, however, provided a Certificate of Approval certifying
compliance with all its recommendations and cleared their
departure.
At the time of the voyage, Dopson had accumulated over
thirteen (13) years of offshore oil field work experience. He
began his career in the oil field industry as a roustabout. Over
the years, Dopson was promoted to watch-stander, a position he had
occupied for approximately five (5) years. During his career, he
learned to make rounds and lower pump rooms, inspect bilges, clean
bilges and accumulated safety training.
On April 28, 1992, Dopson was working in the lower port pump
room when he discovered leakage. Upon examining the bilges, he
allegedly discovered a large paint chip, approximately eight (8)
inches long, clogging the sump, or drain. He then attempted to
remove the paint chip since the pump room could not be properly
drained if the sump was clogged. The sump, however, was covered by
a one hundred (100) pound grating. Dopson's injury occurred while
attempting to remove this grating.
In order to lift the grating, Dopson apparently placed the
heels of his feet on a ledge with his back to a bulkhead, bent over

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3Appellee argued to the jury that Dopson's pain "mysteriously"
developed after Dr. Patton advised Dopson to meet with a
rehabilitation counselor so he could soon get back to work.
4
at the waist, placed his right hand on a hand rail approximately
three feet away and reached down to place his left-hand fingers
through the grating. In attempting to pull the grating up by its
edge (like a trap door), he fell forward (or slipped) and injured
his back. Dopson testified that he lay paralyzed on the floor for
two hours before he was finally able to crawl for help. He further
testified that he completed the remainder of the tow with extreme
pain. Upon returning to the United States and after several visits
with two doctors, surgery was suggested. Such surgery was not
approved by Wilrig's own doctor, Dr. Levy, until January of 1993.
The surgery was performed on February 1, 1993, by Dr. Patton.
The appellant underwent a left L5-S1 microlumbar disectomy, an
operation done under a microscope, which Dr. Patton testified was
a less intrusive surgery and usually allowed for quicker
recoveries. During this procedure, the left side of the herniated
disk was removed. Dopson was having a normal recovery for the
first two-and-a-half months following surgery, until he complained
to Dr. Patton about back pains.3 Dr. Patton was unable to find the
source of this pain. After receiving a second opinion from Dr.
Phillips, it was discovered that scar tissue had formed and was
inflaming the nerves, a condition diagnosed as arachnoiditis. Due
to this pain Dopson discontinued the physical therapy that Dr.
Patton had recommended. Drs. Patton, Phillips and Levy testified
that the appellant should return to work with restrictions from

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5
light to moderate manual labor.
II. Discussion
A. Whether the district court abused its discretion in
limiting testimony it deemed repetitive and whether this
precluded the jury from arriving at a proper verdict?
The appellant asserts that the district court should have
granted its motion for a new trial because the district court
erroneously prevented him from presenting evidence of the TREASURE
STAWINNER's unseaworthiness. Specifically, appellant claims he was
prevented from eliciting testimony and evidence to show that Wilrig
did not hire crewmen who were currently classified as roustabouts,
but rather, that Wilrig designated men with other classifications
to serve as roustabouts in addition to their regular jobs on that
voyage. This evidence was essential in supporting Dopson's theory
of unseaworthiness, since Noble recommended that the crew include
four roustabouts. Appellant intended to demonstrate that the
spirit of this requirement had not been fulfilled by showing that
a roustabout had specific characteristics and abilities which may
not have been possessed by other seamen. Thus, Dopson claims there
were no actual roustabouts on board to assist him with heavy,
manual labor while he made his rounds. Consequently, the ship was
unseaworthy. Because we find that the lower court's actions were
proper and sufficient evidence was presented on the issue of
unseaworthiness, we affirm the trial court.
1. trial court's intervention and comments
This Court reviews evidentiary rulings only for abuse of

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6
discretion and will reverse a judgment on the basis of evidentiary
rulings only where the challenged ruling affects a substantial
right of a party. Seidman v. American Airlines, Inc., 923 F.2d
1134, 1138-39 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted). A
district judge is given "reasonable control over the mode and order
of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence . . . to avoid
the needless consumption of time." FED. R. EVID. 611(a); Cranberg
v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 756 F.2d 382, 391 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 850 (1985). Moreover, as a common law
judge, he has an overall responsibility to see that the trial is
just and not subject to delay. Cranberg, 756 F.2d at 391. Thus,
he may question witnesses, elicit facts, clarify evidence, and pace
the trial. Id. However, the district court must maintain both
objectivity and the appearance of neutrality when it intervenes to
terminate the questioning of a witness. Miles v. Olin Corp., 922
F.2d 1221, 1228 (5th Cir. 1991); Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765
F.2d 456, 471 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 822 (1985).
Otherwise, the court may improperly influence and prejudice the
jury against a party. See Dartez, 765 F.2d at 471. For these
reasons, we review the record as a whole, not just isolated actions
or comments by the trial judge, to determine whether the trial was
fair and impartial. Miles, 922 F.2d at 128; Cranberg, 756 F.2d at
391.
The record is replete with testimony that the men designated

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4For example, here are excerpts of testimony taken from two
witnesses. The following testimony was elicited from a Wilrig
employee, Mr. Murphy, by appellant's counsel:
Q. There were not four roustabouts, there were no roustabouts,
were there?
A. . . . they were just designated roustabouts.
Q. Right. There were no roustabouts?
A. No, they were not that. There were no roustabouts.
Q. Okay. And roustabouts are the ones who are usually
appointed by you, the barge engineer or the tool pusher, to
do the heavy lifting and the heavy work, is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And, in fact, there were no roustabouts at all, were there?
A. There were no roustabouts.
Supp. R. vol. 1, at 156-57.
The following testimony was elicited from Mr. Istre, another
employee of Wilrig, by appellant's counsel:
Q. Okay. Now the exhibits that have been placed in evidence
show that Noble Denton, the insurance company, recommended
four roustabouts to do roustabout work, apparently, on this
tour of 54 days. Were there any roustabouts at all on this
trip, this tow?
A. There was a, toolpusher and the driller that were
designated as roustabouts.
Q. Were there four roustabouts on this tow?
A. No, sir, not --
Q. Okay. Is a roustabout the person who normally is supposed
to do the heavy, hard work?
A. Right.
Q. Okay.
A. Right, yes, sir.
Q. And there were none on this tow?
A. No, sir.
Id. at 30-31.
7
as roustabouts were not actual roustabouts.4 Nonetheless, Dopson's
counsel further questioned other witnesses on whether actual
roustabouts were on board for the tow and the type of work they
performed. The district court believed this testimony to be
repetitive and time consuming. Therefore, when appellant's counsel
proceeded to question another witness, Mr. Shinn, about the numbers
of roustabouts aboard the rig, the court intervened and stated that

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5Dopson objected to the court's interruption and comments
outside of the presence of the jury. The court overruled the
objection with the following response:
But, let me explain, the fact has been -- it was very
repetitive, I felt, and there had been testimony that the crew
was adequate in the eyes of the insurer and . . . other
persons to satisfy the insurance company's need for a name,
perhaps even the toolpusher was designated as a roustabout.
So I could see no need for the repetition and I didn't want
the jury to get the misconception that just because you didn't
hire a "roustabout" might be a factor. It's up to them to
decide. You can argue the insurance company wanted to call at
least four of them roustabouts, whether they were toolpushers,
drillers or whatever. So I note your objection for the record
and it would be overruled.
Supp. R. vol. 1, at 259-269.
8
evidence had already been heard that "four people on [the] tow
[were] designated as roustabouts" by Wilrig and prodded counsel to
move on.5
Appellant also argues that the judge's remarks were an
improper comment on the facts in the presence of the jury. Yet,
more importantly, he claims the jury concluded from the
intervention and comment that the court favored the defendant's
position and that the "designation" of roustabouts was sufficient
for the vessel to be seaworthy. Thus, we must determine whether
the remarks of the trial court, which were timely objected to,
impaired a substantial right of the objecting party. Reese v.
Mercury Marine Div. of Brunswick Corp., 793 F.2d 1416, 1423 (5th
Cir. 1986); Newman v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 648 F.2d 330, 335 (5th
Cir. Unit B June 1981).
Upon reviewing the record in its entirety, we do not believe
that the district court's remark or actions denied the appellant a
fair trial. The record clearly demonstrates that the trial judge

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6The Court stated the following after Mr. Istre's testimony:
Alright, ladies and gentlemen, you've heard a preliminary
witness and it's always lengthy and [there is] some degree of
repetition and I try to keep my mouth shut so that you can get
a grab on the case. So that witness is slow. But from now
on, the witnesses are going to go through this courtroom like
a space ship in orbit. No repetition. Boom, Boom, to the
point.
Supp. R. vol. 1, at 82.
9
desired to avoid repetitive and confusing testimony.6 Furthermore,
the record does not evidence any severe admonishments or reprimands
against any party, which would lead the jury to believe that one
party was favored. The trial court's sole reason for its comment
and acts was to further its responsibility to "keep the trial
moving." Reese, 793 F.2d at 1426. We cannot say that the sole
comment complained of affected the substantial rights of the
parties. Consequently, we hold that the district court acted
within the bounds of acceptable conduct to maintain the proceedings
at a reasonable pace and therefore, we find no abuse of discretion.
2. the unseaworthiness claim
Dopson next argues that the totality of the trial court's
remark and actions precluded the jury from reaching a proper
decision. Specifically, the appellant argues that the court's
interruption prevented him from driving the point home to the jury
that the difference between actual and designated roustabouts was
tantamount to the issue of seaworthiness. For this reason, Dopson
requests a new trial to present the jury with adequate evidence for
their deliberations.
A plaintiff is entitled to a new trial on evidentiary grounds

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10
whenever the jury verdict is against the great weight of evidence.
Winter v. Brenner Tank, Inc., 926 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1991)
(citations omitted); Smith v. Tidewater Marine Towing, Inc., 927
F.2d 838, 843 (5th Cir. 1991). This Court reviews the denial of a
motion for new trial under an abuse of discretion standard.
Winter, 926 F.2d at 471. Thus, under this standard -
When the trial judge has refused to disturb a jury verdict,
all the factors that govern our review of his decision favor
affirmance. Deference to the trial judge, who has had an
opportunity to observe the witnesses and to consider the
evidence in the context of a living trial rather than upon a
cold record, operates in harmony with deference to the jury's
determination of the weight of the evidence and the
constitutional allocation to the jury of questions of fact.
Id. (quoting Shows v. Jamison Bedding, Inc., 671 F.2d 927, 931 (5th
Cir. 1982)). We are not convinced that the jury verdict was
against the great weight of evidence in the case before us.
A ship is unseaworthy unless it and all its appurtenances and
crew are reasonably fit and safe for their intended purpose. Miles
v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 981 (5th Cir. 1989) (a "seaman who is not
reasonably fit" may render a vessel unseaworthy); see Bommarito v.
Penrod Drilling Corp., 929 F.2d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1991). The
shipowner has an absolute duty to provide the members of his crew
with a seaworthy vessel, an obligation not dependent on fault.
Miles, 882 F.2d at 981; Comeaux v. T.L. James & Co., Inc., 666 F.2d
294, 298-99 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982). To establish unseaworthiness,
a plaintiff must prove that the crewmember is not "equal in
disposition and seamanship to the ordinary men in the calling."
Miles, 882 F.2d at 981 (quoting Claborn v. Star Fish & Oyster Co.
Inc., 578 F.2d 983, 987 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936

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7In Miles, the seaman in question launched a vicious and
unprovoked attack , fatally inflicting 62 knife wounds on another
crewmember.
11
(1979)).
The Miles Court stated that a seaman possessing a savage and
vicious nature7 would render a vessel unseaworthy. Id. at 982.
The Comeaux Court found, as a matter of law, that the ship in
question was unseaworthy due to an inadequate crew. Comeaux, 666
F.2d at 299. The Court stated that not only had the crew on board
been insufficient in number, but that the crewmember assisting the
plaintiff when the injury occurred was totally blind in one eye and
wholly inexperienced. Id. ("Of course, to be inadequate or
improperly manned is a classic case of an unseaworthy vessel,"
quoting June T., Inc. v. King, 290 F.2d 404, 407 (5th Cir. 1961)).
In light of the evidence brought before the jury and reviewed by
this Court, the finding of an unseaworthy vessel is unwarranted.
The testimony and evidence furnished by the appellee, Wilrig,
was sufficient to invalidate any claims of unseaworthiness. The
record reveals that the TREASURE STAWINNER had been built and
certified according to the Rules and Regulations of the American
Bureau of Shipping, United States Coast Guard, United Kingdom
Department of Energy and the Norwegian Maritime Directorate. The
ship had received industry awards for safety performance and had
never had any citations issued against it by any regulatory agency.
The evidence also established that the compliment of
crewmembers met and exceeded the amount recommended by Noble by one
member. Moreover, the jury was painfully aware of the fact that

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8Counsel for Wilrig elicited the following testimony from Mr.
Murphy:
Q. Mr. Murphy, weren't there four people designated as
roustabouts . . . on that tow?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. They were physically able to do roustabout work, weren't
they?
A. They had been roustabouts in the past.
Q. That was part of their previous experience?
A. Right.
Q. But, as a matter of fact, these guys who were designated as
roustabouts had advanced past that basic elementary level,
isn't that true?
A. That's correct.
Supp. R. vol. 1, at 157.
12
four roustabouts had been "designated" pursuant to Noble's
recommendation, rather than hiring four "actual" roustabouts.
Dopson has argued that the court prevented counsel from
accentuating the differences, if any, between the roustabouts
recommended and those utilized, but this argument is meritless. It
is clear from the record that a distinction was clearly drawn
regarding the roustabouts and its value was weighed accordingly by
the jury in their deliberations. Furthermore, even appellee's own
counsel described these differences to the jury.8 Lastly, though
there were no "true" roustabouts available to assist Dopson with
the grating, testimony revealed that there was more than a
sufficient number of able bodied men available to help appellant,
if only he would have asked for assistance. Appellant did not
present a single shred of proof evidencing that the crewmembers in
question were not equal in disposition and seamanship to ordinary
men in the calling. Therefore the jury verdict will stand.
B. Did the jury err in finding Dopson contributorily

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9Dopson provides a few cases to support his contention that
his apportionment of fault should be much less. See Gautreaux v.
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 811 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1987) (seaman found 50%
contributory negligent when he ignored the suggestion to use
readily available wire cable to lift a heavy sling, and instead
used a 3/4 inch manila rope); Trindle v. Sonat Marine, Inc., No.
CIV.A.85-7085, 1990 WL 893 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 5, 1990) (seaman was found
to be 5% contributory negligent when loosening and removing a fuel
pipe cap as directed, resulting in a lower back injury).
13
negligent?
Appellant next complains that the jury failed to follow the
court's instructions regarding the contributory negligence of a
seaman. The court instructed the jury as follows:
[Y]ou are cautioned that as Jones Act seaman, the plaintiff is
required to exercise only slight care for his own safety. You
cannot find the plaintiff negligent, so as to defeat or reduce
the Jones Act liability of the defendant, if the plaintiff has
exercised slight care for his safety.
Supp. R. vol. 1, at 427. Dopson alleges that the evidence at trial
established that he had in fact exercised "slight care" under the
circumstances. Moreover, appellant argues that even if he was
partially at fault for his accident, the evidence does not support
a finding that he was ninety percent at fault, particularly since
he acted in an "emergency" situation to unclog the sump. In any
case, his apportionment of fault should be much lower.9
On a motion for a new trial, the appropriate standard of
review to test the sufficiency of the evidence in Jones Act claims,
is whether there exists a "reasonable evidentiary basis" for the
jury's verdict. Thezan v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 708 F.2d 175,
181 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1050 (1984); Gautreaux
v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 811 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1987). Where there
is an "evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict, this Court's

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10Testimony conflicted as to the proper way of lifting the
grating, thus one could conclude that there was no one way of
lifting the grating which could be called the "right way."
14
function is exhausted, and [the plaintiff] is not free to
relitigate the factual dispute." Thezan, 708 F.2d at 181 (quoting
Manchack v. S/S OVERSEAS PROGRESS, 524 F.2d 918, 919 (5th Cir.
1975)). We are of the opinion that a reasonable basis exists for
the jury's verdict and thus we will not interfere with the
judgment.
A seaman's duty to protect himself is slight, but nonetheless
it does exist. Id.; Johnson v. Offshore Express, Inc., 845 F.2d
1347, 1355 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 968 (1988).
Contributory negligence is available to mitigate a vessel owner's
liability when an injured seaman has been negligent in breaching a
duty to act or refrain from acting. Thezan, 708 F.2d at 181. In
general, a seaman has no duty to find the safest way to perform his
work, but where it is shown that there existed a safe alternative
available of which he knew or should have known, a seaman's course
of action can be properly considered in determining whether he was
negligent. Id.; Fontenot v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., 714
F.2d 17, 20 (5th Cir. 1983); see Johnson, 845 F.2d at 1355.
The evidence at trial showed that Dopson had removed the
grating by himself on prior occasions without incurring any injury.
Dopson also testified that he had seen the grating removed by other
crewmembers either by themselves, or in pairs of two.10 He had also
received instruction as to the proper method of lifting heavy
objects and had accumulated many years of safety training.

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11Conflicting testimony was given by both parties as to whether
or not the grating was bolted at the time of the injury.
15
Moreover, the evidence supported Wilrig's contention that safer
and more convenient alternatives existed to remove the paint chip
without removing the grating. Among these alternatives were
stepping onto the subfloor and reaching beneath the grating to the
sump to remove the chip by hand, using a wet-dry shop vacuum the
appellant had available to him to suck the paint chip off the top
of the sump, and calling for assistance. Although, there were no
"actual" roustabouts on board, there was testimony from various
crewmembers that they were available to provide assistance if
appellant had asked for it. Yet, probably the most significant
evidence working against Dopson, were pictures of the grating
itself which suggested that Dopson had attempted to lift the
grating while it was bolted down.11 In light of this evidence, the
jury could conclude that Dopson did not exercise "slight care" and
that he was mostly to blame for his injury. This Court will not
speculate as to the thought process of the jury members nor
speculate as to what evidence they weighed most heavily. Their
findings will remain untouched.
C. Did the jury err in calculating the damage award?
The appellant makes the final argument that the damages for
lost future income and pain and suffering were inadequate. This
Court will overturn a jury verdict for inadequacy only upon the
strongest of showings. Thezan, 708 F.2d at 182-83. A jury has

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16
great discretion in determining and awarding damages in an action
for personal injuries. Book v. Nordrill, Inc., 826 F.2d 1457, 1462
(5th Cir. 1987). "The denial of a motion for new trial on the
issue of inadequate damages is a matter of discretion with the
trial court and is not subject to review except for abuse of
discretion." Id. (quoting Young v. City of New Orleans, 751 F.2d
794, 798 (5th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted)). Only in "extreme
and exceptional" cases where the award is so gross as to be
" `contrary to right reason' or a `clear abuse of discretion with
respect to assessment of damages' will this Court overturn a jury's
decision that has been approved by the trial judge." Id. (quoting
Bailey v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 613 F.2d 1385, 1390 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980)); see Johnson v. Offshore
Express, Inc., 845 F.2d 1347, 1356 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 968 (1988). Because we find that the lower court did not
abuse its discretion and that the evidence was sufficient to
sustain the jury's findings, we deem the damage award adequate.
1. fringe benefits and lost meals
Dopson contends that the jury did not include the value of
lost fringe benefits and meals in the damage award. However, even
if they were included, they were inadequate pursuant to testimony
elicited from his own economic expert. Thus, he requests this
issue to be remanded for a recalculation of damages that would
comport with the evidence on the record, or in the alternative, a
new trial on the issue of damages.
An injured seaman bringing a claim for Jones Act negligence

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12The jury assigned damages as follows:
Pain and suffering, including physical pain
and suffering, mental anxiety, disability
and loss of life's pleasures $ 22,000.00
Loss of past income $ 28,000.00
Loss of future income $200,000.00
Total $250,000.00
17
can recover the value for past and future lost meals. Gautreaux v.
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 811 F.2d 908, 914 (5th Cir. 1987). A seaman
may also recover the value of fringe benefits as part of his
compensation. See Williams v. Reading & Bates Drilling Co., 750
F.2d 487, 490 (5th Cir. 1985); Treadaway v. Societe Anonyme Louis-
Dreyfus, 894 F.2d 161, 169 (5th Cir. 1990). Appellant's claim,
that the jury did not include the value of fringe benefits and
meals in its award, is without merit since the jury did not provide
a breakdown of what it included in its award of $200,000 for future
lost income.12 Moreover, the jury is not obligated to follow an
economic expert's calculations in determining an award, her figures
are only a "suggested guideline for [the] jury." Hass v. Atlantic
Richfield, 799 F.2d 1011, 1017 (5th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff argued
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant him a
new trial because the damages were grossly inadequate in light of
testimony of his economic expert). Moreover, the jury is free to
consider evidence of higher discount rates, the appellant's ability
to mitigate damages, and factors which may have prevented the
appellant from obtaining employment in the future. Bartholomew v.
CNG Producing Co., 832 F.2d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 1987).

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18
The jury has great discretion, to weigh the credibility of
witnesses and their testimony, in arriving at an appropriate award.
Just as the jury can discard the value of meals, benefits and wages
assigned by appellant's expert, it may instead accept the economic
testimony given by the appellee. Or, the jury can base an award on
a blend of each party's calculations. The jury weighed testimony
that Dopson had delayed his own recovery by not attending physical
therapy when it was first recommended and the fact that he
discontinued his therapy, thereby precluding the mitigation of
damages. Also, the jury considered the fact that Wilrig's
Brazilian counterpart was taking control over the rig with its own
crewmembers, leaving Dopson's near future employment uncertain.
Evidence was also presented that Dopson could go back to work in a
light to moderate manual labor occupation. Upon reviewing the
record, we cannot say the damage award was inadequate. This Court
will not upset the jury's solemn verdict.
2. pain and suffering
Lastly, Dopson also complains that the award for past and
future pain is inadequate. He bases this argument on the fact that
much larger awards have been given for far lesser injuries in this
Circuit. However, we are only concerned with the award given by
the jury in this case. The jury was properly instructed in
awarding damages and the record discloses sufficient evidence from
which they could reach a verdict. Thus, the jury acted within the
bounds of its province in awarding $22,000 for past, present and

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13The jury heard testimony from Mr. Allen, a Wilrig employee,
that Dopson had complained of back pains prior to his injury. This
testimony may have influenced the jury's decision. However, we
will not speculate on the jury's deliberations.
19
future pain and suffering.13 That the appellant is not satisfied
with the award is not determinative over this Court's review of the
findings. This Court will not subject its opinion over the jury's.
III. CONCLUSION
The district court is affirmed on all matters raised on
appeal.
AFFIRMED.

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