(caption unavailable)

* Local Rule 47.5.1 provides: "The publication of opinions that have no
precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-
settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on
the legal profession." Pursuant to that rule, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 94-20182
_______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
EDGAR MOSQUERA GAMBOA,
ERROL DAN ALLEN,
and
MAXIMINO PALACIOS-BASTIDA,
Defendants-Appellants.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(CR H 93 82 9)
_________________________
August 15, 1995
Before SMITH, WIENER, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*
I.
FBI agent Robert Doguim set out to infiltrate the cocaine
distribution organization of Arana, which was then transporting
fifty kilograms of cocaine a week to New York and Pittsburgh. In

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May 1992, Arana and his wife, Mariella, agreed to let Doguim
transport cocaine for them and collect the payment for the
contraband. Arana also would receive a commission for all deals
between Doguim and any associate introduced to him by Arana.
Servicol International was a Houston paging and money wiring
business used by Arana and his drug-trafficking associates as a
communications center. Servicol was used to phone Columbian drug
contacts, or be "phone patched" from a remote location. Defendant
Maximino Palacios-Bastida ("Bastida") owned Servicol and knew that
his business was being used extensively by drug traffickers.
In July 1992, Bastida asked Arana to broker twenty kilograms
of cocaine for sale. Arana agreed, selling the contraband half to
Sam Alvarado and half to Jefferson. Jefferson sent Tyson as his
courier to Servicol to pick up the drugs. Soon thereafter,
Jefferson had trouble selling all of his cocaine, and could not pay
Bastida. Bastida, in turn, could not pay Arana. Arana and
Jefferson agreed that the latter would return the unsold portion of
the cocaine to Bastida. Courier Tyson delivered the unsold cocaine
to Bastida, and defendant Errol Allen delivered the collected money
for the other portion of the shipment to Bastida.
Arana supplied Jefferson with a residence, located at 2323
Gentryside in Houston. In April 1992, Arana caused twenty
kilograms of cocaine to be delivered to Allen, who was one of the
conspirators in the part of the operation managed by Jefferson.
In October 1992, Arana introduced Doguim to New Jersey cocaine
trafficker Lucho and his associate "Fernando." Lucho and Fernando,

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acting as brokers for another supplier, Don Miguel, introduced Don
Miguel to Doguim and Arana. Negotiations at two Houston restau-
rants ensued, at the culmination of which Doguim was introduced to
Don Miguel's supplier and Colombian supervisor, Ricardo Munoz. At
the same time, Lucho and Arana negotiated with Doguim to transport
cocaine from Houston to New York, Newark, and Chicago. Arana would
receive a cut from the profits of this operation.
In November 1992, Arana introduced Doguim to yet another
supplier, "Mauricio," who had been sent from Columbia by Medellin
to supervise the shipment from Houston to Pittsburgh. At that
time, Arana asked Doguim to help him ship 150 kilograms of cocaine
to Pittsburgh. That amount was later reduced to thirteen kilo-
grams.
On November 17, 1992, the thirteen kilograms of cocaine were
transferred from Arana to Doguim, with Allen as courier. After
working with the undercover FBI agents who had been coordinating
the operation, local authorities apprehended Allen's car and
searched it, seizing the cocaine. Allen first was advised that he
was not under arrest. After he refused to consent to a search of
the vehicle, he was transported to a police command station,
fingerprinted, and released.
On February 26, 1993, another deal went down. In a transfer
scripted by defendant Edgar Gamboa, undercover FBI agent Vasquez
left a van where it was picked up by Zulney Arboleda, who drove the
van into the garage of the Wild Willow stashhouse and shut the
garage door. Later, she departed, left the van parked where she

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had picked it up, and drove away in her original vehicle. Vasquez
returned to the van, which subsequently was discovered to contain
200 kilograms of cocaine.
On March 12, 1993, Gil Atzmon picked up a van filled with
boxes containing a total of approximately $2.5 million. Surveil-
lance had placed the van at the Dounray currency stashhouse not
long before Atzmon picked it up. Some of the boxes bore Gamboa's
fingerprints, and each of them was labeled to indicate the amount
of money it contained.
Earlier on March 12, Gamboa had been arrested. When he was
stopped, his vehicle contained a loaded Ruger pistol, a pager, and
a cellular phone. Also on that day, search warrants were executed
at the Dounray money-laundering stashhouse and at Gamboa's
McCormick residence. At the latter, several firearms and a
bulletproof vest were found, among other things. On March 13, a
search warrant was executed at the Wild Willow cocaine stashhouse.
Nineteen kilograms of cocaine and over $11,000 in cash were found.
II.
The government's case at trial was based on testimony from
informants Arana, Burgess ("Mike Tyson"), and Danny Chand;
undercover FBI agents Doguim and Efrain Gutierrez; surveillance;
recorded and wire-tapped conversations; and cellular phone toll
records. In addition, the government introduced cocaine and
currency seized on several occasions.
A seventeen-count indictment was brought against Bastida,

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Allen, Gamboa, and other members of their organization. Count 1
charged Bastida, Allen, and Gamboa, along with Arana, Lopez, and
Arboleda (who are not before us on appeal), with conspiracy to
distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). The conspiracy
was charged to have lasted from about September 1992, through the
time of the indictment, in April 1993. Count 2 charged Allen and
Arana with possession with intent to distribute cocaine on
November 17, 1992, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(A). Count 3 charged Arana, Lopez, Gamboa, and Arboleda with
possession with intent to distribute cocaine on February 26, 1993.
Count 4 charged Arana, Lopez, Gamboa, and Arboleda with possession
with intent to distribute of cocaine on March 13, 1993. Count 5
charged Gamboa, Atzmon, and Carlos Gamboa with the transfer of $2.5
million, the proceeds of illegal cocaine distribution activity, on
March 12, 1993, and in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).
Counts 6-10 charged Bastida with failure to file currency transac-
tion reports on various occasions.
Gamboa and Allen were convicted on all relevant counts (1,3,4,
and 5) and (1 and 2), respectively. Gamboa was convicted on counts
1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17; and acquitted on counts
11 and 12 (structuring on November 18 and 25, 1991).
III.
Although he did not request a multiple conspiracies jury
instruction, Gamboa argues that he was prejudiced by a variance in

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proof between the single conspiracy alleged in count one of the
indictment and two conspiracies proven at trial. For this court to
reverse a conviction based on a variance between the indictment
charges and the proof at trial, Gamboa must prove that (1) a
variance arose between the indictment and the government's proof
and (2) the variance prejudiced his substantial rights. United
States v. Jackson, 978 F.2d 903, 911 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2429 (1993). If no variance is established, the inquiry
is at an end. We examine three factors in determining whether the
government proved the single conspiracy alleged in the indictment:
(1) whether there was a common goal of the criminal activity;
(2) the nature of the criminal scheme; and (3) whether the
participants in the various dealings overlapped. United States v.
Morris, 46 F.3d 410, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2595
(1995). The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict. United States v. Greenwood, 974 F.2d 1449, 1458 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2354 (1993).
Gamboa argues that the government proved one money-laundering
and drug-trafficking conspiracy involving Arana, Bastida, Jeffer-
son, "Tyson," and others. The existence of this conspiracy was
largely shown through the testimony of government informant Danny
Chand. A second, separate conspiracy, Gamboa argues, was proven
between Arana and Agent Doguim. This conspiracy, Gamboa argues,
was a "side deal" that did not involve Lucho.
An application of the Morris factors reveals that there was
only one conspiracy. First, both of the groupings characterized by

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Gamboa as separate conspiracies had as their objective the earning
of usable profits through the sale and distribution of cocaine.
Second, the nature of the criminal groupings was consistent with a
common scheme. Third, the participants in the two groupings
overlapped and interacted. We also agree with the government that,
even if there were a variance under Morris, Gamboa has failed to
show prejudice. The evidence of his involvement was ample.
IV.
Gamboa argues that the proof at trial only showed him to have
"conspired" with law enforcement officials. Allen adopts this
argument. Gamboa is correct that a defendant cannot be convicted
of a conspiracy where his sole coconspirator was a government
informant or a law enforcement officer carrying out his duty in an
undercover capacity. United States v. Manotas-Mejia, 824 F.2d 360,
365 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 457 (1987). A conspiracy
may exist among three or more people, however, even if the link
connecting many of the coconspirators is a government informer.
Id.
Gamboa argues that the most proven at trial was an agreement
between himself and agent Gutierrez. Viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict, we must determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found a conspiracy involving
Gamboa and another bona fide conspirator. United States v. Fierro,
38 F.3d 761, 768 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1388
(1995). Proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy is

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not required, and the defendant's participation may be proved by
circumstantial evidence. United States v. Quiroz-Hernandez, 48
F.3d 858, 866 (5th Cir. 1995). Concert of action, presence among
or association with drug conspirators, and evasive and erratic
behavior are among the factors that may be considered in determin-
ing whether a defendant is guilty of drug conspiracy. United
States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1552 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 1113 (1995). The cellular phone tolls, Gamboa's finger
prints on the boxes containing the $2.5 million, and his statements
(as related by the government informants and undercover agents who
testified at trial), taken together, are sufficient to support the
conspiracy conviction.
V.
Allen complains that the district court erred by denying his
motion to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle he was
driving on November 17, 1992. The officers searching Allen's car
did not have a warrant. The government concedes that this was not
an inventory search.
The government argues that the police search of the car driven
by Allen was made pursuant to consent (that of the FBI, lessee of
the car), and cites several factually inapposite cases in support
of this theory. See United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1468
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2427 (1993); United States v.
Baldwin, 644 F.2d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Horton, 488 F.2d 374, 380-81 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416

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9
U.S. 993 (1974). These cases establish that the valid consent of
either automobile passenger, in a joint-control situation,
legitimizes the search as to both defendants. No representative of
the FBI was present in the automobile when it was stopped, however;
the concept of joint control thus is inapplicable here. Common
authority over the premises searched is "not to be implied from the
mere property interest a third party has in the property." United
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974). The authority
justifying third-party consent "does not rest upon the law of
property . . . but [] rather on mutual use of the property by
persons generally having joint access or control for most pur-
poses." Id. The Matlock court contrasted such a situation to
landlord and hotel clerk cases. Id. In short, the government has
cited no caselaw supporting its claim that an absent bailee, owner,
or lessee can consent to the search of an automobile.
Warrantless searches of an automobile and a closed container
within it are justified where there is probable cause that the
vehicle and the container contained contraband. United States v.
Piaget, 915 F.2d 138, 140 (5th Cir. 1990). We look to the totality
of the circumstances in determining whether an officer has probable
cause. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983).
Here, the surveillance team knew that the drug trafficker, who
had described himself to one of the undercover officers to
facilitate their meeting, would arrive at the restaurant for a
rendezvous. The undercover rental car was to be delivered to the
trafficker, who would leave the area to load thirteen kilograms of

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cocaine into the vehicle. The trafficker was then scheduled to
return to the scene to return the keys to the undercover officer.
The team had observed Allen, who fit the physical description the
drug trafficker had given of himself, arrive at the appointed
restaurant, speak with the undercover officer, depart the restau-
rant, and drive off in the undercover rental vehicle as he engaged
in countersurveillance. Later, the team observed Allen stop behind
a maroon Toyota, open its trunk, and place a box from the Toyota
into the undercover rental car. These facts establish an abundance
of probable cause. See United States v. Panitz, 907 F.2d 1267 (1st
Cir. 1990) (finding warrantless search justified on "sting
operation" facts very similar to those of Allen's stop).
Allen argues that even if there was probable cause, there were
no exigent circumstances supporting the search. This argument is
unpersuasive. The mobility of an automobile creates exigent
circumstances. United States v. Delario, 912 F.2d 766, 768 (5th
Cir. 1990).
Although Allen argues that none existed in this case because
he was driving the car directly back to the undercover officers,
any number of things could have happened to prevent the drugs from
reaching their intended destination. Allen could have noticed the
surveillance on him and decided not to return the car as planned.
He could have decided to double-cross the undercover agents by
absconding with the cocaine and attempting to keep all of the
profits from its sale for himself. Or, he could have been
carjacked or had mechanical problems requiring him to leave the car

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and get help. In short, the delivery of the car into the hands of
the undercover agents was in no way guaranteed. The district court
committed no error in admitting the fruits of the search against
Allen and Gamboa.
VI.
Gamboa asserts that insufficient evidence supported his
conviction for possession with intent to distribute the 200
kilograms of cocaine delivered to the government on February 26,
1993. He points out that his fingerprints were not found on the
individual packages of cocaine (no fingerprint testing was done)
and that he was not shown to have been in any place where the 200
kilograms originated. Accordingly, Gamboa argues that the
government proved neither actual nor constructive possession of the
cocaine.
Possession of contraband may be either actual or constructive.
Constructive possession is ownership, dominion, or control over the
conveyance in which the contraband is concealed. United States v.
Posner, 868 F.2d 720, 722-23 (5th Cir. 1989). A conviction for
aiding and abetting the possession of narcotics with the intent to
distribute requires that the defendant participated in and
associated himself with the venture in a way calculated to bring
about the its success. United States v. Williams, 985 F.2d 749,
753 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 148 (1993).
Gamboa's conviction on count 3 was amply supported by the
evidence. Agent Gutierrez testified that he was given the pager

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12
number "710-1465" to communicate with the supplier of the cocaine.
When Gamboa was arrested, that pager was found in his possession.
Lucho told Agent Gutierrez that the person in possession of the 200
kilograms of cocaine would meet with them at Doneraki's restaurant
on February 26. Gamboa showed up, advising the others that he had
received approval from Colombia to release the load. At that time,
Lucho greeted Gamboa as "Maestro," meaning master or teacher in
Spanish. Furthermore, Gamboa exercised control over and supervised
the transfer of the 200 kilograms. He asked what kind of vehicle
was going to be used to transport the cocaine, approving the use of
a van, as it would be large enough to conceal the weight of the
load. Cellular phone toll records show that Gamboa made a number
of calls to other conspirators on February 26, and the jury could
properly infer that these calls were made to supervise and
coordinate the transfer of the cocaine in Gamboa's constructive
possession.
The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict,
show that Gamboa's subordinates had actual possession and control
over the 200 kilograms of cocaine. Therefore, the jury could have
inferred that Gamboa had at least constructive possession.
VII.
On March 13, 1993, a search warrant was executed at the Wild
Willow stashhouse. Nubia Arboleda, who was present at the time of
the search, falsely identified herself to government agents as
Denise Green. Nineteen kilograms of cocaine were found in a box in

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the garage of the stashhouse.
Gamboa argues that his conviction for possession with intent
to distribute these 19 kilograms was not supported by sufficient
evidence. He claims that agents found nothing connecting him to
the residence during their search of it. Furthermore, and somewhat
inconsistently, he claims that social ties between the Gamboa and
Arboleda families provide an innocent explanation for the multitude
of cellular phone calls he made to the stashhouse. Finally, he
points out that he was arrested the day before the execution of the
search warrant, and argues that the cocaine could have been placed
in the stashhouse after his arrest.
This conviction also was supported by sufficient evidence. As
discussed above, there was adequate evidence linking both Gamboa
and Arboleda to the larger conspiracy. Accordingly, Gamboa would
be guilty of the substantive possession offense committed by
Arboleda in furtherance of he conspiracy even if he would not have
individually had constructive possession of the cocaine in the Wild
Willow stashhouse. Both Gamboa and Arboleda were followed to 16615
Dounray, the stashhouse for the money-laundering operation.
Documents seized inside that house included the Wild Willow
stashhouse address and phone number. Gamboa was the only person
observed driving the Infiniti, and toll records show a number of
calls from its cellular phone to the Wild Willow stashhouse.
Although Gamboa claims that any connection between these calls and
drug transactions is purely speculative, the large number of calls
made at the time when drug transfers were scheduled entitled the

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jury to infer otherwise.
VIII.
Next, Gamboa challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his money-laundering conviction for the $2.5 million
transferred on March 12, 1993. The elements of money-laundering
are (1) the conduct or attempted conduct of a financial transac-
tion; (2) which the defendant knows involves the proceeds of
unlawful activity; (3) with the intent to promote or further the
unlawful activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). Gamboa argues
that the government failed to show that he transferred, delivered,
moved, or otherwise disposed of the money.
The evidencetrial showed that Gamboa opened the garage door of
the Dounray money-laundering stashhouse seconds before the arrival
of the van which would later carry the $2.5 million. His finger-
prints were found on some of the boxes containing the money. Each
box was labeled with the amount of money contained therein. Also,
toll records showed a number of calls from Gamboa's cellular phone
to the Dounray money-laundering stashhouse. Gamboa's argument does
not overcome our standard of review. Viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict, the evidence is sufficient to support the
money-laundering conviction.
IX.
Bastida avers that the court erred by refusing to submit his
proposed instruction on entrapment. Although Bastida did not

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testify at trial, he claims that facts elicited during the cross-
examination of informant Danny Chand were sufficient to raise the
issue. In order to be entitled to an entrapment instruction, the
defense must show government conduct creating a substantial risk
that the offense would have been committed by a person other than
one who was ready to commit it. United States v. Menesses, 962
F.2d at 420, 429-30 (5th Cir. 1992). Once this showing has been
made, the burden shifts to the government to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the
act before any enticement took place. Jacobson v. United States,
112 S. Ct. 1535, 1536 (1992).
Bastida quotes the relevant portion of Chand's cross-examina-
tion in his brief. In the cross-examination, Chand related that he
told Bastida that he, Chand, had people with a lot of money behind
him. Although this statement may have alerted Bastida to the
possibility that Chand would continue being a valuable money-
laundering customer into the future, Bastida was already laundering
for Chand at the time it was made. Thus, the defense did not carry
its burden at trial of proving enticement. See United States v.
Ivey, 949 F.2d 759, 769 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
64 (1992). Even if enticement had been proven, the government
would have established predisposition in rebuttal. The fact that
Bastida was already laundering money before the challenged comments
by Chand is dispositive.
Allen and Gamboa adopted by reference Bastida's entrapment
argument. However, we consider the claim only as to Bastida, as it

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is fact specific. See, e.g., United States v. Stouffer, 986 F.2d
916, 921 n.4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 314 (1993).
X.
Allen argues that the district court erred by instructing the
jury, over defense objection, that it could convict on the basis of
"deliberate ignorance." A deliberate ignorance instruction is
appropriate where the evidence at trial raises the inference that
(1) the defendant was subjectively aware of a high probability of
the existence of the illegal conduct and (2) purposely contrived to
avoid learning of it. United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d
946, 951 (5th Cir. 1990).
The crux of Allen's complaint is that neither the government
nor the defense's theory at trial was deliberate ignorance. The
government argued that Allen had actual knowledge he was being paid
to transport cocaine, while Allen argued that he had no knowledge
whatsoever. This claim is meritless. The deliberate ignorance
theory was an appropriate, well-supported alternative theory in
light of the defense's claim of total ignorance.
Allen, who is college-educated, testified that he "had no
idea" what was in the packages "Chico" paid him $350 each to
deliver. (He had earlier told undercover agents that he was paid
$1350 a delivery.) This testimony is facially incredible. Some
knowledge or suspicion of wrongdoing on the part of Allen is also
shown by his reaction when stopped by the police on November 17,
1992. Narcotics Division officer H. C. Riddle testified that Allen

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told him he was driving a rental car, leased by his employer, that
had been parked at the house of his girlfriend. This lie, coupled
with Allen's testimony that he had no knowledge of anything illegal
about his delivery activities, supports the deliberate ignorance
instruction.
XI.
Gamboa challenges the enhancement of his sentence under
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) for his role as a manager or supervisor of the
cocaine distribution organization. The guidelines provide that:
If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an
organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved
five or more participants or was otherwise extensive,
increase by three levels.
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). The district court's finding that Gamboa was
a manager or organizer is a finding of fact, which we review only
for clear error. The court relied, independently, upon both prongs
of § 3B1.1(b) in making its determination, but Gamboa objected only
to the finding that he supervised five or more participants.
Accordingly, we review the finding that Gamboa supervised five or
more participants for clear error, but the finding that he
supervised an "otherwise extensive" criminal activity only for
plain error. United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162-64 (5th
Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1266 (1995). In
light of the proof at trial, as discussed in response to Gamboa's
sufficiency challenges, the finding that Gamboa supervised an
"otherwise extensive" criminal activity is certainly not plainly
erroneous. No relief is warranted.

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XII.
Gamboa also challenges the district court's enhancement of his
sentence for possession of a firearm in connection with the drug
offense under U.S.S.G. § 201.1(b)(1). We review this finding of
fact for clear error. United States v. Vaquero, 997 F.2d 78, 84
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 614 (1993). If a defendant
proves that there was no connection between the firearm possessed
and the narcotics offense, the enhancement is inappropriate.
United States v. Villareal, 920 F.2d 1218, 1222 (5th Cir. 1991).
A defendant may be held accountable for a co-defendant's
possession of a firearm during the commission of a narcotics
trafficking case if the possession was reasonably foreseeable.
United States v. Sparks, 2 F.3d 574, 587 (5th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 720 (1994). Firearms are "tools of the trade"
of those engaged in drug activities. United States v. Aquilera-
Zapata, 901 F.2d 1209, 1215 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Ortiz-Granados, 12 F.3d 39, 43 (5th Cir. 1994); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1,
comment. n.3.
Gamboa was arrested shortly after departing the currency
stashhouse on Dounray, and the loaded pistol found inside his
Landcruiser was present there with two other implements of the drug
trade. Also found were a cellular phone (582-4042) and a pager
(710-1465). Five more guns were found at Gamboa's house on
McCormick street, and he also possessed a bullet-proof vest. The
presence of all of these "tools of the drug trade" supports the
inference that the pistol in the Landcruiser was also connected to

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Gamboa's drug-trafficking activities.
An independent basis for affirming the enhancement for the
possession of a firearm is the shotgun Atzmon had in the trunk of
his rental vehicle. Gamboa did not challenge the district court's
finding that Atzmon's possession was reasonably foreseeable to him.
The district court's application of the firearm possession
enhancement was adequately supported under either basis.
XIII.
Gamboa challenges the district court's finding that 392
kilograms of cocaine were attributable to him. The sentencing
guidelines hold a defendant accountable for sentencing purposes for
all reasonably foreseeable acts in furtherance of the jointly
undertaken criminal activity. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Section
2D1.1(c)(3) of the guidelines provides for a base offense level of
38 where between 150 and 500 kilograms of cocaine are attributable.
The district court found that the 200 kilograms seized on
February 26 and the 19 kilograms seized on March 13 were directly
attributable to Gamboa. Furthermore, the court adopted the
presentence report's conversion of the $2.4 million seized from the
maroon van driven by Atzmon, the $255,000 seized from the Dounray
money-laundering stashhouse, and the $11,000 seized from the Wild
Willow cocaine stashhouse into an additional 171.96 kilograms of
cocaine. In making this calculation, the court valued the cocaine
at $16,000 per kilogram.
Gamboa challenged these findings, arguing that the money

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should have been converted to cocaine at a rate of $24,000 per
kilogram. The district court overruled Gamboa's challenges to the
PSR, finding that the 200 kilograms alone easily satisfied the
requirements of § 2D1.1(c)(3). We agree with the district court.
The 200 kilograms were loaded from the Wild Willow stashhouse and
delivered to agent Gutierrez on Gamboa's orders. They were
obviously foreseeable to him. As this cocaine alone puts him at a
base offense level of 38, we need not address the remainder of his
cocaine attribution arguments. Even if he could demonstrate error,
it would be harmless. See United States v. Montoya-Ortiz, 7 F.3d
1171, 1182 (5th Cir. 1993).
AFFIRMED.

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