(caption unavailable)

*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 93-5386
(Summary Calendar)
RICHARD T. REYNOLDS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CLERK OF COURT 9TH JDC,
ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(92-cv-1574)
(April 20, 1994)
Before JOLLY, WIENER and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Proceeding pro se, Plaintiff-Appellant Richard T. Reynolds
filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
Clerk of Court, 9th Judicial District Court (the "Clerk"), and the
Custodian of Records, Police Department of [the City of] Alexandria

-- 1 of 6 --

2
(Louisiana) (the "Custodian"), Defendants-Appellees herein, for
alleged constitutional violations in connection with Reynolds'
arrest and conviction in state court for crimes of violence
including one involving sexual assault. Reynolds appealed the
district court's dismissal in part and stay in part of his claim
against the Clerk, and dismissal without prejudice of his claim
against the Custodian by granting the Custodian's motion for
judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons set forth below, we
affirm in part and vacate in part to permit Reynolds to exhaust his
state and federal habeas remedies; and we order interruption of
prescription (tolling of the statute of limitations) on the claims
underlying his § 1983 action while he pursues his habeas remedies.
I
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Reynolds, a Louisiana state prisoner convicted of aggravated
rape and burglary, sued the Clerk and the Custodian for failure to
produce the police report and investigation report associated with
his arrest and subsequent conviction. Both defendants moved to
dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
The district court denied the Custodian's motion to dismiss,
noting that Reynolds had stated sufficient facts "to state a claim
for damages resulting from an `official policy.'" Id. at 84-86
(citing Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). The
district court then construed Reynolds' complaint to contain two
claims: 1) that if the police and investigation reports did not

-- 2 of 6 --

3
exist, there was insufficient evidence for a grand jury to return
an indictment; and 2) that without access to copies of the reports
Reynolds was unable to pursue a meaningful appeal.
The district court found the first claim to be a challenge to
Reynolds' confinement so that it sounded more properly in habeas.
The district court therefore stayed the claim pending the
exhaustion of habeas relief. The district court found that
Reynolds' second claim was unavailing as, pursuant to Louisiana
state lawSQspecifically La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44:3(A)(4) (West
1992)SQReynolds was not entitled to obtain copies of the reports.
On the basis of those findings, the district court granted the
Clerk's motion to dismiss, stayed Reynolds' § 1983 complaint as to
the first claim, and dismissed the second claim. The Custodian
then filed an unopposed motion for judgment on the pleadings, which
the district court granted, dismissing the first claim as to the
Custodian, without prejudice. Reynolds timely appealed both
rulings.
II
ANALYSIS
A. First Claim
Reynolds' first claimSQthat without the reports he could not
have been convictedSQindirectly challenges the legality of his
confinement. Therefore, Reynolds must pursue state and federal
habeas remedies before asserting claims under § 1983. Serio v.
Members of Louisiana State Bd. of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112, 1119
(5th Cir. 1987). As a general rule, prisoners who challenge the

-- 3 of 6 --

4
constitutionality of their convictions or sentences must first
exhaust their state and federal habeas remedies as a prerequisite
to seeking § 1983 relief. Id. at 1117. Accordingly, in most
instances federal courts must decline to address the merits of a
potential § 1983 claim until state and federal habeas processes
have been exhausted. See id.; William v. Dallas County Comm'rs,
689 F.2d 1212, 1214-15 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 935
(1983).
Reynolds admits that he has not pursued habeas remedies. We
therefore affirm the district court's dismissal, without prejudice,
of Reynolds' first claim, and hold that the applicable prescriptive
period shall be interrupted (tolled) while Reynolds pursues habeas
relief. Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 996 F.2d 786, 788-89
(5th Cir. 1993) (citing Rodriguez v. Holmes, 963 F.2d 799, 804-05
(5th Cir. 1992).
B. Second Claim
Reynolds' second claim is that the defendants' failure to
furnish copies of the requested reports to him violates his
constitutional rights by denying him an opportunity to pursue a
meaningful appeal. The district court held that under La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 44:3(A)(4) (West 1992) Reynolds was not entitled to
copies of the reports. We disagree.
Section 44:3(A)(4)(a) mandates that the reports are a matter
of public record, and that Reynolds is entitled to them; however,
the district court relied on the exception to that rule embodied in
§ 44:3(A)(4)(d). That exception prohibits "the disclosure of

-- 4 of 6 --

5
information which would reveal the identity of the victim of a
sexual offense." The district court found that this exception
precludes any disclosure of either report.
Reynolds cites no cases, either state or federal, interpreting
§ 44:3(A)(4)(d). There is Louisiana case law, however,
interpreting the parallel exception, embodied in § 44:3(A)(4)(c),
prohibiting the disclosure of information which would reveal
undercover or intelligence operations. At least one state court of
appeal has indicated that the exception does not bar disclosure of
the reports in their entirety, and that a criminal defendant is
entitled to information otherwise excludable if he already has
knowledge of such information. State v. Campbell, 566 So.2d 1038,
1043 (La. Ct. App. 1990). We are therefore constrained to conclude
that the district court erred in dismissing Reynolds' second claim
based on the proposition that the exception to § 44:3(A)(4) applied
to prevent disclosure of the subject reports in their entirety.
As Reynolds may be entitled to the information sought, and as
he asserts that he requested that information for the purpose of
pursuing a meaningful appeal, he is again indirectly challenging
his conviction so that his claim sounds more properly in habeas.
And again, he must exhaust state and federal habeas remedies before
seeking § 1983 relief. See Serio, 821 F.2d at 117; see also
discussion in Section II.A. supra.
For the foregoing reasons we affirm the district court's stay
of Reynolds' § 1983 complaint regarding the first claim, but we
vacate the district court's dismissal of the second claim.

-- 5 of 6 --

6
Reynolds' complaint is thus stayed in its entirety and prescription
interrupted (the statute of limitation tolled) pending his
exhaustion of his state and federal habeas relief. See Burge,
996 F.2d at 788-89. As Reynolds is proceeding pro se, we take the
additional pains to point out that he must raise in his habeas
proceedings the issue of entitlement to copies of the reports as
urged in his so-called second claim if he intends to pursue it.
AFFIRMED in part and VACATED in part.

-- 6 of 6 --