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93-3605Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit22.03.2004

Gesamter Gesetzestext

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 93-3605
Summary Calendar
_____________________
MORRIS PETERSON and
JEANETTE S. PETERSON,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY
and RYAN-WALSH STEVEDORING CO., INC.,
Intervenors-Plaintiffs-
Appellees,
versus
BUCK KREIHS CO., INC.,
a/k/a Buck Kreihs Industrial Co., Inc.,
Defendant-Appellant,
versus
STONEWALL JACKSON MV and
WATERMAN STEAMSHIP CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellees.
* * * * * * *
WATERMAN STEAMSHIP CORPORATION and
AMSOUTH BANK,
Cross-Claimaints-
Appellees,
versus
BUCK KREIHS CO., INC.,
Cross-Defendant-
Appellant.

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*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions
that have no precedential value and merely decide particular
cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes
needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal
profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined
that this opinion should not be published.
2
_______________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana
(CA-88-1754(I))
_______________________________________________________
March 22, 1994
Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Morris Peterson, a longshoreman, tripped over some welding
hoses as he followed a barge-loading crane on the S/S STONEWALL
JACKSON. The hoses belonged to Buck-Kreihs Company, Inc., whose
crew was welding on the opposite side of the ship. Peterson sued
Buck-Kreihs and Waterman Steamship Corp., the owner of the ship.
After a bench trial, the court apportioned liability as follows:
Peterson 25%, Buck-Kreihs 75%, and Waterman 0%. Buck-Kreihs
appeals.
Buck-Kreihs' Liability
We will not set aside the district court's judgment unless
it is clearly erroneous. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). To conclude
that a finding is clearly erroneous, we must be left with a firm
conviction, after a review of the entire evidence, that the
district court erred. Cupid v. McClanahan Contractors, Inc., 1

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1 Buck-Kreihs cites the following testimony to support its position that Peterson unequivocally
testified that he tripped over hoses laying flat on the walkway:
Q. Now, in terms of when your accident happened, Mr. Peterson, what actually happened is
that as you were walking along the deck you slipped and as you slipped you caught you
right foot, apparently, under those two hoses that were lying across you path, didn't you?
A. No, sir.
Q. That's not what happened?
A. I hooked them two hoses, then I slipped.
Here, Peterson is responding to whether he slipped before or after his foot became entangled in the welding hoses.
While this leading question does give some support to Buck-Kreihs position, the rest of Peterson's testimony shows
that he is unsure about which set of hoses actually caused him to trip. Therefore, we conclude that the district
court did not clearly err.
3
F.3d 346, 348 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 1993 WL 531401
(1994).
Buck-Kreihs does not dispute that it owed Mr. Peterson a
duty of reasonable care. See Melerine v. Avondale Shipyards,
Inc., 659 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1981). Waterman instructed
Buck-Kreihs that all welding hoses crossing the longshoremen's
walkway should lay flat. By finding that Buck-Kreihs was 75%
responsible for the accident, the district court implicitly found
that Peterson tripped over a coiled hose. The testimony of
Peterson1, Weeks, Deffes, and Frosch, support this conclusion;
they all testified to the presence of welding hoses strewn in the
longshoremen's walkway on the night of the accident. This
circumstantial evidence supports the district court's finding,
and therefore it will stand.
Allocation of Fault

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4
Buck-Kreihs argues that if Peterson tripped over a coiled
hose, the district court erred when it found that Peterson was
only 25% responsible for the accident. We review the district
court's allocation of fault for clear error. Randall v. Chevron
USA, Inc., 13 F.2d 888, 900 (5th Cir. 1994).
Peterson's primary duty was making sure nothing obstructed
the crane as it loaded barges onto the ship. While Peterson may
have been able to move the welding hoses, there were
considerations militating against such action. Weeks, the
stevedore supervisor, testified that because the hoses belonged
to Buck-Kreihs, they were not under the longshoreman's control.
And, Peterson stated that he was reluctant to move the hoses for
fear that he could seriously injure a welder working on the other
side of the ship. Peterson's proper course of action would have
been to notify his supervisor. But, given that Buck-Kreihs
created the dangerous situation by leaving the coiled hoses in
Peterson's path, we cannot say that the court clearly erred by
allocating 75% of the fault to Buck-Kreihs.
Waterman's Liability
The district court found that Waterman was not responsible
for the accident because it ceded control over the ship to the
stevedore. See Manister v. Tenneco Oil Co., 867 F.2d 892, 896
(5th Cir. 1989). Buck-Kreihs argues that Waterman is,
nevertheless, liable because it made the decision to allow the
welding and cargo operations to occur contemporaneously. If

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5
Peterson had tripped over a welding hose laying flat on the
walkway, this argument could have merit. But Peterson tripped
over a coiled hose, and Buck-Kreihs did not offer any evidence
showing that Waterman had actual knowledge of the coiled hoses in
Peterson's path. See Pimental v. Ltd. Canadian Pac. Bul, 965 F.2d
13, 17 (5th Cir. 1992). Therefore, the responsibility rests on
Buck-Kreihs' shoulders.
AFFIRMED.

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