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* Local Rule 47.5.1 provides: "The publication of opinions
that have no precedential value and merely decide particular
cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes
needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal
profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 93-1010
Summary Calendar
GOSPEL LIGHTHOUSE CHURCH, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
CITY OF DALLAS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(3:91 CV 0698 P)
(August 6, 1993)
Before WISDOM, KING, and GARWOOD, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.*
I.
This case concerns whether a church school's claim that a
zoning ordinance was unconstitutional was properly dismissed on the
basis of mootness. We hold that in the particular circumstances of
this case the district court did not abuse its discretion in

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1 The City never tried to enforce the zoning ordinance
requiring Gospel to obtain a SUP for the operation of a church
school.
2
finding that the mootness of the claim bars this suit. We
therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
II.
The plaintiff/appellant, Gospel Lighthouse Church, Inc.
(Gospel) operates a private church school within a residential
district of the city of Dallas. This district was zoned so that
Gospel was required to obtain a Special Use Permit ("SUP") for the
operation of its school on the property. On April 9, 1991, Gospel
filed suit against the City of Dallas (City), alleging that the
zoning ordinance violated the equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution, and requested declaratory and injunctive
relief.1 On June 10, 1992, however, the City passed an ordinance,
changing the zoning of the land in question from residential to
agricultural. Agricultural zoning does not require Gospel to
obtain a SUP for the operation of its church school.
On September 11, 1992, Gospel moved to join Montessori Village
School, Inc., as a party plaintiff and to file its First Amended
Original Complaint which added claims by Gospel of actual and
nominal damages. The City moved on September 25, 1992, to dismiss
Gospel's claims based on mootness because of the zoning change. On
December 7, 1992, the court denied Gospel's motion to join
additional parties and to permit an amended complaint. The court
granted the City's motion to dismiss on the basis of mootness.
This appeal followed.

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2 United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388
(1980); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969));
Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982).
3 Geraghty at 397.
4 Rocky v. King, 900 F.2d 864, 866 (5th Cir. 1990).
3
III.
A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer "live"
or the parties lack a personal stake in the outcome.2 "The
requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of
the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence.
. . ."3 Moreover, the mootness doctrine requires that the
controversy posed by the plaintiff's complaint be "live" not only
at the time the plaintiff files the complaint but also throughout
the litigation process.4
All of Gospel's claims are based on the assumption that it was
required to obtain a SUP for the church school. Because the City
changed the zoning ordinance, eliminating Gospel's need to obtain
a SUP to operate its school, no controversy remains between the
parties. The personal stake requirement of the mootness doctrine
serves an important purpose by assuring that federal courts are
presented with disputes they are capable of resolving. Gospel lost
its personal stake in the outcome when the zoning change resolved
its dispute. Thus, the resolution of Gospel's controversy by the
zoning change renders this case moot and further litigation
unnecessary.
Because the controversy has been resolved and the
plaintiff/appellant's claims are therefore moot, federal subject

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5 Sannon v. United States, 631 F.2d 1247, 1250 (5th Cir.
1990).
6 Id.
7 County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979).
8 See Pembroke v. Wood County, 981 F.2d 225, 228 (5th Cir.
1993).
4
matter jurisdiction no longer exists. Article III of the United
States Constitution limits federal courts' jurisdiction to cases or
controversies.5 This requirement demands that a cause of action
before a federal court present a controversy, and no controversy is
typically presented "when the question sought to be adjudicated has
been mooted by subsequent developments. . . . "6 Although
jurisdiction may have been proper when the case was filed,
jurisdiction may cease to exist if: (1) conditions or events change
so as to eradicate the effects of the alleged violations, and (2)
there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will
recur.7 In this case, both of these conditions have been met.
As discussed above, the City has amended the zoning
ordinance. There is also no reasonable expectation that the zoning
on the property will change so as to require a SUP for the
operation of the church school. There is no evidence that the City
had ever attempted to enforce the ordinance against Gospel. At
Gospel's request, the City willingly changed the ordinance. Thus,
this is not a case in which the plaintiff would likely be subjected
to the same treatment again.8
IV.
Because Gospel's claims are moot, there is no case or

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5
controversy. We AFFIRM the district court's judgment, dismissing
this case for lack of jurisdiction.

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