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* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions
that have no precedential value and merely decide particular
cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes
needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal
profession." Pursuant to that rule, we have determined that this
opinion should not be published.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 93-1008
Summary Calendar
_____________________
RAYMOND FLORES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JOE DRISKELL, Former Warden
Venus Pre-Release Unit CCA, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(3:92 CV 1791 R)
_________________________________________________________________
June 4, 1993
Before KING, DAVIS and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Raymond Flores, an inmate in the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice (TDCJ), brought this case against several prison
officials, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated
when he was placed in lock-up for sixteen days without a hearing.
Finding that Flores failed to file his complaint within the

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2
applicable limitations period and that his claims are frivolous,
the district court dismissed Flores' action. We affirm.
I
Flores alleges that his constitutional rights were violated
when he was placed in lock-up between October 18, 1989 and
November 2, 1989 without a hearing. According to Flores, he was
brought before Joseph Driskell, former assistant warden of the
Venus Pre-Release Unit, on October 18, 1989, after a complaint
was lodged against him by Betty Stoffer, an employee in the Venus
United Kitchen. This complaint arose out of a dispute between
Flores and Stoffer, which resulted in verbal confrontations on
October 17 and 18.
According to Flores, during his meeting with Driskell,
Driskell insulted him with racial slurs and vulgar language, and
called him a liar. Shortly after leaving Driskell's office,
Flores was placed in pre-hearing detention. Flores was allegedly
not informed of any charge against him until October 25, when a
jail official informed Flores that Stoffer had filed charges
against him alleging that he had threatened to slap her. On
November 2, 1989, the day Flores was released from lock-up, he
was visited by the TDCJ monitor and allegedly told that he had
investigated Stoffer's charge against Flores and found it to be
untrue. The TDCJ monitor also allegedly told Flores that he
recommended that no action be taken against Flores, but that the
warden of Venus had rejected his recommendation and decided to
transfer Flores to the maximum-security Ellis I Unit. Flores was

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transferred several times, first to Ellis I, then to the Bill
Clements Unit, which Flores alleges is a maximum-security
facility, and finally to the Ramsey III Unit, a minimum-security
facility.
Flores, proceeding pro se and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
filed this action on August 4, 1992, alleging that various prison
officials violated his civil rights. Specifically, Flores
alleged in his complaint that: (1) Stoffer violated his right of
access to the courts and his right to due process; (2) Driskell
violated his right of access to the courts, and his rights to due
process, equal protection, and freedom from cruel and unusual
punishment; (3) Venus' chief of security, TDCJ's Venus monitor,
and the directors and owners of the Corrections Corporation of
America (CCA) violated various constitutionally protected rights;
(4) TDCJ's director violated various constitutionally protected
rights by failing to intervene and stop the violations that
occurred at Venus, and by failing to transfer Flores to another
pre-release unit; and (5) the defendants generally violated
TDCJ's rules, various court decrees, and Texas state law. As for
relief, Flores stated in his complaint that he seeks monetary
damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief in the form of
a court order against (1) the violation of his alleged right to
be transferred to another pre-release facility, (2) violations of
his constitutional rights and TDCJ's rules and decrees, and (3)
retaliation against writ-writers.

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Flores' case was reviewed by a magistrate judge who
determined that Flores failed to file his complaint within the
applicable two-year limitations period. Nevertheless, the
magistrate judge also reviewed the merits of Flores' claims and
recommended that the court dismiss (1) his claims regarding
TDCJ's refusal to transfer him to a pre-release unit because
prisoners do not have a constitutional right to be placed in any
particular prison, (2) his claim for injunctive relief on behalf
of writ-writers because Flores lacks the standing to bring such
an action, and (3) his claim for injunctive relief against Venus
because Flores was no longer incarcerated there. Flores objected
to the magistrate judge's report, contending that (1) Texas'
repeal of its prisoner-tolling provision violates prisoners'
right of access to the courts, (2) his transfer from Venus was
retaliatory, and the violations of his constitutional rights
continue because TDCJ refuses to transfer him to another pre-
release facility, (3) his release date has been delayed in
retaliation for his writ-writing activities, and (4) the
magistrate judge erred in evaluating the merits of his claim.
The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and
dismissed Flores' action as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(d).
II
Flores' appeal raises two issues: (a) whether Flores'
complaint is time-barred, and (b) whether Texas' repeal of the
imprisonment tolling provision of its statute of limitations for

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1 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.001 (Vernon 1986 &
Supp. 1993), amended by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 1049, § 56,
eff. Sept. 1, 1987.
5
personal injury claims violates prisoners' access to the courts.
A
Although no statute of limitations is set forth in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, the Supreme Court has held that courts entertaining
claims brought under section 1983 "should borrow the state
statute of limitations for personal injury actions." Own v.
Okure, 488 U.S. 238, 236, 109 S. Ct. 573, 574 (1989), citing
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938 (1985); see
Gartrell v. R.S. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 256-57 (5th Cir. 1993).
The forum state in the case before us is Texas, and, under Texas
law, personal injury actions must be brought "not later than two
years after the day the cause of action accrues." TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (Vernon 1986); see Gartrell, 981 F.2d
at 256-57. In the past, Texas tolled the limitations period
while a person was imprisoned1 but, effective September 1, 1987,
this tolling provision was eliminated. Accordingly, the
applicable period of limitations is two years beginning on the
date the cause of action accrues, or, when the cause of action
accrues prior to the effective date of the statute, September 1,
1987. Id.; see Burrell v. Newsome, 883 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir.
1989).
"While the limitations period is determined by reference to
state law, the standard governing the accrual of a cause of
action under section 1983 is determined by federal law."

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2 Helton v. Clements, 832 F.2d 332, 334 (5th Cir. 1987);
see also Burrell, 883 F.2d at 418.
3 In the brief he has submitted on appeal, Flores directly
addresses only these claims. Because Flores has not raised
adequate challenges to the district court's dismissal of his
claims (1) for injunctive relief for himself and other inmates,
and (2) that TDCJ officials refused to remedy his transfer, we
conclude that these claims have been waived for the purposes of
this appeal. See In re Municipal bond Reporting Antitrust
Litigation, 672 F.2d 436, 439 n.6 (5th Cir. 1982) (considering
issues waived where appellant's brief failed to set forth
contentions and accompanying reasons). We also do not address
Flores' claim that TDCJ officials retaliated against him by
delaying his release date, for such a claim must initially be
pursued through a petition for habeas corpus relief, and there is
no indication in the record that Flores has actively pursued such
relief. See Serio v. Members of Louisiana State Board of
Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112, 1117-19 (5th Cir. 1987) (recognizing
that, where the resolution of a section 1983 claim may
automatically entitle a claimant to immediate or earlier release,
resolution of the section 1983 claim would "reduce any related
state habeas corpus actions to `an exercise in futility'").
6
Burrell, 883 F.2d at 418; see Gartrell, 981 F.2d at 257. "Under
federal law, a cause of action accrues the moment the plaintiff
knows or has reason to know of the injury,"2 or when "the
plaintiff is in possession of the `critical facts' that he has
been hurt and the defendant is involved." Freeze v. Griffith,
849 F.2d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 1988), quoting Lavellee v. Listi, 611
F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1980).
Flores' alleged constitutional injuries occurred when he was
placed in lock-up on October 18, 1989 and when he was transferred
from Venus on November 3, 1989.3 On these dates, Flores was "in
possession of the `critical facts' that he [was] hurt and the
defendant[s] [were] involved." Freeze, 849 F.2d at 175.
Nevertheless, Flores did not bring this action until September 2,
1992. As expressly admitted by Flores in the brief he has

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submitted to this court, "[a]s for being time barred, Plaintiff
filed his suit 10 months after the two-year statute of
limitation . . . ." Accordingly, we conclude that Flores'
complaint is time-barred.
B
Flores also contends that Texas has violated prisoners'
right of access to the courts by repealing the imprisonment-
tolling provision of its statute of limitations. See supra Part
II.A. According to Flores, Texas generally does not give
prisoners the legal assistance they need to bring their actions
before the two-year limitations period expires.
As stated by the Supreme Court, a complaint is "frivolous"
within the meaning of [28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)] if "it lacks an
arguable basis in either law or fact." Denton v. Hernandez, ___
U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733-34 (1992), quoting Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Supreme Court has
expressly stated what prison authorities must do to ensure that
the right of prisoners to access the courts is satisfied: "[T]he
fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires
prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and
filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with
adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons
trained in the law." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S.
Ct. 1491 (1977) (emphasis added). Moreover, to prevail on a
denial-of-access claim, a petitioner must show actual prejudice.
See Mann v. Smith, 796 F.2d 79, 84 (5th Cir. 1986).

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In asserting his denial-of-access claim, Flores simply
states that he waited until he received the legal assistance he
wanted before pursuing his claim. Therefore, Flores has failed
to show that he suffered prejudice as a result of TDCJ policies
which do not comply with the Bounds "adequate law libraries or
adequate assistance" standard. See Mann, 796 F.2d at 84. In
fact, Flores has not even alleged that TDCJ denies prisoners the
use of adequate law libraries. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828; 97 S.
Ct. at 1491. Accordingly, we conclude that his claim is
frivolous pursuant to section 1915(d). See Moore v. Mabus, 976
F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1992) (A complaint is legally frivolous
when it involves the "mere application of well-settled principles
of law.").
III
For the forgoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's
dismissal of Flores' action.

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