(caption unavailable)

*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 92-8395
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
ROBIN SHURLEEN ROLLER,
Defendant-Appellent.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Texas
P 92 CR 41 2
May 27, 1993
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
BACKGROUND
Around 8:00 p.m. on April 3, 1992, United States Border Patrol
Agent Danny Burns noticed about six or eight familiar vehicles in
the parking lots located near the Boquillas Boat Crossing in the

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Big Bend National Park area. After patrolling the Boquillas Canyon
road, Agent Burns noticed an unfamiliar white Chevrolet sedan which
contained two passengers as it pulled in front of him onto Route
12. Finding it unusual for an unfamiliar vehicle to have arrived
after his initial patrol of the area at such a late hour and to be
leaving within 20 minutes of its arrival, Burns signalled for the
car to pull over. At trial, Burns also stated that he suspected
that the persons in the vehicle had either picked up someone or
something because of the brief visit in the area.
Upon inquiry, the female driver indicated to Burns that they
were coming from Boquillas. The female passenger, whom Burns later
recognized, indicated that she was being picked up and that they
were on their way to Alpine. Burns requested that the driver
present her driver's license and also asked her to open the trunk
of the vehicle. The driver, Robin Shurleen Roller, voluntarily
complied, and Burns discovered that the trunk of the vehicle
contained two large nylon sacks of marijuana. Both parties, Robin
Shurleen Roller and Molly Jean Grinkavitch (the passenger), were
indicted for conspiring to possess and for possession of marijuana
with the intent to distribute.
Prior to trial, Roller filed a motion to suppress all of the
seized items and the laboratory test results on the basis that
Burns lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle or probable
cause to conduct the search. The district court conducted a
hearing on the motion to suppress and ruled that the stop and
search of the vehicle were justified. Based on the "roving patrol"

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doctrine, the district court concluded that Burns was justified in
his stop and search of the vehicle because he reasonably suspected,
based on articulable facts and rational inferences from those
facts, that the vehicle was engaged in illegal activity.
Following waiver of a trial by jury, the district court found
Roller and Grinkavitch guilty of both counts.
OPINION
Roller argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant
her motion to suppress because the arrest and search of her vehicle
occurred without reasonable suspicion or probable cause in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. She asserts that the officer
stopped the vehicle merely because he did not recognize it and, at
the time of the stop, the Border Patrol officer had not observed
any illegal activity; further, Roller contends the officer searched
the vehicle because he recognized the passenger and had heard that
she had been involved in drugs.
In ruling on the motion to suppress, the district court
specifically found that Burns had a reasonable suspicion to stop
the vehicle for the following reasons: 1) the hour of the day, 2)
the proximity of the area to the border crossing, 3) the car was
not recognized as one belonging to a local resident and had not
been in the parking lot twenty minutes earlier when Agent Burns
patrolled it, 4) the boat crossing had been closed for a few hours,
5) the area is one frequented by smugglers of both illegal aliens
and narcotics, 6) a vehicle had been seen twenty minutes earlier on
the Mexican side of the river at the boat crossing, and 7) there is

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generally no traffic in the area after dark. The court noted that
the subsequent search of the vehicle was justified by those same
reasons, in addition to the fact that Grinkavitch stated that she
had just crossed the border from Boquillas.
A vehicle and its occupants may be briefly detained for
investigation based not upon probable cause but upon reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. The question whether an officer
had reasonable suspicion to stop a person is one of law. See
United States v. Casteneda, 951 F.2d 44, 47 (5th Cir. 1992).
A Border Patrol agent conducting a roving patrol in a border
area may make a temporary, investigative stop of a vehicle if
specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences drawn from
those facts reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicle is
engaged in illegal activities. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1975).
Factors to be considered include known characteristics of a
particular area; the proximity of the area to the border; the usual
traffic patterns on a particular road; the agent's previous
experience with criminal traffic; information about recent illegal
trafficking; characteristics of the vehicle stopped, including its
type and appearance and the behavior of the driver. Id. at 884.
Roller challenges the application of the district court's factual
findings to the factors enumerated in Brignoni-Ponce as satisfying
a reasonable suspicion. Roller contends the only factor warranting
a reasonable suspicion in this case is the proximity of the area to
the border.

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1 In Casteneda, an agent with five years of experience
stopped a truck on a gravel road approximately 35 miles from the
border. The road was known for narcotics trafficking and as a
bypass between the two border checkpoints in the area. Id. at 45-
46.
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Reasonable suspicion of illegal activities can be found in
this case when considering the Brignoni-Ponce factors. The facts
justifying the stop which were noted by Border Patrol Agent Danny
Burns and accepted by the district court satisfy the factors which
are properly considered for an investigative stop under the "roving
patrol" doctrine. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884.
Roller cites Casteneda to argue that Burns did not have
reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle.1 Casteneda was a case
in which the propriety of the stop centered on the agent's
testimony that he could detect the odor of marijuana trailing the
truck he was investigating. 951 F.2d at 46-47. In Casteneda, this
Court concluded that without the agent's testimony that he smelled
marijuana, the Brignoni-Ponce factors were suspicion-neutral. Id.
This Court also noted that many roads near the Texas-Mexico border
share characteristics similar to those of the road in Casteneda and
that use of these roads does not in itself create reasonable
suspicion to warrant a stop. Id., n.4.
Unlike the facts of Casteneda, Burns testified to the many
reasons for his reasonable suspicion that the car was probably
engaged in illegal activities. He maintained that it was the car's
brief venture into the tourist area; the fact that he did not
recognize the vehicle; the less-than-one mile proximity of the
location to the Mexican border; the fact that he noticed a car

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coming from the Mexican side of the border while he was proceeding
down Boquillas Canyon Road; the fact there were no checkpoints at
that area; and the probability that the parties picked up something
or someone as providing the basis of his reasonable suspicion to
make the stop. Burns is an experienced agent who was hired in
1972. Therefore, the Brignoni-Ponce factors were satisfied.
Roller's theory that the district court erred in denying her
motion to suppress because Burns did not have probable cause to
search the vehicle is also without merit.
The Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
45 S. Ct. 280. 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925), held:
[T]he true rule is that if the search and seizure
without a warrant are made upon probable cause,
that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of
circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an
automobile or other vehicle contains that which by
law is subject to seizure and destruction, the
search and seizure are valid.
Id. at 153. See also United States v. Ervin, 907 F.2d 1534, 1537
(5th Cir. 1990). The question of the legality of the search is a
question of law and is subject to de novo review. United States v.
Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 744 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
2945 (1992).
Warrantless searches of vehicles are permitted if the search
is supported by probable cause. United States v. Kelly, 961 F.2d
524, 527 (5th Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court in Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949),
defined probable cause as "a reasonable ground for belief of
guilt." See id. at 175. The existence of probable cause is

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determined by reviewing the totality of the circumstances. United
States v. Reed, 882 F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 1989). "A succession
of otherwise `innocent' circumstances or events . . . may
constitute probable cause when viewed as a whole." United States
v. Muniz-Melchor, 894 F.2d 1430, 1438 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 495
U.S. 923 (1990). This Court noted in Kelly that the factors
relevant to probable cause are not technical ones but instead they
are "factual and practical ones of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent persons, not legal technicians, act."
Kelly, 961 F.2d at 527 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
The district court validated Burns's search based on the
driver's indication that they had crossed the border from
Boquillas. The district court also upheld the reasons given for
the stop as justifying the search of the trunk. Viewing the
totality of the following factors: the lack of checkpoints at the
border crossing, the irregularity of late-night traffic in the
area, the fact that the driver and the passenger gave conflicting
stories about their purpose in the area as well as the indication
that they had come from Boquillas, the time of day, and the fact
that Burns was familiar with the passenger, probable cause to
search the vehicle existed. See United States v. Espinoza-Seanez,
862 F.2d 526, 531 (5th Cir. 1988) (the proximity to the border, the
time of day, the normal patterns of traffic in the area, and the
fact that the driver lied about where he was coming from justified
the search); United States v. Gordon, 712 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir.
1983) (the proximity of the location to the border, the fact that

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the Border Patrol agent of 15 years did not recognize the truck
although he was familiar with the area and its traffic patterns
along with the fact that local traffic had stopped for the evening
justified the stop and search).
Roller's arguments that reasonable suspicion and probable
cause to stop and search the vehicle did not exist are not
persuasive. The district court's denial of the motion to suppress
is affirmed.

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