(caption unavailable)

*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 92-4262
(Summary Calendar)
CHRISTOPHER EURE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN, WASHINGTON CORRECTIONAL
INSTITUTE,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Louisiana
(91-CV-1164)
(February 22, 1993)
Before KING, DAVIS and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Petitioner-Appellant Christopher Eure, a state prisoner in
Louisiana, filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district

-- 1 of 5 --

2
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the constitutional
validity of his sentence and included an allegation of ineffective
assistance of counsel. He appeals the dismissal of his petition by
the district court. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
I
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Represented by an attorney, Eure was convicted in 1983 on his
plea of guilty to state charges of committing two armed robberies.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, he was not prosecuted for a third
armed robbery in which the victim, a taxi driver, was shot and
severely injured. Eure did not appeal, but he now attacks aspects
of his sentencing collaterally through the instant habeas corpus
proceeding.
Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the U.S. magistrate
judge recommended denial of habeas relief. Eure filed objections
to the magistrate judge's report but failed to take issue
specifically with any of the report's findings. Eure did assert
that he was denied due process by being sentenced on the basis of
the armed robbery of which he was charged but for which he was not
prosecuted or convicted. He also averred that if his counsel had
presented unspecified mitigating factors which Eure had suggested,
the sentences would have been concurrent.
The district court, in effect adopting the magistrate judge's
report, denied habeas relief. Eure timely appealed.

-- 2 of 5 --

3
II
ANALYSIS
We have held that we will not allow "the `sandbagging' of
district judges when an appellant fails to object to a magistrate's
report in the district court and then undertakes to raise his
objections for the first time in this court." Nettles v.
Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc).
Accordingly, "[p]arties filing objections must specifically
identify those findings objected to," or the parties are barred
from attacking those findings on appeal. Id., n.8. "[T]he failure
of a party to file written objections . . . shall bar the party
from a de novo determination by the district court of an issue
covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on
appeal factual findings accepted or adopted by the district court
except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice." Id. at
410 (emphasis added).
Eure contends first that he is entitled to relief on grounds
that his trial court relied on materially false and prejudicial
information in his presentence report (PSI). He fails to state,
however, just what information in the report he believes was
incorrect; he asserts only that "neither counsel nor the court was
certain whether [he] had been involved in one or two armed
robberies." In his report the magistrate judge stated that "there
is nothing in the PSI which might have misled the [trial] Judge
concerning [the facts of another armed robbery and a murder trial
wherein Eure was acquitted]." The magistrate judge found further

-- 3 of 5 --

4
that Eure "failed to demonstrate how any of the information
contained in the PSI considered by the Judge was materially false."
Finally, the magistrate judge found that "the Judge felt that the
sentence he was imposing was proper for this particular defendant
in regards to these two robberies." Eure's claim is not only
barred by Nettles, it also lacks arguable merit.
Eure poses as another issue: "Whether the trial judge erred
in concluding there was no plea agreement." We shall not consider
this allegation on the merits, however, as Eure has not briefed it.
See Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 1987).
Furthermore, it is barred by Nettles and lacks arguable merit. The
trial court was well aware of the aspect of the agreement that the
third armed robbery charge would be dismissed but that the state
made no other promises in exchange for Eure's plea.
Eure also urges as an issue: "Whether the trial court erred
when it failed to consider the agreement at sentencing." For the
reasons set forth in the preceding paragraph we shall not consider
this allegation, which lacks merit as well.
Eure contends additionally that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to examine the PSI and to rebut
misleading and false information contained in it. But Eure does
not state in his brief what information in the PSI may have been
false or misleading. The magistrate judge found that Eure "failed
to demonstrate how any of the information contained in the PSI
considered by the Judge was materially false." Consequently, the
magistrate judge found that Eure had failed to show how he may have

-- 4 of 5 --

5
been prejudiced by counsel's failure to examine the PSI.
Eure did not challenge these findings in his objections to the
magistrate judge's report. Accordingly, his briefed contention
that counsel was ineffective is barred by the Nettles doctrine.
Furthermore, the district court was correct in finding that Eure
failed to demonstrate that he had been prejudiced by any action or
omission of counsel, an essential element of an ineffectiveness
claim. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 F.2d 668, 694, 697,
104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
Finally, the transcripts of Eure's rearraignment and
sentencing show that his trial counsel was fully familiar with the
relevant facts and that he represented Eure ably and well. Under
the plea agreement, he received a substantial concession from the
state, i.e., dismissal of the third robbery charge, the one
involving the severe wounding of the victim. Eure received a
substantial sentence as a result of the series of armed robberies
in which he participated, not for lack of effective legal
representation.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's denial of
Eure's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
AFFIRMED.

-- 5 of 5 --