(caption unavailable)

*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions
that have no precedential value and merely decide particular
cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes
needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal
profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined
that this opinion should not be published.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________________
No. 92-2608
(Summary Calendar)
_____________________________
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP.,
as receiver of WESTERN BANK -
WESTHEIMER,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
FRED E. RIZK CONSTRUCTION CO.,
and FRED E. RIZK,
Defendants-Appellants.
_________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(CA-H-91-3122)
_________________________________________________
(December 22, 1992)
Before KING, DAVIS, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM*:
In this suit on a promissory note, Defendant-Appellants Fred
E. Rizk Construction Co. and Fred E. Rizk (collectively, "Rizk")
appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Plaintiff-Appellee Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC). Finding
no reversible error, we affirm.

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1See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2).
2Walker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 355, 358 (5th Cir.
1988).
3FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see Resolution Trust Corp. v.
Marshall, 939 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1991).
2
I
The construction company was the maker of a promissory note
that was held by the FDIC's predecessor, Western Bank))Westheimer,
and Fred Rizk guaranteed it. The note was defaulted on in November
1987, just after the FDIC had been appointed as receiver of the
bank.1
In 1991, the FDIC sued Rizk on the note. Several months after
the initiation of the lawsuit, the FDIC filed a motion for summary
judgment to which Rizk did not reply. The district court found
that the FDIC had made out a prima facie case on the note, and, as
there was no opposition, the court granted the FDIC's motion. Rizk
timely filed a notice of appeal.
II
In reviewing the district court's grant of a motion for
summary judgment, we subject the grant to de novo review, applying
the same standards used by the district court.2 Summary judgment
is proper when the "pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law."3 We have stated that "[s]uits to enforce promissory notes

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4Marshall, 939 F.2d at 276 (citing FDIC v. Cardinal Oil Well
Servicing Co., 837 F.2d 1369, 1371 (5th Cir. 1988)).
5Eversley v. MBank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir.
1988)(citing Matsushita Electrical Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317 (1986); and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242
(1986)).
6Marshall, 939 F.2d at 276 (citing FSLIC v. Atkinson-Smith
Univ. Park Joint Venture, 729 F. Supp. 1130, 1132 (N.D. Tex.
1989)).
3
are especially appropriate for disposition by summary judgment.4
As noted above, Rizk did not oppose the FDIC's motion for
summary judgment. A district court acts properly in granting an
unopposed summary judgment motion when the "[movant]'s submittals
ma[ke] a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment."5
To prevail on a summary judgment motion on the promissory note
in question, the FDIC had to establish that: (1) the note is
valid; (2) the FDIC is the present holder of the note; and (3) Rizk
had defaulted on the note.6 In support of its summary judgment
motion, the FDIC submitted an affidavit by the FDIC case
administrator setting forth such information. Considering the
uncontested fact (Rizk did not contest the note's validity in his
answer) and the affidavit attached to the summary judgment motion,
the district court found that the FDIC had established a prima
facie case on the note under the controlling authority. After a
thorough review of the record, we agree with the district court's
findings.
The only defense raised by Rizk in his answer was that an
"accord and satisfaction" had been reached on the note. The

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7See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
8Rizk also argues that summary judgment was improperly
granted because the FDIC did not prove that it was a holder in
due course. This argument fails, however, because the FDIC's
status as a holder in due course is not relevant given that the
FDIC proved a prima facie case as to recovery on the promissory
note and Rizk failed to put forward any defense to the district
court.
4
statement in his answer, however, amounts to nothing more than a
bald assertion, totally unsupported by specific factual
representations. That cannot create an issue of fact.7 As Rizk
did not put forward any competent summary judgment evidence in
support of his defense, the district court properly granted summary
judgment in favor of the FDIC, which had made out a prima facie
case as to indebtedness on the note.8
III
Having thus found that the district court properly granted
summary judgment in favor of the FDIC, we
AFFIRM.

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