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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 92-1411
Summary Calendar
RONALD WILSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
JERRY NEAL, Chief of Police,
Amarillo Police Department,
Amarillo, Texas,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 92-1412
RONALD D. WILSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
JOE MORRIS, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 92-1414
RONALD D. WILSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
POTTER COUNTY, TX, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.

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*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
2
Appeals from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas
(CA 2 90 26, CA 2 90 39 & CA 2 90 203)
April 20, 1993
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Ronald D. Wilson, plaintiff, was a prisoner in the Potter
County Correctional Center in Amarillo, Texas. Wilson filed three
complaints pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The first, the subject of
appeal No. 92-1411, was filed against Jerry Neal, the chief of the
Amarillo Police Department. The subject of the complaint is
alleged harassment and false arrest resulting from a homosexual
encounter between Wilson and Detective Ron Clemmons. The second,
the subject of appeal No. 92-1412, was filed against three
correctional officers. In this suit, Wilson makes various
allegations of harassment and use of excessive force by prison
officials and other inmates. The third, the subject of appeal No.
92-1414, was filed against Potter County and Deputy Sheriff Calvin
Stalter. In this suit, Wilson alleged that prison officials were
tampering with his mail.
On October 29, 1990, the magistrate judge held a Spears
hearing with respect to all three suits. At the hearing, Wilson

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refused to make any statements until he was represented by counsel.
At this point, the magistrate judge made the following statement:
The result of your failing to give the
Court any information to allow the Court to
either order additional process based upon
these two other suits that you have pending,
to allow the Court to narrow the issues that
are presently pending before the Court, to
give the Court any information concerning
whether you should be allowed to continue to
proceed in forma pauperis [or] whether you
should have to pay court costs[,] filing fees,
based upon your employment now, the failure to
just flat out refuse to give any information
(sic) is going to leave me no alternative but
to recommend to the district judge that all
your cases be dismissed.
The magistrate judge went on to explain to Wilson that he could
invoke his rights under the Fifth Amendment if any of his
statements would tend to incriminate him, but that to invoke the
privilege in a general manner would result in dismissal of the
case. The magistrate judge asked Wilson if he understood and
Wilson answered affirmatively. The magistrate judge then asked
Wilson "[d]o you still wish not to make any statement concerning
these cases whatsoever?" Wilson responded, "[y]es, sir, I do.
Like I said, I will not state anything until I am represented by
counsel and any motion that you deny we'll take it to Appellate's
[sic] Court."
At this point, the magistrate judge allowed respondents to put
on evidence and then returned to addressing Mr. Wilson. The
magistrate judge asked Wilson to explain why he needed a lawyer in
this case. Wilson stated that he would feel more comfortable with
an attorney, but refused to provide the magistrate judge with any

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information to support this request. The magistrate judge again
informed Wilson that this refusal to provide information relating
to his individual claims and his motion for appointment of counsel
would result in a recommendation that the cases be dismissed.
The magistrate judge's report and recommendation did recommend
dismissal with prejudice for Wilson's refusal to cooperate in the
Spears hearing. The district court adopted this recommendation in
all three suits.
Although neither the magistrate judge nor the district court
specifically cited to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), the dismissal with
prejudice of all of Wilson's suits was the result of Wilson's
failure to comply with the court's rules. Rule 41(b) dismissals
are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA,
975 F.2d 1188, 1191 (5th Cir. 1992). This Court will find an abuse
of discretion unless "there is a clear record of delay or
contumacious conduct by the plaintiff, and ... the district court
has expressly determined that lesser sanctions would not prompt
diligent prosecution, or the record shows that the district court
employed lesser sanctions that proved to be futile." Id. (footnote
omitted).
Wilson repeatedly refused to cooperate with the magistrate
judge's attempts to have him state the facts of his case in order
to avoid dismissal. Wilson completely disregarded several
admonishments by the magistrate judge and even refused to provide
any information to support his request for appointment of counsel.
Wilson displayed utter contempt for the magistrate judge by stating

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that he would simply appeal any unfavorable decisions on his
motions. The record is clear that Wilson's behavior was
contumacious.
In recommending dismissal with prejudice, the magistrate judge
presented an alternate recommendation to the district court. This
included revoking Wilson's informa pauperis (IFP) status, requiring
him to pay filing fees on each suit, and assessing $500 in
attorney's fees against him. When presented with this lesser
option, the district court chose to accept the recommendation of
the magistrate judge that Wilson's suits be dismissed with
prejudice. This is tantamount to an express determination that the
lesser sanctions contained in the alternative recommendation would
not be adequate. As a result, we find that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in dismissing with prejudice Wilson's
three § 1983 actions; and those dismissals are now affirmed.

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