Summary Calendar JULIUS DREW, SR. v. ROSCO A. ANDERSON, Individually and as Anderson & White Bail Bonds

*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions
that have no precedential value and merely decide particular
cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes
needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal
profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 91-8469
Summary Calendar
_____________________
JULIUS DREW, SR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ROSCO A. ANDERSON, Individually and as
Anderson & White Bail Bonds, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellants.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
W 90 CA 35
_________________________________________________________________
(March 18, 1993)
Before KING, DAVIS and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Julius Drew, Sr., appeals from the
district court's decision dismissing his civil rights complaint
for want of prosecution. Because Drew has no standing to

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prosecute his complaint, and therefore no standing to challenge
the dismissal of his complaint, we dismiss his appeal.
I.
Julius Drew, Sr., an unsuccessful state court litigant,
filed this pro se civil rights suit in federal district court on
February 20, 1990. In his federal complaint, Drew alleged that
the opposing parties in the state court litigation, their
attorneys, and the judge who presided over the state court
litigation conspired to deprive him of federal rights in
violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1985. Specifically, Drew
contended that (1) the opposing parties presented false
information during discovery in the state court litigation and
(2) the presiding judge ruled against him on various motions
because of a conspiracy between the opposing parties and the
presiding judge.
On March 12, 1990, almost a month after filing his federal
complaint, Drew filed a notice of bankruptcy with the district
court. The notice indicated that, on February 7, Drew had filed
for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §
701 et seq, in the Western District of Texas. The notice further
indicated that a trustee, Marsha Kocurek, had been appointed to
administer Drew's estate.
In response to the notice of bankruptcy, the district court
stayed Drew's civil rights case for thirty days "in order for the
trustee to intervene if the trustee desires." The district court

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noted, however, that if the trustee did not intervene, "the case
[would] be dismissed for want of prosecution." When the trustee
did not intervene within the specified time period, the district
court sua sponte extended the stay until June 29, 1990. The
district court again warned that, "if the trustee has not
intervened by that date, the case will be dismissed for want of
prosecution."
The trustee never intervened or filed an appearance in
Drew's civil rights case. Accordingly, on July 3, 1990, the
district court dismissed Drew's complaint for want of
prosecution. This appeal followed.
II.
On appeal, Drew argues that, by dismissing his complaint,
the district court acted "in violation of the bankruptcy laws."
The dismissal was erroneous, he contends, because: "[1] under the
bankruptcy laws all entities are stayed at the filing of the
bankruptcy petition[;] . . . [2] after continuing to proceed with
the case the Court denied the Plaintiff/Appellant the right to
participate in the proceedings[;] . . . [and] [3] the Court
considered all attempts of Plaintiff/Appellant to participate as
moot." We do not address the merits of Drew's contentions,
because we conclude, for the following reasons, that he does not
have standing to prosecute this appeal.
When Drew filed his bankruptcy petition, his civil rights
claims against the defendants in this case became part of the

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1 The underlying state court litigation, which forms the
basis for Drew's instant civil rights claims, was filed in
November 1987. As best we can tell from the record, the actions
about which Drew complains--i.e., certain discovery responses and
rulings--occurred sometime in 1989. Thus, the claims existed at
the time Drew filed his bankruptcy petition.
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bankruptcy estate. The Bankruptcy Code provides that, when a
case is commenced under 11 U.S.C. § 301, 302, or 303, an estate
is created. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). The Code further provides that
the bankruptcy estate is comprised of, among other things, "all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case." Id. § 541(a)(1). The legislative
history to section 541(a)(1) indicates that the definition of
property of the estate is to be interpreted broadly, and includes
causes of action existing at the time of the commencement of the
bankruptcy action. See S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82,
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868; H.R. Rep. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 367, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6323; United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 205 n.9
(1983) (noting that scope of 541(a)(1) is broad and includes
causes of action); In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 741 F.2d 1266,
1274 (5th Cir. 1983) (section 541(a)(1) is all-encompassing and
includes causes of action); see also Burkett v. Shell Oil Co.,
448 F.2d 59, 59 (5th Cir. 1971). Because Drew's civil rights
claims existed at the time the bankruptcy action was commenced,1
they became part of the bankruptcy estate.
Moreover, in a Chapter 7 case, it is the trustee and not the
debtor who represents the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 323. As

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representative of the estate, the trustee "succeeds to all causes
of action held by the debtor at the time the bankruptcy petition
is filed." Miller v. Shallowford Community Hosp., Inc., 767 F.2d
1556, 1559 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶
541.10[5] (15th ed. 1985)). Therefore, once a trustee is
appointed in a Chapter 7 case, only the trustee has the capacity
to represent the estate and prosecute claims formerly belonging
to the debtor. See Bauer v. Commerce Union Bank, 859 F.2d 438,
441 (6th Cir. 1988) ("It is well settled that the right to pursue
causes of action formerly belonging to the debtor . . . vests in
the trustee for the benefit of the estate"), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1079 (1989). Unless the claims are either abandoned or
administered in accordance with the Code, they remain the
property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 554(d). And, absent such
circumstances, the debtor has no standing to pursue the claims.
Bauer, 859 F.2d at 441.
Accordingly, we hold that Drew lacks standing to prosecute
his claims and this appeal from the district court's order
dismissing his claims. Upon filing for bankruptcy, his then-
existing civil rights claims became part of the bankruptcy
estate. When the trustee was appointed, she became the
representative of the estate and succeeded to Drew's civil rights
claims. Because nothing in the record suggests that these claims
were abandoned or administered in accordance with the Code, these
claims remain the property of Drew's bankruptcy estate. As
property of the estate, Drew's claims and this appeal may only be

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prosecuted by the trustee. See Transload & Transport, Inc. v.
American Marine Underwriters, Inc., 94 B.R. 416, 418-19 (E.D. La.
1988).
III.
We conclude that, because Drew lacks standing to prosecute
his civil rights claims against the named defendants, he also
lacks standing to appeal the district court's order dismissing
those claims. We therefore DISMISS Drew's appeal.

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