(caption unavailable)

* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
__________________
No. 91-5100
Summary Calendar
__________________
In the Matter of: MICHAEL KRYDER and BETH KRYDER,
Debtors.
MICHAEL KRYDER and
BETH KRYDER,
Appellants,
versus
THE FROST NATIONAL BANK
OF SAN ANTONIO,
Appellee.
______________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas
(S-90-130-A)
______________________________________________
(February 9, 1993)
Before GARWOOD, HIGGINBOTHAM, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.*
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
Debtors-appellants Michael Kryder and Beth Kryder (the
Kryders) appeal from the district court's affirmance of the

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bankruptcy court's decision to sustain exceptions filed by
creditor-appellee Frost National Bank of San Antonio (Frost Bank)
to the Kryders' claims of exempt property in their bankruptcy
petition. We hold that the bankruptcy court's findings that the
Kryders had deliberately overvalued certain assets and failed to
list other assets with the intent to defraud their creditors are
not clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm.
Facts and Proceedings Below
The Kryders filed a joint petition for bankruptcy under
Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the Northern
District of Texas, Fort Worth Division, on February 7, 1989. After
the Kryders had filed their various schedules of estate and
exempted property and Frost Bank had filed its exceptions thereto,
the case was transferred to the Eastern District of Texas on
December 3, 1989.
In their bankruptcy schedules, the Kryders had listed various
items of household and personal goods and their values. These
included household goods with a total value of $10,000 and jewelry
with a total value of $3,300. The Kryders claimed this property
was exempt pursuant to Texas Property Code §§ 42.001 & 42.002.
Frost Bank, in its objections to the exemptions claimed by the
Kryders, submitted a financial statement that the Kryders had
prepared for Frost Bank on June 30, 1988, roughly six months before
the Kryders filed their petition. In this financial statement, the
Kryders estimated the cost and market value, respectively, of: art
as $15,046 and $20,500; furniture and fixtures as $31,121 and
$30,000; and jewelry as $15,630 and $40,000. According to the

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deposition testimony of Michael Kryder, in the six months between
June 30, 1988 and February 7, 1989, the Kryders had sold some items
of jewelry for a total of $11,100, and had sold no art or other
household goods. The remaining differences in value he attributed
to the difference in market values (used in the June 1988 financial
statement) and liquidation values (used in the schedules
accompanying the bankruptcy petition).
Frost Bank's objections also alleged that the Kryders had
failed to include in their schedules two checking accounts
containing a total of over $3,000 and two Individual Retirement
Accounts (IRA's) containing over $20,000 in investment
certificates. In his deposition, Michael Kryder stated that he
believed that the checking accounts had nearly zero balances
because he had written checks against those accounts that had not
been posted as of the time the bank statements had been prepared.
He stated further that he had not listed the IRA's because he
believed that they were exempt property.
Prior to the bankruptcy court's hearing on Frost Bank's
exceptions, the Kryders agreed to turn over the total amount in the
two checking accounts to the estate. After the hearing, in an
order dated April 5, 1990, the bankruptcy court found that the
Kryders had deliberately understated the value of their household
property and jewelry in order to defraud their creditors and had
deliberately failed to list the checking accounts and IRA's in
order to defraud their creditors. The bankruptcy court held that
the deliberate concealment of the checking accounts and IRA's
prevented the Kryders from claiming any exemption in those

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accounts, and therefore ordered that the accounts be turned over to
the estate.
The district court upheld the bankruptcy court determinations
in an opinion dated November 7, 1991. The Kryders then timely
appealed to this Court.
Discussion
On appeal, the Kryders challenge only the sufficiency of the
evidence before the bankruptcy court to support that court's
factual findings. They do not challenge the legal consequences,
the disallowance of exemption of the IRA's, imposed by the
bankruptcy court as a result of those factual findings. Thus, the
only issues we address on appeal are whether the bankruptcy court
erred in finding that the Kryders intentionally undervalued their
assets and omitted the checking accounts and IRA's in order to
defraud their creditors.
This Court reviews factual findings of the bankruptcy court
only for clear error. Bankruptcy Rule 8013; In re Killough, 900
F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir. 1990). Thus, we must affirm the bankruptcy
court findings of fact unless "we are . . . left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." In re
Texas Extrusion Corp., 844 F.2d 1142, 1164 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 311 (1988).
After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the
evidence before the bankruptcy court was clearly sufficient to
sustain the bankruptcy court's findings of fact. The bankruptcy
court was amply supported in its conclusion that the Kryders had
undervalued their household goods and jewelry by the large

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1 The Kryders' make one last-ditch argument before this Court:
that they believed that the IRA's were not property of the estate
at all because they somehow resembled a spendthrift trust. This
argument not only stretches credulity and existing law, but is
irrelevant because the question here is whether the bankruptcy
court had enough evidence before it to sustain its findings, not
whether these accounts would have been exempt under the
bankruptcy laws had the Kryders not failed to list them.
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discrepancies in the values reported by the Kryders in their June
1988 financial statement and their bankruptcy petition schedules.
Further, the bankruptcy court was entitled to disbelieve Michael
Kryder's deposition testimony attempting to explain away these
discrepancies.
Similarly, the bankruptcy court was entitled to disbelieve
Michael Kryder's deposition testimony that he had failed to list
the checking accounts because he thought there was no remaining
balance in them, and the IRA's because he thought they were exempt.
The Kryders never explained why they listed a great deal of
property that they also considered exempt but neglected to mention
the IRA's.1 Further, Michael Kryder had previously participated in
two corporate bankruptcies and his claims of misunderstanding the
requirements of the property schedules could be found to ring
hollow. Finally, if a debtor is uncertain as to whether certain
assets are legally required to be included in the petition, it is
the debtor's duty to disclose those assets to the court so that the
question may be resolved. In re Montgomery, 86 B.R. 948, 957
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988).
We conclude that the bankruptcy court had sufficient evidence
before it on which to base its factual findings and that therefore
those findings are not clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm the

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district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court.
AFFIRMED

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