(caption unavailable)

* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
__________________
No. 91-1778
Summary Calendar
__________________
CATHERINE M. STARR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DR. T. WILLIAM HOWARD, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
______________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi
(CA H 90-0190(W))
______________________________________________
(February 18, 1993)
Before GARWOOD, HIGGINBOTHAM and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.*
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-appellant Catherine Starr (Starr) commenced pro se
this suit generally claiming that her rights were violated by
defendants-appellees Dr. T. William Howard (Howard), Dr. W.C. Bass
(Bass), Dr. Henry A. Maggio (Maggio), Dr. Jerry M. Ross (Ross),
Robert Owens (Owens), Howard McNeill (McNeill), Gulf Coast Mental

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1 This application alleged that Michael had earlier contacted
GCMHC, a state agency, and a doctor at the facility helped him to
complete commitment papers, but these papers were never filed.
Apparently, this alleged activity is the only link GCMHC has to
this case.
2
Health Center (GCMHC), Memorial Hospital of Gulfport (MHG), and the
Mississippi State Hospital at Whitfield (MSH). Her suit also
seemingly asserted some sort of conspiracy by the defendants and
that they had committed against her the state law torts of
defamation of character, negligence, and malpractice. The district
court, following diverse motions by several defendants and letter
responses by Starr, ultimately dismissed the suit without
prejudice. It determined that any conspiracy claim failed to
satisfy the requirements of notice pleading, any other unnamed
federal claims also failed to satisfy the requirements of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, that there was no diversity jurisdiction, and that the
claims against MSH were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Finding
that the district court did not reversibly err, we affirm.
Facts and Proceedings Below
As can be gleaned from official records and Starr's pro se
filings, Starr claimed that on or about September 6, 1985, her
husband Michael filed an Affidavit and Application for Commitment
Proceedings of Starr with the Chancery Clerk of Harrison County,
Mississippi.1 The affidavit was signed by Starr's step-uncle,
McNeill, in the capacity of a witness. On the same day, a state
chancellor issued a writ to the Harrison County sheriff's office to
take custody of Starr and deliver her to MHG, a private hospital.
Sheriff's officer sergeant Owens executed the writ. Owens

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2 She alleged that, "They have had me followed, monitored and
watched, and tell my husband every move I make, so, he then can
abuse me and my children . . . ." The defendants also
apparently conspired to keep Starr unlawfully confined.
3 Her precise allegations concerning what happened at MSH
were, "I sleep on a bed that someone had peed in and eat out of
dirty trays. I was ordered to pull all my clothes off, and
parade to the shower in front of a bunch of perverts. I was
examined by a Doctor Ross. He examined my female parts and I saw
3
transported Starr to MHG where she was examined the next day by
physician Howard and either psychologist Bass or Maggio. The two
doctors determined that she was a paranoid schizophrenic and
reasonably expected "to physically injure . . . herself or others."
She alleges that she was kept at MHG for observation for over
seventy-two hours. The commitment order reflects that she was
given an admission hearing on September 10, and that at the hearing
she was provided with court-appointed counsel, and at its
conclusion the special master found by clear and convincing
evidence that Starr posed a "substantial likelihood of physical
harm to . . . herself or others," and ordered her to be committed
to MSH. Starr was released from MSH about a month later.
On September 13, 1990, Starr, a Mississippi citizen, filed a
one-page, one-paragraph complaint seeking one billion dollars in
damages against Howard, Bass, Maggio, Owens, Ross, McNeill, GCMHC,
MHG, and MSHSQall Mississippi citizens or entities. She claimed
that the defendants had denied Starr her constitutional rights and,
inferentially, had engaged in some sort of conspiracy.2 This
complaint was fleshed out by a letter Starr wrote to the court
stating that Owens had invaded her privacy by taking her into
custody, and that she was subsequently abused at MSH.3

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lights blink on and off, as if they where taken pictures or
something."
4 Starr alleged that Bass, Maggio, and Howard "violated the
confidentiality law by releasing information" about Starr while
she was confined at MHG, and that "Dr. Maggio and Dr. Bass
equally shared the responsibility for my commitment." She made
more allegations against Ross that he "was negligent for keeping
me in confinement without any just cause and making a diagnosis
without any proof or evidence. He put a lable [sic] on me that
is damaging to me. Paranoia. Just because these people ordered
him to." She further alleged that she was denied therapy at MSH
and that she did not receive proper nourishment because the MSH
personnel were "getting the food that was assigned to us." She
also alleged that GCMHC was guilty of willful and malicious acts
and acts of gross negligence for telling Starr's husband how she
could be committed.
4
As the suit progressed, the court entered orders on February
5 and again on April 4, finding that Starr's responses were
inadequate, and warning Starr that her complaint would be dismissed
unless she adequately responded to the motions of several of the
defendants to dismiss, for change of venue, for summary judgment,
and for more definite statement. Starr's responses consisted of
more letters asserting diverse abuses.4 She also contended that
her commitment was unlawful because Mississippi's civil commitment
law was unconstitutional. These responses the court found
inadequate, and on June 28, 1991, it dismissed her complaint
without prejudice.
Discussion
Because Starr has proceeded pro se from the inception of this
lawsuit, the district court properly recognized its obligation to
construe her pleadings liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 92 S.Ct. 594,
596 (1972); Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1990).
Even so, "Pro se litigants are not excused from complying with

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5
court orders or substantive and procedural law." American Inmate
Paralegal Assoc. v. Cline, 859 F.2d 59, 61 (8th Cir. 1988). Here,
the district court ordered her twice to properly respond to
defendants' motions, before it dismissed her case for failing to
meet minimal pleading requirements and for failing to properly
allege jurisdiction.
We assume that Starr's complaint is based on a violation or
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 since she asserted deprivation of
her constitutional rights. See Greco v. Orange Memorial Hospital
Corp., 513 F.2d 873, 877 n.7 (5th Cir. 1975) (to proceed under
section 1983 a plaintiff must allege deprivation of a
constitutional right by a defendant acting under color of law).
Viewed as a section 1983 action, Starr's claims can only proceed
against entities found to be state actors operating under color of
law. Id. Starr does not have a claim against McNeill because it
is not alleged that he acted under color of law, nor are any facts
alleged that tend to indicate that he did so. See Brummett v.
Camble, 946 F.2d 1178, 1184 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that "a private
person does not act under color of law simply because he invokes
state authority"). Similarly, MHG, as a private hospital, is not
presumed to have acted under color of law, and since Starr has
failed to allege that MHG's actions occurred under color of law, or
facts so indicating, MHG was not a state actor. Similarly, doctors
Bass, Maggio, and Howard, who examined Starr at MHG, are also not
alleged or shown to be state actors. Since the rest of the
defendants are state agencies or employees of state agencies, we
will examine the alleged constitutional deprivations to determine

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5 The Supreme Court has defined "seizure" under the fourth
amendment as a "'means of physical force or show of authority, .
. . in some way restrain[ing] the liberty of a citizen.'" See
Graham v. Connor, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871 n.10 (1989) (citing Terry
v. Ohio, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 n.16 (1968)).
6 The remainder of her complaints alleging that she was
improperly examined, information about her was improperly
disseminated, and that the defendants are following her, are
entirely too vague and conclusory to serve as a basis for
liability. She fails to allege which laws or policies have been
followed or broken, or any specifics on how these alleged
violations occurred.
7 We draw this inference from one of Starr's letters to the
court that states, "All you have to do is have three people go
down and sign papers against you, and your life is not your own.
They sign you over to the state."
6
if Starr made out a sufficient complaint against any of the
remaining defendants.
The gravamen of Starr's complaint seems to be that the
defendants violated her right against unreasonable search and
seizure5 because she was committed under unconstitutional
procedures as set forth in Miss. Code Ann. §§ 41-21-65 to 41-21-73
(Supp. 1991).6 The only claim we can infer is that the statute is
unconstitutional because it fails to satisfy minimum due process
requirements.7 We note initially that the statute has never been
held to be unconstitutional. In Vitek v. Jones, 100 S.Ct. 1254
(1980), the Supreme Court approved a list of minimum requirements
for commitment of a convicted felon to a mental institution. Id.
at 1264-65. Although we have not enunciated the due process
requirements for a civil commitment proceeding, and since Starr has
failed to enunciate any specific due process violations, we will
use, without adopting, Vitek as a guide in addressing the
constitutionality of the Mississippi statute. See Doe v. Austin,

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8 We would also note that Starr was not committed on the mere
basis that she was suffering some vague "mental illness" but on
the express allegation and finding that she was a danger to
herself and others.
7
848 F.2d 1386, 1393-94 (6th Cir. 1988) (describing the Vitek
requirements and applying them to Kentucky's civil commitment
statute). Upon reviewing the Mississippi statute, this Court finds
that the statute's ample due process requirements meet the minimum
Vitek standards, and that it cannot be said that clearly
established law rendered belief in the statute's facial
constitutionality objectively unreasonable in September and October
1985.8
The individual defendants, to the extent they are state
actors, are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity unless
their conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of the legal
rules clearly established at the time the conduct was taken.
Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038 (1987). The burden is
on Starr "to come forward with summary judgment evidence sufficient
to create a genuine issue as to whether the defendant's conduct was
objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law."
Pfannstiel v. Marion, 918 F.2d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir. 1990). To
avoid dismissal of a section 1983 claim, Starr's complaint "cannot
be cast in 'broad, indefinite and conclusory terms.' . . . Rather,
the plaintiff must plead specific facts with sufficient
particularity to meet all the elements necessary to lay a
foundation for recovery, including those necessary to negative the
defense of qualified immunity." Brown v. Texas A & M Univ., 804
F.2d 327, 333 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Elliot v. Perez, 751 F.2d

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9 As pointed out by the district court, MSH, as a subdivision
of the state of Mississippi, enjoys absolute immunity from suit
under the Eleventh Amendment. In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State
Police, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (1989) the Court held that "[s]ection 1983
provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil
liberties, but it does not provide a federal forum for litigants
who seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of
civil liberties. The Eleventh Amendment bars such suits unless
8
1472, 1479 (5th Cir. 1985)).
Starr fails to present any facts that would negate the defense
of qualified immunity for the individual defendants in this case.
Owens was acting under a court order, which Starr does not contend
was in any way improperly issued; therefore Owens was entitled to
immunity. See Haigh v. Snidow, 231 F.Supp. 324, 326 (S.D. Cal.
1964) (holding that "[t]he order of the court being regular on its
face, and issued by competent authority, the sheriff and his
deputies incurred no civil liability in executing it"). Starr's
only allegation against GCMHC is that, even though it was not
involved in committing Starr, one of its employees acted improperly
in telling Starr's husband how she could be committed. GCMHC, as
a governmental entity, may be liable under section 1983 "where the
alleged unconstitutional activity is inflicted pursuant to official
policy" but such liability "may not be imposed on a government
entity on a theory of respondeat superior for actions of government
employees." Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir. 1992).
Since Starr is not alleging that any policy of GCMHC is defective,
but only that one of GCMHC's employees engaged in improper
behavior, GCMHC is immune from liability. MHG is not a state
actor, nor is any policy of MHG allegedly constitutionally
improper.9 It is not alleged that any of the defendants violated

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the State has waived its immunity." Id. at 2309. Mississippi
has not waived its immunity from suit in federal courts. Miss.
Code Ann. § 11-46-5(4) (Supp. 1992) ("Nothing contained in this
chapter shall be construed to waive the immunity of the state
from suit in federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States.").
The allegations against Dr. Ross individually (see notes 3 &
4, supra) do not show a then clearly established constitutional
violation on his part personally so as to defeat qualified
immunity.
10 Reviewing her filings, we find only two alleged facts in
support of a conspiracy: (1) McNeill's brother is or was a
constable in Harrison County; and (2) McNeill expressed
satisfaction to the special master after Starr's admission
hearing. Neither of these facts is sufficiently relevant to link
the defendants to a conspiracy.
9
Miss. Code Ann. §§ 41-21-65 to 41-21-73, nor do such facts as are
alleged show such a violation by any defendant. Even if the
hearing was not in accordance with the law, nothing indicates that
such a failure was attributable to any of the defendants.
The remaining section 1983 claim that Starr may be asserting
is apparently a conspiracy, which is vaguely described as the
defendants acting together to deny Starr her constitutional
rights.10 As we have held, "To establish a cause of action based
on conspiracy a plaintiff must show that the defendants agreed to
commit an illegal act." Arsenaux v. Roberts, 726 F.2d 1022, 1024
(5th Cir. 1982). No such showing has been made here, so Starr has
failed to make out a conspiracy claim since "[t]he conspiracy
allegations made by [Starr] are conclusory, and more than a blanket
of accusation is necessary to support a § 1983 claim." Id.
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing Starr's section 1983 claims.
After the district court had dismissed Starr's claims under

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10
federal law, all that remained were her state law claims of
negligence, malpractice, and defamation against citizens of
Mississippi. Since Starr is also a citizen of Mississippi, her
suit lacked complete diversity as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Therefore, having dismissed the federal claims, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Starr's state law
claims, which were merely pendent claims.
The "district court and opposing parties are not required to
forever sift through such pleadings after [Starr had] been given
notice of the pleading requirements of the case." Old Time
Enterprises, Inc. v. Int'l Coffee Corp., 862 F.2d 1213, 1219 (5th
Cir. 1989). Where, as here, if the district court gives the
plaintiff opportunity to amend the complaint, and she still fails
to adequately allege a claim, the district court may dismiss the
complaint. Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792-93 (5th Cir.
1986).
Conclusion
None of Starr's claims on appeal demonstrate reversible error
in the district court's dismissal without prejudice of her
complaint. Therefore, the district court's judgment is
AFFIRMED.

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