Dawson v. Barnhart

1 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
2Dawson’s argument that the Administrative Law Judge committed
an error of law by not classifying him as being of “advanced age”
for the purposes of the pre-2001 disability benefits is wholly
without merit. An individual of “advanced age” is an individual
age fifty-five or older. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(e). Born on
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
January 9, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 04-31121
Summary Calendar
_____________________
DAVID A. DAWSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant - Appellee.
__________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana, Shreveport
USDC No. 5:03-CV-660-SMH
_________________________________________________________________
Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
David A. Dawson seeks review of the Social Security
Administration’s denial of disability insurance benefits to which
he claims entitlement. The Administrative Law Judge held that
Dawson was not disabled on or before December 31, 2000, when he was
last eligible for such benefits. Dawson argues that the facts show
he was disabled beginning October 28, 1998.2 We review a final

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September 23, 1946, Dawson became fifty-five years old on September
23, 2001, well after the period at issue here.
decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to determine whether the decision
was supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the
proper legal standards were used in evaluating the evidence.
Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994).
There is little evidence to suggest that Dawson could not
perform “light work” prior to January 2001, when colon cancer was
first suspected. The medical records on which Dawson relies show
only that he sought treatment for a groin abscess in October 1998
and again in June 1999. In early 2001, he denied any prior medical
problems other than the abscess. A medical expert reviewing the
medical records concluded that Dawson’s only functional limitations
occurred after surgery in 2001. We find that the record provides
substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision that
Dawson was not disabled on or before December 31, 2000, when he was
last eligible for Social Security disability insurance benefits.
AFFIRMED.

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