Coker v. Dixie Motors Inc, et al

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
June 3, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-30127
Summary Calendar
DEBORAH H. COKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DIXIE MOTORS, INC.; LOUISIANA
INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
(01-97-R-5)
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Before DAVIS, WIENER, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Deborah Coker appeals from district
court’s summary judgment dismissing all of her claims against
Defendant-Appellee Dixie Motors, Inc. (“Dixie”), some of its
employees and officers, and its insolvent insurer, on behalf of
which Defendant-Appellee Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association
(“LIGA”) had intervened. Coker asserted claims under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act, as well as

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state law claims under Louisiana law. Coker’s claims were grounded
in allegations of discrimination on the basis of her sex through
creation of a hostile work environment, pay below a similarly-
situated male employee, and constructive discharge.
Dixie filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of
Coker’s claims. Dixie asserted that the individuals who
purportedly created the hostile work environment were not employees
of Dixie but of a separate entity in which Dixie owned 50% of the
stock and thus had neither legal nor actual control of that entity
or its employees. Dixie also contended that Coker’s Equal Pay Act
claim could not succeed because the male employee with whom Coker
sought to be compared was not similarly situated. And, Dixie
insisted that Coker had failed to allege or adduce facts sufficient
to create a genuine dispute about constructive discharge.
In a lengthy, detailed, and well-reasoned opinion entitled
Order and Reasons, the district court fully explicated the basis
for its grant of Dixie’s motion for summary judgment dismissing
Coker’s action. Thereafter, Coker sought reconsideration and the
district court issued comprehensive supplemental opinions
explaining its denial of rehearing.
On appeal, Coker contends generally that the district court
erred in granting Dixie’s motion for summary judgment, specifically
complaining of the court’s failure to order joinder of parties and
to grant Coker’s motions for reconsideration, as well as the

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court’s refusal to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over Coker’s state law claims.
In addition to considering the opinions of the district court
granting summary judgment of dismissal of Coker’s complaint and
denying reconsideration, we have carefully reviewed the appellate
briefs of counsel for the opposing parties and the entire record on
appeal. Based on our consideration of the foregoing and our
application of the pertinent law to the operable facts in the light
most favorable to Coker as non-movant, we are firmly convinced by
our de novo review that the district court’s grant of summary
judgment dismissing Coker’s claims was legally correct and
supported by the facts when viewed most favorably to Coker and the
law applicable thereto; and we are equally satisfied that the
district court properly exercised its discretion in denying
rehearing and in considering and disposing of Coker’s state law
claims. For essentially the reasons set forth in the writings of
the district court, we affirm the dismissal of Coker’s action,
including her state law claims, and also affirm the court’s denial
of her motions for rehearing.
AFFIRMED.

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