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03-20582•Parker v. Metro Transit Auth
03-20582Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit23.02.2004
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
February 23, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________
m 03-20582
_______________
MARY FRANCES PARKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
m H-01-3175
_________________________
Before KING, Chief Judge, JONES
and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Mary Parker appeals a summary judgment
on her claims against the Metropolitan Transit
Authority (“Metro”) for retaliation under title
VII and violations of the Equal Pay Act. We
review a summary judgment de novo, using the
same standards as did the district court. BP
Oil Int’l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petoleos de
Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2003).
Finding no error, we affirm.
I.
The district court decided first that Parker
had not established a prima facie case of re-
taliation, because her being placed on a wit-
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has deter-
mined that this opinion should not be published and is
not precedent except under the limited circumstances
set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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2
ness list and giving a deposition in her co-
worker’s state court action for discrimination
did not constitute participation in a proceeding
under title VII, and was therefore not protect-
ed activity. This is an issue of first impression
in this circuit. Because this appeal must be de-
cided on other grounds, we do not pass on the
correctness of the district court’s decision on
that issue.
The district court alternately determined
that had Parker established a prima facie case,
she failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Metro’s legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for her discharge
were pretextual. Metro states that Parker’s
employment was terminated because of her
poor performance and failure properly to com-
ply with appropriate policies.
The record indicates that Parker received
consistently low performance ratings, that her
supervisors believed she was not successfully
adjusting to the public sector after years of pri-
vate employment, that she was put on proba-
tion several times and given performance im-
provement plans with which she did not com-
ply, and that she did not follow particular pol-
icies on several occasions. Parker argues that
her actions on several occasions were reason-
able, but she has failed to provide evidence
that she did not violate the policies or that her
supervisors’ dissatisfaction with her perform-
ance was not the reason Metro terminated her.
The district court was correct in entering sum-
mary judgment on Parker’s retaliation claim.
II.
The district court also entered summary
judgment on Parker’s Equal Pay Act claims.
Parker points to two male employees who she
alleges are paid more than she is for substan-
tially the same job. The district court decided
that Parker’s claim fails because (1) one of
these men had actually had a lower starting
salary than Parker, but had received merit rais-
es for which Parker was ineligible because of
poor performance, and (2) the other man per-
formed a job that was different from Parker’s
and for which Parker was not qualified. Sum-
mary judgment on this claim was correct.
AFFIRMED.
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