United States v. Shaw

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
m 00-30231
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
CINDY SHAW, A.K.A. CYNDIA SHAW,
AND
WALTER SHAW,
Defendants-Appellants.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
(98-CR-119-1)
_________________________
April 4, 2001
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA,
HIGGINBOTHAM, and SMITH,
Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*
Walter Shaw and his wife, Cyndia Shaw,
were convicted of conspiracy to manufacture
and possession of methamphetamine. They
appeal the denial of their motion to suppress
evidence discovered in a search of their trailer.
They contend that the warrant was issued im-
properly. Cyndia Shaw also appeals the suf-
ficiency of the evidence to support her * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has
determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the
limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
(continued...)
*(...continued)
47.5.4.

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conviction of conspiracy. Finding no error, we
affirm.
I.
C h r is W a t s o n o v e r d o s e d o n
methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin and
was admitted to Riverview Hospital. In
investigating the overdose, the sheriff’s de-
partment gathered enough information from
Watson and his friend Stephen Lauret to
obtain a search warrant for “a white trailer
located at the end of O.W. Brown Road, on
the left side of the roadway.” Sergeant C.J.
Matthews and other law enforcement officials
searched what they believed was the trailer de-
scribed in the warrant but soon realized they
had entered the wrong residence. The
occupants of that residence pointed out the
correct trailer to the officers, and Matthews
wrote down the numerical address.
Matthews left Trooper Matt Sinanan on the
scene and returned to the sheriff’s office to
find Lauret to identify the Shaws’ residence.
He obtained from the judge a corrected
warrant, which specified the numerical address
of the trailer. The officers then searched the
Shaws’ trailer and discovered chemicals and
equipment used in the production of
methamphetamine.
During the search, the Shaws returned
home in their car. The police apprehended
them and searched the car, finding syringes,
plastic baggies, coffee filters, lye, and jars
filled with a clear liquid.
After being advised of his rights, Walter
Shaw informed the officers that his friends
Stanley Crowell and Marian Wright were
making methamphetamine at a motel. Agents
used the motel phone records to determine the
room number, then obtained a warrant for the
room 105, a search of which revealed a
m e t h a m p h e t a m i n e l a b o r a t o r y ,
methamphetamine, and chemicals.
Shaw and Crowell informed on each other,
revealing that the two couples had worked to-
gether to produce methamphetamine. They fi-
nanced the operation through shoplifting sup-
plies and cameras that they returned to the
stores for money.
Neither defendant contests that he was in
possession of methamphetamine, but Cyndia
contests the sufficiency of the evidence to
prove her role in the conspiracy. The main
question on appeal is whether the evidence
found during the search of the trailer should
have been suppressed.
II.
We review the factual findings in a
suppression hearing for clear error and the
legal conclusions de novo. United States v.
Ceniceros, 204 F.3d 581, 584 (5th Cir. 2000).
We review the denial of a motion to suppress
when a search warrant is involved using a two-
step process. United States v. Cherna, 184
F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
529 U.S. 1065 (2000).
First, we determine whether the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule applies. See
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-14
(1984) (giving “great deference” to a mag-
istrate’s determination of probable cause). If
this exception applies, we affirm. If not, we
examine whether the magistrate had a
substantial basis for concluding that probable
cause existed. Cherna, 184 F.3d at 407
(internal citations omitted).
In Leon, the Court held that even if a
warrant is invalidated, the Fourth Amendment

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does not require suppression of the evidence if
the officers reasonably relied on the warrant.
Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922). This good-
faith exception does not apply when (1) “the
magistrate or judge issuing the warrant was
misled by information in an affidavit that the
affiant knew was false or would have known
was false except for his reckless disregard of
the truth”; (2) “the issuing magistrate ‘wholly
abandoned his judicial role’”; or (3) the officer
“relie[d] on a warrant so lacking in probable
cause as to render belief in its existence
entirely unreasonable.” Id. at 407-08 (internal
citations omitted). Walter Shaw attacks the
warrant on the first two grounds; Cyndia Shaw
utilizes the third.
A.
Walter Shaw contends that Matthews
knowingly made a false statement in his af-
fidavit. If material in the affidavit is false, then
that material should be set aside, and we must
determine whether the remaining material
passes constitutional muster. See Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978); United States
v. Dickey, 102 F.3d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 1996).
Even if the affidavit contains false statements,
the fruits of the search are admissible if the
affidavit, when stripped of its false or
inaccurate statements, supports a finding of
probable cause. United States v. Wake, 948
F.2d 1422, 1429 (5th Cir. 1991).
After Matthews executed the first warrant
on the wrong trailer, he returned to the
sheriff’s office to draft a second one. The
district court found that Matthews returned to
the hospital to retrieve Lauret, took Lauret to
O.W. Brown Road where he identified the
correct trailer, dropped Lauret off at the
sheriff’s office where another deputy returned
him to the hospital, went to the judge’s
residence for approval of the warrant, then
returned to the Shaws’ trailer for the search.
Sinanan testified at the suppression hearing
that about twenty minutes elapsed from the
time Matthews left the scene with Lauret until
the time he returned with the warrant.2
Shaw challenges this finding, arguing that
Matthews did not have enough time to drop
off Lauret and visit the judge.3 Thus, Shaw
claims, Matthews must have gone to the
judge’s house earlier. If he did, then he falsely
swore in the affidavit that the informant had
identified the residence.
The government responds that Matthews
was traveling at approximately eighty miles per
hour over a five-mile radius in scant traffic.
The distance between O.W. Brown Road and
the hospital was four to five miles. The
sheriff’s office was about a mile and a half
from the trailer and one to two miles from the
judge’s residence.4 From the time Matthews
2 Sinanan stated that Matthews brought Lauret
to the trailer at 12:33 a.m., left, and returned at
12:50 a.m. These times reflect testimony in the
second evidentiary hearing. In the first hearing,
Matthews made several mistakes in his testimony
about the sequence of events, and the court found
that he had furnished incorrect information. Before
his testimony in the second hearing, Matthews
reviewed the recorded police radio communications
and telephone conversations to construct a timeline.
3 Shaw notes that Matthews promised the judge,
in an 11:48 p.m. phone call, that he would arrive in
fifteen to twenty minutes, which places Matthews’s
arrival at somewhat earlier than the timeline
allows. The judge testified that Matthews may
have taken longer than twenty minutes to arrive at
his house.
4 Lt. Webb testified that it took only five
(continued...)

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left the sheriff’s office until the time he
presented the affidavit to the judge, about
twenty minutes elapsed. Deputy Brad Spill-
man testified that Matthews left Lauret with
him at the sheriff’s office, and Spillman
returned Lauret to the hospital. Spillman also
stated that he overheard a conversation that
Lauret identified the trailer.
The district court held a suppression
hearing and determined that Matthews’s
version of the facts was correct. When
reviewing a suppression hearing, we “must
give credence to the credibility choices and
findings of fact of the district court unless
clearly erroneous.” United States v. Raymer,
876 F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 1989). A finding
is clearly erroneous only if we are left with the
“definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.” Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985).
The district court has made a credibility
determination supported by the evidence. Al-
though Shaw presents a plausible argument to
the contrary, we decline to overturn the
findings.
Because we uphold the finding that
Matthews took Lauret to identify the trailer
before he presented his affidavit to the judge,
we conclude that Matthews did not knowingly
make a false statement. Thus, we need not ad-
dress Shaw’s further contention that the
warrant, when stripped of its support in the
allegedly false affidavit statement, no longer
describes the trailer’s location with sufficient
particularity.
B.
Walter Shaw argues that the judge did not
act as a detached and neutral officer in signing
the warrant. He bases his contention on the
transcript of the conversation between
Matthews and the judge, in which the judge
said:
If you want to go . . . based on the new
information [the corrected address], do
another [warrant], bring it, I’ll be glad
to sign it. I think you have probable
cause and then go out and if he points
out a different one and it’s the same one
in your search warrant, search it.
Shaw suggests that the judge instructed
Matthews to bring the search warrant to his
house before Matthews took Lauret to identify
the residence. Shaw believes that this conduct
indicated a lack of neutrality and detachment,
qualities critical to the constitutionality of a
warrant. See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York,
442 U.S. 319, 326 (1979). The judge
explained before the district court that he
advised Matthews to obtain the second
warrant even though he might have been able
to use the first one. He indicated that he
thought Matthews had probable cause, but he
wanted Matthews to bring a warrant stating
the additional information. He said he had no
problems with Matthews’s using the informant
to identify the residence so that the police did
not repeat their earlier mistake.
In Lo-Ji Sales, the Court found that a town
justice abandoned his neutrality by signing an
open-ended warrant to search for items not yet
listed, then assisted in the execution of the
warrant, “becom[ing] a member, if not the
4(...continued)
minutes to go from the hospital to O.W. Brown
Road while observing the speed limit. He also
stated that one could make the trip from the
sheriff’s office to the judge’s residence in a couple
of minutes.

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leader, of the search party which was
essentially a police operation. Once in the
store, he conducted a generalized search under
the authority of an invalid warrant; he was not
acting as a judicial officer but as an adjunct
law-enforcement officer.” Id. at 325-36.
Here, t he judge did not come close to
participating in the seizure of evidence; his
actions do not rise to that level of involvement
with the law enforcement process. Cf. Cher-
na, 184 F.3d at 408.
Shaw further avers that the judge’s
willingness to sign the warrant without reading
the affidavit is a “rubber-stamping” of the
warrant that negates neutrality and
detachment. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 914;
United States v. Breckenridge, 782 F.2d 1317,
1321 (5th Cir. 1986). In Breckenridge, the
court found that a judge “rubber-stamped” a
warrant because he did not read the affidavit
carefully and did not know the grounds on
which he issued the warrant. Id. Here, by
contrast, the judge discussed the basis for the
warrant with the officer and knew what the
affidavit would say when he suggested that the
officers had probable cause to search the
trailer. As explained above, we adopt the
district court’s determination that the affidavit
was true. Thus, the judge did not rubber-
stamp the warrant.
Even if he had done so, the warrant is valid
if the officer may reasonably rely on the
judge’s neutrality. Breckenridge held that
where law enforcement officers in good faith
have done everything reasonably necessary to
obtain a warrant, suppressing the evidence
would not further the purposes of the exclu-
sionary rule. Id. at 1320 (citing Leon, 468
U.S. at 921 (“Penalizing the officer for the
magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot
logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth
Amendment violations.”).
This is such a case. Matthews reasonably
asked the judge whether he needed a second
warrant and followed the judge’s advice in ob-
taining it. Assuming again that the affidavit
was true, Matthews had no reason to doubt
the judge’s neutrality. He acted in sufficient
good faith to entitle him to rely on the warrant.
C.
Cyndia Shaw challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence in the affidavit to show probable
cause to issue the warrant. “An officer may
rely in good faith upon a warrant so long as
the warrant is supported by more than a ‘bare
bones’ affidavit,” which is “so deficient in
demonstrating probable cause that it renders
the officer’s belief in its existence completely
unreasonable.” See United States v. Cisneros,
112 F.3d 1272, 1278 (5th Cir. 1997).
The affidavit attached to the second
warrant requested authorization to search for
methamphetamine and equipment used to pro-
duce it. The affidavit contained (1) a report
from the hospital that Watson had overdosed
on methamphetamine; (2) the identity of the
informant Lauret; (3) a statement by Lauret
that he had seen Watson in possession of
methamphetamine two days earlier and that
Watson had told him that he had gotten it from
the trailer to be searched; (4) Lauret’s
admission that he had gone with Watson to
Shaw’s trailer to purchase methamphetamine;
and (5) Lauret’s statement that he believed
methamphetamine was manufactured at the
trailer. The officers reasonably relied on the
sufficiency of the affidavit in executing the
search warrant. Cf. Cisneros, 112 F.3d at
1279 (upholding the sufficiency of an affidavit
based on the statement of an informant with
personal knowledge of a drug operation).

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Therefore, the Shaws have not
demonstrated that the good-faith exception to
the exclusionary rule should not apply.
Because the law enforcement officials acted in
good faith, we need not reach the question of
probable cause.
III.
Cyndia Shaw contends that the
government’s evidence shows only that she
had a serious drug problem. She submits that
Walter Shaw was primarily responsible for the
manufacturing activity and that the evidence
against her was insufficient to support the
conspiracy verdict.
We review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, and it is sufficient if
the trier of fact could have found that the evi-
dence est ablished guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. United States v. Martinez, 190 F.3d
673, 676 (5th Cir. 1999). To prove
conspiracy, the government must show (1) the
existence of an agreement; (2) knowledge of
and intent to join it; and (3) voluntary
participation in it. Id. “A jury may find
knowledgeable, voluntary participation from
presence when it would be unreasonable for
anyone other than a knowledgeable participant
to be present.” Id.
Shaw weighed the chemicals, gassed the
methamphetamine, and wrung used filters.5
She furnished tools and supplies. She urged
Crowell to help her husband manufacture the
drug and let him live in her house to do so.
She raised money to purchase materials and
chemicals through shoplifting and returning
stolen goods. She had ingredients and
equipment used in the manufacturing process
in her car and home. Viewed in the light most
favorable to the jury verdict, the evidence is
sufficient to find that Cyndia Wright
knowingly and voluntarily participated in the
conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine.
AFFIRMED.
5 “Wringing” is a process by which
methamphetamine powder is extracted from the
filters using water and evaporation.

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