Gregorio Chavez Sobrinio v. Medical Center Visitor’s Lodge, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
January 4, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
06-20671
GREGORIO CHAVEZ SOBRINIO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MEDICAL CENTER VISITOR’S LODGE, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas
Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Gregorio Chavez Sobrinio brought this suit against his former
employer, Medical Center Visitor’s Lodge (“MCVL”). He complains
that he was paid below the minimum wage and was not properly
compensated for overtime, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (“FLSA”). 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19.
While MCVL disputes the substantive charges, the threshold
question is whether Sobrinio is covered by the FLSA through his
employment with MCVL. Sobrinio argues that he is entitled to the
FLSA’s protections because he was “engaged in interstate commerce”

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when performing his job duties. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). The district
court disagreed and granted MCVL’s motion for summary judgment,
finding that Sobrinio was not covered by the FLSA.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo. Fiesel v. Cherry, 294 F.3d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 2002).
Sobrinio’s sole challenge is to the district court’s finding that
he was not “engaged in commerce” under the FLSA. This leaves
Sobrinio with a relatively difficult argument under the FLSA, as
“[t]he test of whether one is in commerce is obviously more
exacting than the test of whether his occupation is necessary to
production for commerce.” Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126,
131 (1944).
Sobrinio was a full-time employee of MCVL. MCVL is an 18-room
motel that houses patients (and their families) seeking treatment
at the Texas Medical Center in Houston. Sobrinio provided a
variety of services. He acted as a janitor, security guard and a
driver for the motel’s guests, who were often from out of town.
Importantly, Sobrinio only drove the guests to and from the Texas
Medical Center and nearby stores; he did not drive them to or from
any airport or other interstate transportation center. See
Marshall v. Victoria Transp. Co., Inc., 603 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir.
1979); Airlines Transp., Inc. v. Tobin, 198 F.2d 249 (4th Cir.
1952).
To determine whether these activities amount to Sobrinio being

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personally engaged in interstate commerce, we apply a practical
test. “The test is whether the work is so directly and vitally
related to the functioning of an instrumentality or facility of
interstate commerce as to be, in practical effect, a part of it,
rather than isolated local activity.” Mitchell v. H.B. Zachry Co.,
362 U.S. 310, 324 (1960) (citation omitted). There is no de
minimis requirement. “[A]ny regular contact with commerce, no
matter how small, will result in coverage.” Marshall, 603 F.2d at
1124. It is Sobrinio’s burden to prove that the FLSA applies to
him. Warren Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U.S. 88, 90 (1942).
Given the facts that Sobrinio alleges, we agree with the
district court that his activities are purely local in nature and
fall outside the FLSA’s protections. Sobrinio draws attention to
his activity transporting out-of-state patrons, pointing to cases
finding that transporters are covered by the FLSA. See, e.g.,
Marshall, 603 F.2d 1122 (bus operators that transport passengers to
international transportation points covered); Airlines, 198 F.2d
249 (limousine drivers contracted exclusively to take passengers to
and from airport covered).
But Sobrinio relies on cases, unlike his, that involve
employees transporting travelers to and from interstate and
international transportation points. Those cases might control if
Sobrinio transported motel patrons to and from the airport in
Houston, for instance, but he makes no such allegation.

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This Court has found employees engaged in commerce when “their
work was entwined with a continuous stream of [interstate] travel.”
Marshall, 603 F.2d at 1125 (emphasis added). Sobrinio’s driving
activities cannot be viewed as part of a constant stream of
interstate travel, since his passengers were not in the midst of
such travel. Their interstate travel terminated when they first
reached the MCVL and did not start again until they ultimately
departed.
That many of the motel guests were out-of-state does not alter
the local quality of Sobrinio’s work. His activities took place
outside the stream of travel, after MCVL guests arrived from out-
of-state and before they began their departure journeys. His job
description amounts to nothing more than providing local
transportation for motel patrons.
Sobrinio fails to satisfy his burden of showing that he was
engaged in interstate commerce, and he therefore is not entitled to
the FLSA’s protections based on the facts alleged. Accordingly, we
agree with the district court and AFFIRM its judgment.

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