Strong v. Amoco Production

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
February 15, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________
m 05-30153
_______________
ALAN STRONG, ETC.; ET AL.
Plaintiffs,
ALAN STRONG,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR
ON BEHALF OF LINDSEY STRONG ESTATE, ON BEHALF OF CHELSEY STRONG ESTATE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
B.P. EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________
Appeal From the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
m 6:03-CV-362
_____________________________________

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Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and
SMITH, Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
B.P. Exploration & Production, Inc.
(“B.P.”), appeals the denial of summary judg-
ment, asserting that Alan Strong’s tort claim is
time-barred. Finding that federal maritime law
provides the operative statute of limitations,
we reverse and remand.
I.
In October 1998, Amoco Production Com-
pany (“Amoco”), B.P.’s predecessor in inter-
est, employed Cardinal Wireline Services
(“Cardinal”) to plug an oil well that had been
drilled on the outer continental shelf, off the
coast of Louisiana but outside the state’s ter-
ritorial limit. Strong was a member of the Car-
dinal crew transported to the Amoco oil plat-
form by a utility boat. A liftboat was jacked
up next to the platform to provide additional
workspace for the various operations at the
well.
When the Cardinal crew arrived, the deck
of the liftboat was cluttered with the equip-
ment of an electric line crew that had not yet
finished its work. Because the platform deck
was too small for the wireline equipment,
Strong inquired whether some of the electric
line equipment could be moved from the deck
of the liftboat. An Amoco supervisor respond-
ed that the electric line equipment had to
remain where it was until the electric line work
was completed. The supervisor told the Cardi-
nal crew that because the weather was deterio-
rating, he had to send the utility boat back to
shore. Strong and his crew therefore had to
unload their equipment under existing condi-
tions.
The crew needed to use the liftboat crane to
unload its equipment. The only available space
for the wireline equipment, however, was
directly underneath the crane. The crane could
not boom high enough to place the equipment
there. As a result, when the crane picked up
the tool boxes, the Cardinal crew had to swing
the boxes over to the empty space. Two large
tool boxes were ultimately placed near the
base of the crane, close to one another.
After unloading its equipment, the crew
waited for the electric line work to be com-
pleted, then performed the wireline services.
When it was finished, the crew had to put its
equipment back in the boxes on the liftboat
and await transportation to shore by the lift-
boat or a utility boat.
Strong alleges that there was inadequate
room to load the tool boxes properly on ac-
count of the position of the boxes and the clut-
ter on the liftboat deck caused by the still-pres-
ent electric line equipment. Because of the
lack of space, Strong chose to load the equip-
ment by picking up the tools and swinging
them to another crewman who was standing in
between the tool boxes. When the crew was
almost finished loading its tools, Strong picked
up a “stuffing box” and swung it to the crew-
man standing between the tool boxes. The
crewman failed to catch the box, which swung
back to Strong, who managed to catch it but
injured his back.
II.
In February 2003, Strong, individually and
on behalf of his minor children, together with
his wife, sued B.P. in federal court for, inter
alia, lost wages, pain and suffering, and loss of
consortium resulting from the injury, which
Strong contends was caused by Amoco’s neg-
ligence in creating an unsafe work environ-
ment. He alleges jurisdiction under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), 43

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U.S.C. §§ 1331 et seq., and asserts that
Louisiana’s one-year statute of limitations on
his tort claim, incorporated as federal law by
OCSLA, was tolled while he received benefits
under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act (“LHWCA”), such that the
prescriptive period had not run when he sued.
B.P. moved for summary judgment, arguing
that federal maritime law applies of its own
force and provides a three-year statute of
limitations that bars Strong’s claim. The dis-
trict court denied B.P.’s motion without opin-
ion but certified its ruling for immediate appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). We granted B.P.
leave to appeal.
III.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure provides that summary judgment
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). We review the denial of
summary judgment de novo using the criteria
employed by the district court. Patterson v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 335 F.3d 476, 487 (5th Cir.
2003).
IV.
OCSLA
provides comprehensive choice-of-law
rules and federal regulation to a wide
range of act ivity occurring beyond the
territorial waters of the states on the
outer continental shelf of the United
States . . . . [I]t applies federal law to
certain structures and devices on the
OCS, incorporates state law into federal
law on the OCS, and applies the
LHWCA to certain injuries sustained by
persons working on the OCS.
Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., Inc., 280 F.3d
492, 495-96 (5th Cir. 2002). If state law, as
incorporated by OCSLA, governs Strong’s
tort claim, the one year liberative prescription
period for delictual actions under Louisiana
law was tolled by Strong’s receipt of benefits
under the LHWCA. See Cormier v. Clemco
Servs. Corp., 48 F.3d 179, 183 (5th Cir.
1995). The parties do not dispute that if
Louisiana law must be borrowed under
OCSLA, Strong’s complaint is timely.
Three conditions must be met before state
law is adopted as surrogate federal law under
OCSLA: “(1) The controversy must arise on
a situs covered by OCSLA (i.e. the subsoil,
seabed, or artificial structures permanently or
temporarily attached thereto). (2) Federal
maritime law must not apply of its own force.
(3) The state law must not be inconsistent with
[f]ederal law.” Union Tex. Petroleum Corp. v.
PLT Eng’g, Inc., 895 F.2d 1043, 1047 (5th
Cir. 1990). By not contesting Strong’s argu-
ments that (1) and (3) are satisfied, B.P. im-
plicitly concedes that those conditions have
been met. The sole issue is whether federal
maritime law applies of its own force.
Under federal maritime law, “a suit for re-
covery of damages for perso nal injury or
death, or both, arising out of a maritime tort,
shall not be maintained unless commenced
within three years from the date the cause of
action accrued.” 46 App. U.S.C. § 763a. If
maritime law does apply of its own force,
Strong’s claim is time-barred because he sued
B.P. more than four years after he was injured.

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It is settled that
a party seeking to invoke federal admiralty
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333(1) over a tort claim must satisfy
conditions both of location and of connec-
tion with maritime activity. A court apply-
ing the location test must determine wheth-
er the tort occurred on navigable water or
whether injury suffered on land was caused
by a vessel on navigable water. The con-
nection test raises two issues. A court,
first, must “assess the general features of
the type of incident involved,” to determine
whether the incident has “a potentially dis-
ruptive impact on maritime commerce.”
Second, a court must determine whether
“the general character” of the “activity giv-
ing rise to the incident” shows a “substan-
tial relationship to traditional maritime ac-
tivity.”
Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534
(1995) (internal citations omitted). The key
inquiry is whether the allegedly tortious activ-
ity is “so closely related to activity traditionally
subject to admiralty law that the reasons for
applying special admiralty rules would apply in
the suit at hand.” Id. at 539-40.
Strong argues that federal maritime law
does not apply because he was injured while
performing wireline work. He contends that
the requisite “maritime connection” is missing
because contracts for wireline services are
generally considered nonmaritime in nature.
Furthermore, he alleges that although his in-
jury occurred on the liftboat, a vessel on nav-
igable water, the use of that vessel was merely
incidental to the wireline work done on the
platform. Strong asserts that because the lift-
boat was being used as additional workspace
for the platform, it was Amoco’s decisions as
a platform-owner supervising wireline and
other nonmaritime work, rather than its deci-
sions as a time charterer of a vessel, that
caused the deck clutter that precipitated the
injury.
B.P. counters with four independent argu-
ments why its alleged negligence is maritime in
nature. First, B.P. asserts that failing to pro-
vide a safe workplace on a vessel is a tradi-
tional maritime tort. Second, B.P. contends
that Amoco’s alleged negligence (1) in calling
the utility boat to bring the wireline crew to
the platform while the electrical crew was still
working, (2) in sending the utility boat back to
shore after the wireline crew had been unload-
ed, and (3) in failing to send the liftboat back
to shore to unload the electric line equipment
is maritime in nature because each decision
related to Amoco’s status as the charterer.
Third, B.P. argues that loading and unloading
equipment onto and from a vessel is a tradi-
tional maritime activity. Finally, B.P. urges
that “[p]roviding compensation for shipboard
injuries is a traditional function of the admi-
ralty laws.” Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp.,
61 F.3d 1113, 1119 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
We agree with B.P. that failing to provide
a safe workplace aboard a vessel is a maritime
tort. The liftboat, although jacked up and not
“under sail,” qualifies as a vessel on navigable
waters. See Demette, 280 F.3d at 498 n.18.
Thus, the location requirement of Grubart is
satisfied. Furthermore, a shipowner, or char-
terer in control of a vessel, owes a duty of care
to those working on the vessel “with respect
to the condition of the ship’s gear, equipment,
tools, and work space.” Scindia Steam Navi-
gation Co. v. de los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 167
(1981). The Supreme Court has consistently
applied maritime law to actions arising out of
a failure adequately to satisfy that duty. See
id.; see also Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co.,

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512 U.S. 92 (1994). Thus, by asserting that
his injury was caused by the cluttered, unsafe
condition of the liftboat deck, Strong has stat-
ed a maritime tort claim.
Because Strong has alleged a traditional
maritime tort, federal maritime law applies of
its own force, precluding incorporation of
state law under OCSLA and prescribing
Strong’s claim. We thus find it unnecessary to
address B.P.’s remaining arguments regarding
the maritime nature of its alleged negligence.
The order denying B.P.’s motion for sum-
mary judgment is REVERSED. Because this
matter is before us on interlocutory appeal
rather than final judgment, it is REMANDED
so that the district court can enter summary
judgment for B.P. and can entertain any fur-
ther proceedings that may be appropriate.

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