Brennan v. Mercedes Benz USA, et al

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
October 5, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________
m 03-21127
_______________
JOHN BRENNAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
MERCEDES BENZ USA;
UNIVERSAL TECHNICAL INSTITUTE,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
_________________________
Before JONES, SMITH, and STEWART,
Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff John Brennan appeals a summary
judgment in favor of defendants Mercedes
Benz USA (“Mercedes”) and United Technical
Institute of Texas, Inc. (“UTI”). The district
court dismissed Brennan’s claim of employ-
ment discrimination under title I of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12112-12117, because Brennan could not
prove “the requisite employer-employee rela-
tionship to have standing to sue” under the
ADA. Brennan further appeals the summary
judgment on his claim of intentional infliction
of emotional distress with respect to which the
district court found that Brennan could not
demonstrate the necessary conduct. Agreeing
with both determinations, we affirm.

-- 1 of 5 --

2
I.
In February 1999, Brennan enrolled in
UTI’s entry-level automotive mechanic school.
He suffers from learning disabilities in the form
of dyslexia and attention deficit disorder.
While at UTI, he requested and received
numerous accommodations for his disabilities,
including untimed tests, oral tests, color over-
lays, extra tutoring, and other assistance. He
graduated from UTI in June 2000.
Although UTI’s program focuses on basic
entry-level automotive skills, its affiliate cor-
poration, Custom Training Group, Inc.
(“CTG”), provides more advanced training
that focuses on automobiles from specific
manufacturers. Brennan’s performance at UTI
earned him admission into CTG’s Mercedes
Benz Elite post-graduate training program (the
“Elite Program”). CTG maintains separate
staffs and facilities from UTI, and is also com-
pletely independent from Mercedes. Merced-
es, however, does provide funding for CTG
and works with CTG in establishing admis-
sions and failure standards and developing a
curriculum that will enable CTG’s students to
gain employment with a Mercedes Benz deal-
ership.
Admission into the Elite Program, however,
is not an offer of employment. In fact, pro-
gram graduates never end up employed by
Mercedes (a parts distribution entity), but
rather seek employment from independent
Mercedes Benz dealerships and service cen-
ters. Brennan admits that he never received
wages, benefits, or compensation of any kind
from UTI, CTG (which was not named as a
defendant), or Mercedes.
On January 29, 2001, Brennan began his
training in CTG’s Elite Program under the im-
pression that accommodations similar to those
he received at UTI would be made available to
him at CTG. Despite his requests for these
accommodations, CTG refused to accommo-
date his disability, allegedly informing him,
“We don’t do that here.” After failing an
exam, Brennan was removed from the Elite
Program on April 9, 2001.
Brennan filed a charge of employment dis-
crimination with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission and received a right to
sue letter. He then sued, alleging violations of
the ADA and intentional infliction of emotional
distress The district court held that he lacked
standing to bring his ADA claim and could not
demonstrate evidence sufficient to support his
claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress
II.
A.
We review a summary judgment de novo
and are bound by the same standards as those
employed by the district court. See Chaplin v.
NationsCredit Corp., 307 F.3d 368, 371 (5th
Cir. 2002). Namely, summary judgment is ap-
propriate only where “‘the pleadings, deposi-
tions, answers to interrogatories, and admis-
sions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any,’ when viewed in the light most favorable
to the non-movant, ‘show that there is no gen-
uine issue as to any material fact.’” TIG Ins.
Co. v. Sedgwick James, 276 F.3d 754, 759
(5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)).
Once the moving party has demonstrated that
the non-moving party has no evidence such
that a reasonable jury could support a verdict
in its favor, t he non-moving party must put
forth specific facts that demonstrate a genuine
factual issue for trial. Id.
B.
Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination

-- 2 of 5 --

3
in employment-related decisions based on the
disability of an otherwise qualified individual.
Specifically, § 12112(a) provides, “[n]o cov-
ered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the
disability of such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advance-
ment or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment.” Id.
Brennan contends that this provision com-
pels entities such as UTI and Mercedes to pro-
vide accommodations for his disabilities as part
of the “job training” component of section
12112. Nevertheless, the district court held,
and the defendants argue strenuously on ap-
peal, that the ADA does not provide a cause of
action where the plaintiff is not in an employ-
ment relationship with, or an applicant for em-
ployment with, the defendant. Because Bren-
nan could not demonstrate such an employ-
ment relationship, the district court concluded
that the ADA did not confer standing.
This court has yet to address the proper
scope of standing under title I. Facing similar
questions, other circuits have adopted the
reading favored by the district court in this
caseSSi.e., requiring the existence of an em-
ployment relationship. In McGuinness v.
Univ. of N.M., 170 F.3d 974, 979 (10th Cir.
1998), the court rejected a suit by a medical
student who claimed discrimination, because
the lack of compensation received by students
for their work foreclosed the possibility of
finding the requisite employment relationship
required to bring a claim under Title I.1
Under the text of the ADA, plaintiffs such
as Brennan cannot state a viable claim. Sec-
tion 12112 specifically discusses employment
opportunities. Its only provision under which
Brennan can attempt to find shelter is its ref-
erence to “job training.” This phrase, how-
ever, when read in context, is equally unhelpful
to Brennan.2
The entirety of § 12112 affords protection
to “qualified individuals with a disability,” in
the context of employment decisions. Under
Brennan’s reading of the statute, every educa-
tional institution in which a student received
tutelage that may one day be useful in the pro-
curement of employment would be compelled
by the ADA to provide the accommodations
1Two district courts have concluded that
plaintiffs situated as Brennan is (i.e., lacking a
(continued...)
1(...continued)
active or prospective employment relationship)
cannot state a viable claim under Title I. See
Collins v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 262 F. Supp.
2d 959 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (rejecting claim of a
spouse of an allegedly discriminatorily-treated
former employee); Foote v. Folks, Inc., 864 F.
Supp. 1327, 1328 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (conclud-
ing that the legislative history of the ADA
indicates it was intended to protect job appli-
cants and employees). Similarly, other circuits
have rejected claims under Title I of the ADA
where the plaintiff was a former employee and no
longer was an applicant for that position or was
unable to perform the essential job functions as the
“qualified individual” provision of the statute
requires. See, e.g., Weyer v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir.
2000).
2 Cf. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132
(1993) (noting that it is a “fundamental principle of
statutory construction (and, indeed, of language
itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be de-
termined in isolation, but must be drawn from the
context in which it is used”).

-- 3 of 5 --

4
Brennan sought at CTG. We reject this
reasoning.
Therefore, although it is obvious that Bren-
nan and others are enrolled in CTG’s Elite
program with an eye toward receiving training
that would help them gain employment from a
small group of specific employers (i.e., Mer-
cedes Benz dealerships and service centers), it
is equally manifest that no such employment
relationship yet existed. As noted above,
Brennan never received compensation for his
“work” at the Elite program (either from Mer-
cedes, UTI, or even CTG), nor did he ever ap-
ply for employment with any of the named
defendants. As a result, district court was en-
tirely correct in granting summary judgment
with respect to Brennan’s ADA claim.
Brennan’s brief makes repeated references
to statutory provisions that neither formed the
basis of his complaint nor have any relevance
to its allegations. Brennan’s reliance, there-
fore, on the Individual with Disabilities in Ed-
ucation Act, title II of the ADA, and the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973 is therefore misplaced.3
C.
In Texas, for a plaintiff to prevail on a claim
of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
he must demonstrate that the defendant acted
intentionally or recklessly, that the conduct
was extreme and outrageous, and that the
conduct caused him severe emotional distress.
Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Cos. v. Sears, 84
S.W.3d 604, 610 (Tex. 2002). In determining
whether alleged conduct is sufficiently outra-
geous to fall under the ambit of the cause of
action, the Texas courts have warned that the
conduct must have been “’so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to
be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolera-
ble in a civilized society.’” Twyman v. Twy-
man, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1993) (quot-
ing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
cmt. d).4
Brennan claims that defendants’ conduct
meets this “utterly intolerable”5 level of mis-
behavior in that he was not offered the accom-
modations for his disability that he believed
were necessary to his success. As a result,
Brennan alleges he suffered emotional distress
because, in his own words, “I have lost my
chances of what I wanted to do with my life to
work on Mercedes Benz cars.”
The district court appears quite correct in
its conclusion that Brennan has been unable to
demonstrate any evidence suggesting the sort
of “severe” distress that is required for recov-
ery under this cause of action.6 But, putting
the nature of the alleged distress aside, Bren-
nan cannot demonstrate a scintilla of evidence
suggesting the defendants’ conduct constituted
3 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (does not apply
to post-secondary institutions); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12131-12134 (deals solely with “public enti-
ties,” defined as instrumentalities of state of local
governments); 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-795 (applies only
to entities receiving federal financial support).
4 See also Hughes Training, Inc. v. Cook, 254
F.3d 588, 594 (5th Cir. 2001) (recognizing Texas’s
requirements for claims of intentional infliction of
emotional distress).
5 Hughes Training, 254 F.3d at 594 (citing
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Bertrand, 37 S.W.3d 1,
13 (Tex. App.SSTyler 2000, pet. denied)).
6 GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d
605, 618 (Tex. 1999) (requiring emotional distress
that is “so severe that no reasonable person could
be expected to endure it”).

-- 4 of 5 --

5
anything near the sort of outrageous behavior
needed to support a claim for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress
Brennan concedes that UTI granted him the
accommodations he desired while he was a
student in UTI’s entry-level training program,
and Brennan’s brief does not even make a
cursory attempt to address this deficiency, so
summary judgment was proper. Additionally,
because Mercedes’s participation in the CTG
Elite Program is limited to establishing stan-
dards and developing curriculum, Brennan
cannot even muster evidence demonstrating
contact with Mercedes, let alone contact of the
outrageous sort necessary to support his claim.
AFFIRMED.

-- 5 of 5 --