United States v. Granado

REVISED SEPTEMBER 12, 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-51007
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
GILBERT ARREOLA GRANADO,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Texas
August 14, 2002
Before JOLLY, DUHÉ, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
DUHÉ, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal of the district court’s denial of a motion
to suppress evidence obtained during a vehicle stop. Because we
find the vehicle stop violated the Fourth Amendment, and the
government did not show that the seizure was not the product of
that Fourth Amendment violation, we REVERSE the denial of the
suppression motion, VACATE the convictions, and REMAND with
instructions to suppress.

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1 The frame did not block the letters or numbers on the plate.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Texas Department of Public Safety trooper Jimmy Schroeder
(“Schroeder”) was driving south on Interstate 35 in Williamson
County, Texas when he noticed a minivan traveling in the opposite
direction. The minivan lacked a front license plate, which is
required of vehicles registered in Texas, but not of vehicles
registered in many other states. Schroeder made a u-turn and
followed the van to determine whether it was registered in Texas,
and thus in violation of the law.
Schroeder was unable to read the name of the state that had
issued the plate, because a license plate frame partially blocked
its name.1 He stopped the vehicle because if it was registered in
Texas, the lack of a front license plate would be a violation of
Texas law; and because he thought that the license plate frame
obstructed the license plate, constituting a violation of Texas
law. As he approached the van, Schroeder determined that the plate
was issued in Coahuila, a Mexican state.
Nonetheless, he proceeded to the driver’s side door of the
van, opened it, and asked Appellant Gilbert Arreola Granado, the
driver for his driver’s license. This began a lengthy stop that
included extensive questioning, a frisking, and a search of the
van. That search revealed methamphetamine and cocaine, and
Schroeder arrested Appellant. Appellant later admitted he was being

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paid to transport contraband.
A two-count indictment charged that Appellant possessed
cocaine and methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), § 841(b)(1)(A), and § 841(b)(1)(B).
Appellant moved to suppress the drugs and his statements to
Schroeder, arguing they were the product of an illegal search and
seizure, because the vehicle stop violated the Fourth Amendment.
After a hearing, the district court denied the motion and
Appellant’s motion to reconsider. Appellant entered a conditional
guilty plea to both counts, expressly reserving in writing the
right to appeal the district court’s denial of the suppression
motion. After sentencing, Appellant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review
factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.
United States v. Kelley, 140 F.3d 596, 601 (5th Cir. 1998).
The decision to stop an automobile is constitutional “where
the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation
has occurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct.
1769, 1772, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996). A trooper’s incorrect belief
that a motorist is in violation of state traffic laws is
insufficient to justify a vehicle stop. United States v. Lopez-
Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 288 (5th Cir. 1999).
Schroeder stopped Appellant because he believed the lack of a

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front license plate or the “obscured” rear license plate violated
Texas law. However, he determined before reaching the van that it
was not registered in Texas, so the lack of a front license plate
was not an objective reason to continue the stop. Therefore, the
only potential justification for the continued stop is that the
license plate was obscured in violation of Texas law.
The Texas statute governing license plate display makes it an
offense to display a license plate that, among other things:
(5) has letters, numbers, or other identification marks
that because of blurring matter are not plainly visible
at all times during daylight;
(6) is a sticker, decal, or other insignia that is not
authorized by law and that interferes with the
readability of the letters or numbers on the plate; or
(7) has a coating, covering, or protective material that
distorts angular visibility or detectability.
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 502.409 (Vernon Supp. 2002). Unless
Appellant’s license plate violated that statute, the stop was
unlawful.
Appellant’s license plate does not violate the Texas statute.
We strictly construe the Texas Transportation Code. United States
v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998). A photograph of the
“obscured” plate is in evidence. Visibility of identifying marks on
Appellant’s plate is not obscured by “blurring matter”. There is no
“sticker, decal, or other insignia” that interferes with

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2 We decline to stretch the meaning of the word “insignia” to
include a license plate frame.
3 The government cites an unpublished Texas case, Rivera v.
Texas, 2001 WL 1249994 (Tex. App. – Houston (1 Dist.)), for the
proposition that it is illegal to cover a license plate with a
clear plastic coating. That case is factually distinct from the
case at bar, which involves no such covering. Moreover, unpublished
opinions do not constitute authority.
5
readability.2 Nor is there a “coating, covering, or protective
material” disturbing angular visibility.3 There is only a license
plate frame, and that alone does not violate Texas law, under the
facts of this case. The statute is specific in what it prohibits
and the district court erred in construing it more liberally.
The government’s comparison to United States v. Casas, 1999 WL
33290609 (W.D. Tex. 1999), where a district court upheld a vehicle
stop, fails. There, the vehicle was stopped pursuant to a United
States Customs Office-issued request to stop all vehicles matching
a certain description, because of suspected drug activity. No such
suspicion of unlawful activity existed here. Moreover, the vehicle
in Casas had no license plate at all, a clear violation of the law.
Because the stop was unreasonable, the resulting search and
seizure were also illegal. United States v. Frisbie, 550 F.2d 335,
338 (5th Cir. 1977). All evidence derived from an illegal search or
seizure must be suppressed, unless the government shows there was
a break in the chain of events sufficient to refute the inference
that the evidence was the product of the Fourth Amendment
violation. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254,

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2261-62, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975). We examine the totality of the
circumstances, focusing especially on (1) the temporal proximity of
the violation and the discovery of the evidence or statement; (2)
the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and
flagrancy of the initial misconduct. Id.
The drugs found in the van and Appellant’s statements derived
directly and immediately from the unlawful stop. They were
temporally related to the illegal stop, as they occurred within
minutes. Any possible intervening circumstances came so close on
the heels of the stop as to remain tainted with that illegality.
Finally, the violation of Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights was
unmistakable. Therefore, the drugs and statements must be
suppressed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the denial of the
suppression motion, VACATE the convictions, and REMAND with
instructions to suppress.

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