United States of America v. CLAUDE LEE COLES, JR., a/k/a Cheese

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4050
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CLAUDE LEE COLES, JR., a/k/a Cheese,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:09-cr-00332-JAG-1)
Submitted: August 25, 2016 Decided: August 29, 2016
Before NIEMEYER, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Caroline S. Platt,
Appellate Attorney, Carolyn V. Grady, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney,
Olivia L. Norman, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

-- 1 of 4 --

2
PER CURIAM:
Claude Lee Coles, Jr., appeals from the district court’s
judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to
60 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Coles argues that this
sentence is procedurally and substantively plainly unreasonable.
We affirm.
This court will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation
of supervised release “if it is within the statutory maximum and
is not ‘plainly unreasonable.’” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d
638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Crudup, 461
F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006)). When reviewing whether a
revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first assess the
sentence for unreasonableness, “follow[ing] generally the
procedural and substantive considerations that we employ in our
review of original sentences.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438. A
supervised release revocation sentence is procedurally
reasonable if the district court considers the Sentencing
Guidelines’ Chapter Seven advisory policy statement range and
explains the sentence adequately after considering the policy
statements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors it is
permitted to consider in a supervised release revocation case.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. A
revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the district
court states a proper basis for concluding the defendant should

-- 2 of 4 --

3
receive the sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum. See
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if a sentence is found
procedurally or substantively unreasonable will we “then decide
whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 439
(emphasis omitted). A sentence is plainly unreasonable if it is
clearly or obviously unreasonable. Id.
Coles contends that his 60-month revocation sentence is
procedurally and substantively unreasonable because the district
court did not sufficiently consider a sentence within the
advisory policy statement range of 7 to 13 months’ imprisonment.
Contrary to Coles’ assertion, however, the record makes clear
that the district court heard his arguments in mitigation at the
revocation hearing but rejected them in light of the nature and
circumstances of his violative behavior, his history and
characteristics, deterrence for other members of the SCORE drug
treatment program, and the need for the revocation sentence to
sanction his breach of trust on release, all factors the court
was permitted to consider in imposing a revocation sentence.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), 3583(e); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(b) (U.S. Sentencing
Comm’n 2015) (“[A]t revocation the [district] court should
sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking
into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the
underlying violation and the criminal history of the

-- 3 of 4 --

4
violator.”). We therefore conclude that the revocation sentence
is not procedurally or substantively unreasonable and affirm the
district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

-- 4 of 4 --